Forlando Brown v. Adele Pope , 610 F. App'x 239 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1689
FORLANDO J. BROWN,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
RUSSELL L. BAUKNIGHT, Special Administrator of James Brown
Estate and Special Trustee of James Brown August 1, 2000
Irrevocable Trust Agreement,
Trustee – Appellee,
v.
ADELE J. POPE, individually and as Trustee of the Irrevocable
Trust established by James Brown in August 1, 2000,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
ROBERT L. BUCHANAN, JR., individually and as Trustee of the
Irrevocable Trust established by James Brown in August 1,
2000,
Defendant.
No. 14-1713
FORLANDO J. BROWN,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
RUSSELL L. BAUKNIGHT, Special Administrator of James Brown
Estate and Special Trustee of James Brown August 1, 2000
Irrevocable Trust Agreement,
Trustee – Appellee,
v.
ROBERT L. BUCHANAN, JR., individually and as Trustee of the
Irrevocable Trust established by James Brown in August 1,
2000,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
ADELE J. POPE, individually and as Trustee of the Irrevocable
Trust established by James Brown in August 1, 2000,
Defendant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. William O. Bertelsman, Senior
District Judge. (3:08-cv-00014-WOB-JGW)
Submitted: June 30, 2015 Decided: July 21, 2015
Before GREGORY, AGEE, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Adam T. Silvernail, MOSES & BRACKETT, PC, Columbia, South Carolina;
J. Calhoun Watson, SOWELL GRAY STEPP & LAFFITTE, L.L.C., Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellants. William W. Wilkins, Burl F.
Williams, NEXSEN PRUET, LLC, Greenville, South Carolina; J. David
Black, NEXSEN PRUET, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina; John A.
Donsbach, Sr., DONSBACH & KING, LLC, Augusta, Georgia, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Adele Pope and Robert Buchanan (Appellants) appeal the
district court’s orders granting summary judgment to Forlando
Brown on Appellants’ counterclaims, dismissing the James Brown
Irrevocable Trust as a party, denying reconsideration, and denying
Pope’s motion to certify questions of law to the Supreme Court of
South Carolina. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary
judgment. D.L. ex rel. K.L. v. Balt. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 706
F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment should be granted
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists, we view “the facts and the
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir.
2011). “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a
verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “Conclusory or speculative allegations do
not suffice, nor does a ‘mere scintilla of evidence’ in support of
[the nonmoving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power
Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002).
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With these considerations in mind, we affirm the grant of
summary judgment to Brown on all five of Appellants’ counterclaims,
substantially for the reasons stated by the district court, and we
affirm the denial of reconsideration and the motion to certify
questions to the Supreme Court of South Carolina. Brown v. Pope,
No. 3:08-cv-00014-WOB-JGW (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2014; June 16, 2014).
In addition, we note that, as to their counterclaim of fraud,
Appellants have failed to allege and support the existence of each
element of a fraud claim. As to their claim for attorney’s fees,
we have looked to other courts’ interpretations of the phrase “as
justice and equity may require” in provisions identical to S.C.
Code Ann. § 62-7-1004 (Supp. 2014), and we conclude that Appellants
have failed to establish that an award of attorney’s fees is
warranted.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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