United States v. Teague , 391 F. App'x 250 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4319
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JEREMIAH LAMAR TEAGUE, a/k/a Booper,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:06-cr-00022-RLV-CH-4)
Submitted: July 29, 2010 Decided: August 12, 2010
Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joseph R. Conte, LAW OFFICES OF J.R. CONTE, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellant. Edward R. Ryan, United States Attorney, Mark A.
Jones, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jeremiah Lamar Teague pled guilty to conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine powder and cocaine
base (crack), 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006) (Count 1), and possession
of crack with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West
Supp. 2010) (Counts 8-10). He was sentenced within the advisory
guideline range to a term of 288 months imprisonment. Teague
appeals his sentence, arguing that his sentence is procedurally
and substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
Teague participated in the conspiracy for eight years.
Because he had a prior felony drug conviction, he was subject to
a mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months. His guideline range
was 235-293 months. At sentencing, Teague requested a downward
variance to remedy the disparity between sentences for crack
offenses and for cocaine powder offenses. The district court
declined to vary. The court stated that it had considered the
sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005), and the sentencing guidelines. The court explained
its sentence as follows:
The court has found that the sentence is justified in
terms of the [§] 3553(a) factors because of the need
to reflect the seriousness of the offense. Defendant
was involved in the conspiracy for a lengthy period of
time. Further, to promote respect for the law and to
provide just punishment. The other factors are taken
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into account adequately by the guidelines. And his
sentence is within the guideline range.
The court finds that his record as scored by the
probation officer does not overstate the seriousness
of the criminal history. The guideline adjustment
that has been applied by the probation officer
sufficiently addresses any disparity between crack and
powder. And the other factors fully justify the
sentence imposed.
On appeal, Teague argues that his sentence is
procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to
consider the § 3553(a) factors adequately, and substantively
unreasonable because it was greater than necessary in light of
the crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity. *
We review a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse
of discretion standard, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007), which requires consideration of both the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id. We must assess
first whether the district court properly calculated the
guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, analyzed any
arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained
the selected sentence. Id. at 49-50; see United States v. Lynn,
592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n individualized
explanation must accompany every sentence”); United States v.
*
Teague also describes the sentence as cruel and unusual,
but does not argue that it violates the Eighth Amendment. To
the extent that the issue is before us, we discern no
constitutional violation.
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Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). An extensive
explanation is not required as long as the appellate court is
satisfied “‘that [the district court] has considered the
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its]
own legal decisionmaking authority.’” United States v. Engle,
592 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)), petition for cert. filed, 78
U.S.L.W. 3764 (June 10, 2010) (No. 09-1512). Finally, we review
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, examining “the
totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it
chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United
States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
On appeal, with new counsel, Teague concedes that he
was subject to a 240-month mandatory minimum sentence. He
argues, however, that the district court’s “bare pronouncement”
that it found the sentence justified under the § 3553(a) factors
was insufficient to permit appellate review. We conclude that
the court’s explanation for the sentence was adequate and did
not amount to procedural error. The court specifically
addressed several of the § 3553(a) factors, principally, the
seriousness of the offense and the length of time Teague was
involved in the conspiracy. The court expressed its belief that
the sentence it had decided to impose would promote respect for
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the law and provide a just punishment, and noted that the other
factors were adequately taken into account in the guideline
calculation. Teague does not identify any relevant factor that
the district court failed to address nor does the record
disclose any such factor.
The claim of substantive error is similarly lacking in
merit. Teague’s sentence was within the advisory guideline
range. An appellate court “may presume that a sentence within
the properly calculated Guideline range is reasonable.” United
States v. Raby, 575 F.3d 376, 381 (4th Cir. 2009). Although the
defendant may rebut the presumption of reasonableness, Rita, 551
U.S. at 347, we conclude that Teague has not done so.
Teague contends that, because his sentence is at the
upper end of the guideline range, the district court failed to
consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity
between a defendant like himself who is guilty of a crack
offense and one who is guilty of a cocaine offense. See
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (holding that
sentencing court may consider crack/powder cocaine sentencing
ratio as basis for variance). Teague asserts that, to avoid
disparity, the district court should have sentenced him to the
240-month mandatory minimum sentence. However, in imposing the
sentence, the court stated its view that the reduction in
offense levels afforded by the 2007 amendments to the guidelines
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for crack offenses was adequate to remedy the sentencing
disparity. Kimbrough does not require the district court to go
beyond the remedy that Congress has provided.
We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the
district court. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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