United States v. Kimberly Jones , 547 F. App'x 199 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4313
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KIMBERLY ANN JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00310-TDS-1)
Submitted: November 21, 2013 Decided: November 25, 2013
Before KING, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stacey D. Rubain, QUANDER & RUBAIN, P.A., Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Frank Joseph Chut, Jr., Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kimberly Ann Jones pled
guilty to two counts of bank fraud and one count of aggravated
identity theft. The district court sentenced her to 32 months’
imprisonment. Jones’s counsel filed a brief in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in
counsel’s view, there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
questioning the propriety of the guilty plea and the
reasonableness of the sentence. Although advised of her right
to file a pro se supplemental brief, Jones has not done so.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
In the absence of a motion in the district court to
withdraw a guilty plea, this court’s review of the plea colloquy
is for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517,
525 (4th Cir. 2002). After reviewing the plea agreement and the
transcript of the plea hearing, we conclude that the district
court fully complied with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P.
11, and that Jones’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.
We have reviewed Jones’s sentence and conclude that
the sentence imposed was reasonable. See Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381,
387 (4th Cir. 2010). The district court followed the necessary
procedural steps in sentencing Jones, appropriately treated the
Sentencing Guidelines as advisory, properly calculated and
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considered the applicable Guidelines range, and weighed the
relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors in light of Jones’s
individual characteristics and history. We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
chosen sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 41; United States v.
Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying appellate
presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentence).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. This court requires that counsel inform Jones, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Jones requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Jones. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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