United States v. Marion Carter, Jr. , 575 F. App'x 149 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4842
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARION W. CARTER, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District
Judge. (3:13-cr-00004-JRS-1)
Submitted: May 30, 2014 Decided: June 5, 2014
Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L.
Bryant, Appellate Attorney, Robert J. Wagner, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J.
Boente, Acting United States Attorney, Peter S. Duffey,
Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
After a jury trial, Marion W. Carter, Jr., was
convicted of two counts of robbery affecting commerce, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012), two counts of
possessing and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime
of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2012), one
count of attempted robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a),
and one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). On appeal, Carter
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting all but
the felon in possession of ammunition conviction. We affirm.
The denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal is
reviewed de novo. United States v. Strayhorn, 743 F.3d 917, 921
(4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 2014 WL 1714559 (May 27, 2014).
We review the sufficiency of the evidence by determining whether
there is substantial evidence in the record, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the Government, to support the
conviction. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could accept as adequate and sufficient to
support the finding that the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 93
(4th Cir. 2011). We assume that the factfinder resolved all
contradictions in the testimony in favor of the Government.
United States v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 563 (4th Cir. 2008).
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We must determine whether any reasonable trier of fact
could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable
doubt. United States v. Madrigal-Valadez, 561 F.3d 370, 374
(4th Cir. 2009). The focus for the court is on the complete
picture created by the evidence. United States v. Burgos, 94
F.3d 849, 863 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). We consider both
circumstantial and direct evidence, drawing all reasonable
inferences from such evidence in the Government’s favor. United
States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). “[A]s a
general proposition, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient
to support a guilty verdict even though it does not exclude
every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.” United
States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir. 2008) (conspiracy
to commit robbery) (alteration and quotation marks omitted); see
also United States v. Robinson, 177 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir.
1999) (robbery conviction supported by circumstantial evidence);
United States v. Taylor, 605 F.2d 1177, 1178 (10th Cir. 1979)
(same). If the evidence supports different interpretations, the
jury decides which interpretation to believe. Burgos, 94 F.3d
at 862. We can reverse a conviction based on insufficient
evidence only when “the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United
States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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“A Hobbs Act violation requires proof of two elements:
(1) the underlying robbery or extortion crime, and (2) an effect
on interstate commerce.” United States v. Williams, 342 F.3d
350, 353 (4th Cir. 2003). The Hobbs Act defines robbery as “the
unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the
person . . . by means of actual or threatened force, or
violence, or fear of injury . . . to his person or property
. . . at the time of the taking or obtaining.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(b)(1).
Brandishing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)
requires the showing of two elements: (1) the defendant
possessed and brandished a firearm, and (2) the defendant did so
during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense or crime of
violence. Strayhorn, 743 F.3d at 922; United States v.
Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649, 652 (4th Cir. 1997).
After viewing the evidence as a whole, we conclude
that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding
that Carter was the person responsible for the two robberies and
the attempted robbery, and that he brandished a firearm during
the two robberies. The jury was entitled to reject his alibi
defense for one of the robberies and his claim that there was
another suspect for the attempted robbery. It is the jury’s
function to weigh the credibility of witnesses and to resolve
conflicts in the evidence. United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d
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358, 387 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1278 (2013).
The jury’s determinations regarding witness credibility and
conflicting evidence will not be disturbed if supported by
substantial evidence, even if we were to draw contrary
inferences. United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL
1623072, at *6 (4th Cir. 2014).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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