Jeffrey Cohen v. Rod Rosenstein , 610 F. App'x 240 ( 2015 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-6157
    JEFFREY COHEN,
    Plaintiff – Appellant,
    and
    DAMIEN RILEY; CHRISTOPHER        PALMER;     KENNETH   BAINES;   MARC
    BARBER; FAISAL MAPANGALA,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    ROD ROSENSTEIN, US Attorney; HARRY GRUBER, Asst. US
    Attorney; JOYCE MCDONALD, Asst. US Attorney; LEAH BRESSACK,
    Asst. US Attorney; BRANDIS MARSH, Asst. US Attorney; MATTHEW
    HOFF, Asst. US Attorney; RACHEL YASSER, Asst. US Attorney,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Baltimore.     William D. Quarles, Jr., District
    Judge. (1:14-cv-03996-WDQ)
    Submitted:   June 11, 2015                      Decided:   July 21, 2015
    Before AGEE and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Jeffrey Brian Cohen, Appellant Pro Se.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    2
    PER CURIAM:
    Jeffrey     Brian    Cohen   appeals       the    district   court’s   orders
    dismissing without prejudice, * under 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1915
     and 1915A
    (2012), his suit against federal prosecutors brought pursuant to
    Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
    
    403 U.S. 388
     (1971), and denying his motion pursuant to Rule
    59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.                        The district
    court determined that Cohen’s complaint raised issues concerning
    the validity of the government’s ongoing criminal case against
    Cohen and, thus, should be dismissed without prejudice under the
    principles of Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
     (1994), and its
    progeny.         Because no conviction has yet occurred, we conclude
    that the district court’s dismissal under Heck is premature.
    See Wallace v. Kato, 
    549 U.S. 384
    , 393 (2007) (rejecting notion
    that       “an   action    which    would       impugn    an   anticipated    future
    conviction cannot be brought until that conviction occurs and is
    set aside”).
    *
    We have jurisdiction because Cohen cannot cure the defect
    identified in his complaint by mere amendment. See Domino Sugar
    Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 
    10 F.3d 1064
    , 1067 (4th
    Cir. 1993) (“Thus we hold that a plaintiff may not appeal the
    dismissal of his complaint without prejudice unless the grounds
    for dismissal clearly indicate that no amendment in the
    complaint could cure the defects in the plaintiff’s case.”)
    (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).
    3
    Accordingly,      we   vacate      the     district      court’s       orders    and
    remand for further proceedings in light of Wallace.                            See id. at
    393-94 (“If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has
    been convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that
    will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial),
    it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with
    common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal
    case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.”).                                   In
    considering the application of Wallace, the district court is
    free    to    consider    whether      the       case    can     be    dismissed       with
    prejudice on the merits.            See Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union
    of   the     U.S.,   Inc.,    
    446 U.S. 719
    ,    736    (1980)    (noting       that
    prosecutors are absolutely immune from monetary damages claims);
    Allen v. Burke, 
    690 F.2d 376
    , 378 (4th Cir. 1982) (same); see
    also Gladney v. Pendleton Corr. Facility, 
    302 F.3d 773
    , 775 (7th
    Cir. 2002) (noting that a dismissal for failure to state a claim
    under § 1915A(b) should be made with prejudice).                              We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately      presented     in    the   materials           before    the    court    and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    4