United States v. Monte Straite , 576 F. App'x 211 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-5031
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MONTE EMMANUEL STRAITE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:11-cr-00321-NCT-1)
Submitted: April 16, 2014 Decided: June 23, 2014
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, Niemeyer and Duncan, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David Bruce Freedman, CRUMPLER, FREEDMAN, PARKER & WITT,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand,
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, Graham T.
Green, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Christopher
Edwards, Third Year Law Student, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Monte Straite appeals his jury convictions of (1) bank
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and 2; (2) armed
bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d) and 2; (3)
carry and use, by brandishing, of firearms during and in
relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2; (4) attempted bank robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and 2; (5) attempted armed
bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d) and 2; and
(6) carry and use, by brandishing, of firearms during and in
relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2. Counts One through Three relate to
the armed robbery of a Bank of America in Advance, Davie County,
North Carolina, on April 23, 2009. Counts Four through Six
relate to the attempted armed robbery of the same bank on July
6, 2009. The district court sentenced Straite to 519 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the district court
erred in denying his Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal
and in admitting evidence of his involvement in two robberies in
2005. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, see
United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998), the
evidence adduced at trial established the following. On April
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23, 2009, at approximately 9:30 a.m., the driver of a dark-
colored minivan parked near the front door of a Bank of America
in Davie County, North Carolina. Three people dressed head-to-
toe in black, with their faces covered, and armed with several
firearms exited the minivan and ran into the bank. They carried
“fancy cloth shopping bags,” J.A. 186, and were dressed like
“ninjas,” J.A. 129. Two of the robbers forced the bank manager
and assistant manager out of their offices and into a separate
room where the vault and safe were located, striking them both
and ordering that the safe be opened. The third assailant
jumped over the teller counter and forced the two bank employees
working there to remove the money from their respective drawers.
The three robbers then ran out of the bank, taking $51,091.00.
On July 6, 2009, at approximately 4:30 p.m., the branch
manager at the same bank saw a red Jeep Cherokee enter the
parking lot at an unusually high rate of speed and back into a
parking spot near the front door. The manager and assistant
manager saw three armed individuals in black clothes exit the
vehicle. The assistant manager testified that “[i]t was three
people and they were running, much in the exact fashion that
they had before. . . . They were wearing black outfits that
looked like ninjas. . . . It looked like the same exact people.”
J.A. 138. The manager ran to the front door and locked it, then
directed the bank’s employees to move toward the back of the
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building. After briefly attempting to enter the bank, the three
individuals got back into the Jeep and drove away. The manager
told police that the driver of the Jeep was a woman.
Shortly after the attempted robbery, deputies from the
Davie County Sheriff’s Office found the Jeep abandoned in a
neighborhood near the bank. Inside, the deputies found a black
t-shirt and a cell phone belonging to Shaketha Burris. The
officers recovered the phone’s contact list and a series of text
messages to a person identified on the contact list as “Monte.”
The deputies also discovered a burgundy van parked directly
beside the Jeep 1; the bank manager later identified the van as
the one used in the April 23 robbery.
The same afternoon, a North Carolina Highway Patrol trooper
stopped a green Oldsmobile approximately 200 yards from the
bank. The driver identified herself as Shaketha Burris and told
the trooper, “I’m the one you’re looking for.” J.A. 213. The
trooper found several items of black clothing, a handgun, and a
black pistol-grip shotgun in the vehicle. Burris later
testified that she attempted to rob the bank with Straite and
two other men.
II.
1
Both the Jeep and the minivan were reported stolen from
Charlotte.
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Straite first challenges the district court’s denial of his
motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, for a
judgment of acquittal on all six counts of the indictment. We
review the district court’s denial of Straite’s motion de novo,
and “we are obliged to sustain a guilty verdict if, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the
verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” United States v.
Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Substantial evidence” is “evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. We consider both circumstantial and
direct evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences in the
government’s favor. United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333
(4th Cir. 2008).
Viewing the evidence adduced at trial in the light most
favorable to the government, we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence from which a jury could find Straite guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of all six counts of the indictment.
The government introduced the testimony of two of Straite’s
accomplices -- Burris and Andrew Atkinson -- which directly
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implicated Straite in the July 6 attempted armed robbery. 2
Further, Atkinson testified that on July 6, Straite admitted to
Atkinson that he had robbed the Bank of America before, and the
testimony from the bank manager and assistant manager
established a strong link between the July 6 attempt and the
April 23 armed robbery. Several of the witnesses testified that
Straite was armed during both incidents. The government also
introduced data from Straite’s cell phone records, showing that
he traveled from Charlotte, the city from which the minivan and
the Jeep were reported stolen, to the vicinity of the bank and
back on April 23 and July 6. Based on this evidence, a rational
trier of fact could have found Straite guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of all six counts of the indictment.
Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in
denying Straite’s Rule 29 motion.
III.
Straite also challenges the district court’s admission of
evidence that he robbed two Food Lion grocery stores in North
2
Straite argues that the evidence connecting him to the
July 6 attempted armed robbery is insufficient to support his
convictions on Counts Four, Five, and Six because the only
evidence against him is the testimony of his accomplices, who
received favorable treatment in exchange for their testimony.
However, this court does not judge the credibility of witnesses
or weigh evidence, as that role is reserved for the jury.
United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 392 (4th Cir. 1984).
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Carolina in 2005, asserting that there was “insufficient
similarity between the 2005 crime[s] and the crimes on trial”
and that the characteristics of the robberies are “of the nature
and type common to any if not all armed robberies across the
country.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. The district court admitted
the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) 3 based on its
tendency “to show by some means the identification of a person
who committed the first act and is on trial for commission of
the present act.” J.A. 156.
We review the district court’s decision to admit the
evidence for an abuse of discretion, which we will not find
unless the decision was “arbitrary and irrational.” United
States v. Byers, 649 F.3d 197, 206 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted). For evidence to be admissible under
Rule 404(b), it must be “(1) relevant to an issue other than the
general character of the defendant; (2) necessary to prove an
element of the charged offense; and (3) reliable.” United
States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d 305, 312 (4th Cir. 2004).
Additionally, the prejudicial effect of the evidence must not
3
Rule 404(b) states that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or
other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character,” but that such evidence “may be
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
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substantially outweigh its probative value. Id. Importantly,
“[a]s we have explained, Rule 404(b) is an inclusive rule.”
United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted). When a district court has
abused its discretion by improperly admitting evidence under
Rule 404(b), we determine whether the error was nonetheless
harmless by asking “whether we can say that we believe it highly
probable that the error did not affect the judgment.” United
States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 356 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the record, and
the applicable law, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the 2005 robberies
under Rule 404(b). The 2005 robberies and the 2009 armed
robbery and attempted armed robbery were substantially similar
in nature. Thus, the evidence of the 2005 robberies was
admissible under Rule 404(b) to help establish that Straite
committed the 2009 offenses. Further, assuming, as Straite
suggests, that the district court improperly admitted the
evidence, we find that any error was harmless. As discussed
above, the government introduced ample evidence of Straite’s
guilt, and “we can say with fair assurance” that any error in
admitting the contested evidence did not affect the verdict.
See id. at 355 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Straite’s convictions.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before us
and oral argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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