United States v. Lavelton Morris , 571 F. App'x 254 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4800
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAVELTON MORRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00102-CCE-2)
Submitted: May 13, 2014 Decided: May 20, 2014
Before WILKINSON, KING, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr.,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Kyle David Pousson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lavelton Morris appeals the 156-month sentence imposed
by the district court following his guilty plea to conspiracy to
distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and 28 grams or more of
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). In
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
Morris’ counsel has filed a brief certifying that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning the calculation
of Morris’ Guidelines range and the substantive reasonableness
of the sentence. Morris has filed supplemental briefs in which
he echoes and supplements counsel’s arguments. Finding no
error, we affirm.
We review Morris’ sentence for reasonableness, using
“an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We must first review for “significant
procedural error[s],” including “improperly calculating[] the
Guidelines range, . . . failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) [(2012)] factors, . . . or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Only if we
find a sentence procedurally reasonable may we consider its
substantive reasonableness. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009).
Here, Morris first contends that the district court
should not have converted the roughly $6000 found in his
2
possession on the night of his arrest to its cocaine equivalent
when calculating his Guidelines range. Assuming, without
deciding, that there was plain error, such error did not affect
Morris’ substantial rights. See United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (discussing standard of review). Because
the actual narcotics Morris and his co-conspirator possessed at
the time of their apprehension was more than adequate to support
Morris’ base offense level, any error in converting the seized
cash to its cocaine equivalency caused no prejudice.
Moreover, there is no merit to Morris’ contention that
the district court improperly applied enhancements under U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1), (b)(12) (2012).
Morris objected to neither enhancement, and their application
was well supported by the facts recounted in Morris’ uncontested
presentence report. See United States v. Miller, 698 F.3d 699,
707 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Nelson, 6 F.3d 1049, 1056
(4th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Because the district court
adequately explained its reasoning and considered Morris’
arguments when sentencing Morris at the low end of his
Guidelines range, we conclude that the sentence is procedurally
and substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We
3
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny Morris’
motions to reconsider and to substitute counsel. This court
requires that counsel inform Morris, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Morris requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Morris. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4