Manuel Caceres-Marroquin v. Loretta Lynch , 633 F. App'x 147 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1775
MANUEL CACERES-MARROQUIN,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: January 28, 2016 Decided: February 17, 2016
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
George E. Lee, LEE IMMIGRATION LAW GROUP, Alpharetta, Georgia,
for Petitioner. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Kohsei Ugumori, Senior Litigation Counsel,
Aric A. Anderson, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Manuel Caceres-Marroquin, a native and citizen of
Guatemala, petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal from the immigration
judge’s finding that his South Carolina conviction for criminal
domestic violence was categorically a “crime of domestic
violence” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (2012) that rendered
him ineligible for cancellation of removal.
We review legal issues de novo, “affording appropriate
deference to the [Board]’s interpretation of the [Immigration
and Nationality Act] and any attendant regulations.” Li Fang
Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008). “Where
. . . the [Board] construes statutes over which it has no
particular expertise, [however,] its interpretations are not
entitled to deference.” Karimi v. Holder, 715 F.3d 561, 566
(4th Cir. 2013). Administrative findings of fact are conclusive
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude
to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012). We defer to
the Board’s factual findings under the substantial evidence
rule. Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2008).
Upon review, we conclude that the Board properly concluded
that Caceres-Marroquin’s South Carolina conviction constituted a
crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a) (2012) that rendered him
ineligible for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1227(a)(E)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2012). We therefore
deny the petition for review for the reasons stated by the
Board. See In re: Caceres-Marroquin (B.I.A. June 12, 2015). We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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