United States v. Jermaine Pugh , 514 F. App'x 281 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4645
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JERMAINE PUGH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:01-cr-00252-BO-1)
Submitted: February 20, 2013 Decided: March 13, 2013
Before WYNN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Joshua L. Rogers, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jermaine Remerius Pugh appeals the district court’s
judgment finding he violated his conditions of supervised
release, revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to
twenty-four months in prison. Pugh asserts that the district
court abused its discretion when it revoked his supervised
release because he argues that the evidence did not show he
committed the violations of which he was accused. Pugh also
asserts that his sentence is plainly unreasonable because the
district court was not authorized to consider whether the
sentence reflected the seriousness of the revocation offenses
under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012). Finding
no error, we affirm.
We review a district court’s decision to revoke an
individual’s supervised release for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). To revoke
supervised release, a district court need only find a violation
of a condition of supervised release by a preponderance of the
evidence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012);
United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992).
This burden “simply requires the trier of fact to believe that
the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.”
United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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This court reviews the district court’s factual
findings for clear error. United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401,
410 (4th Cir. 2010). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if
the court reviews all the evidence and “is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 336-37 (4th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted). It is not enough for us to
conclude we would have decided the case differently. Anderson
v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). We
have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion when it found that the Government’s
evidence established Pugh violated his supervised release.
We also discern no error in the district court’s
decision to impose a twenty-four-month sentence. This court
will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release if it is within the prescribed statutory range and is
not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d
433, 438-40 (4th Cir. 2006). While a district court must
consider the Chapter Seven policy statements, U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual Ch. 7, Pt. B, and the statutory requirements
and factors applicable to revocation sentences under § 3583(e)
and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012), the district
court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke supervised
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release and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory
maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
Chapter 7 advisory policy statements and the § 3553(a) factors
it is permitted to consider in a supervised release revocation
case. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439-40.
And although the district court need not explain the reasons for
imposing a revocation sentence in as much detail as when it
imposes an original sentence, it “still must provide a statement
of reasons for the sentence imposed.” United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A revocation sentence is substantively
reasonable if the district court stated a proper basis for
concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up
to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a
sentence is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable
will this court “then decide whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable.” Id. at 439 (emphasis omitted). We have reviewed
the record and have considered the parties’ arguments and
discern no sentencing error. We therefore conclude that Pugh’s
sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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