McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation , 756 F.3d 307 ( 2014 )


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  •                               PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-2044
    MCAIRLAIDS, INC.,
    Plaintiff – Appellant,
    v.
    KIMBERLY-CLARK CORPORATION; KIMBERLY-CLARK WORLDWIDE, INC.;
    KIMBERLY-CLARK GLOBAL SALES, LLC,
    Defendants – Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of Virginia, at Roanoke.  Samuel G. Wilson, District
    Judge. (7:12-cv-00578-SGW-RSB)
    Argued:   May 13, 2014                      Decided:   June 25, 2014
    Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and J. Michelle CHILDS,
    United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,
    sitting by designation.
    Vacated and remanded by published opinion.    Judge Duncan wrote
    the opinion, in which Judge Wynn and Judge Childs joined.
    ARGUED: Frank Kenneth Friedman, WOODS ROGERS, PLC, Roanoke,
    Virginia, for Appellant.     Andrew G. Klevorn, KATTEN MUCHIN
    ROSENMAN LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellees.        ON BRIEF:
    Joshua F.P. Long, J. Benjamin Rottenborn, Michael J. Hertz,
    WOODS ROGERS, PLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Jeffrey A.
    Wakolbinger, KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, Chicago, Illinois;
    Kevin   P.  Oddo,  LECLAIRRYAN,   PC,  Roanoke,   Virginia,  for
    Appellees.
    DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
    McAirlaids,    Inc.    filed    suit          against    Kimberly-Clark         Corp.
    for    trade-dress     infringement          and       unfair        competition       under
    §§ 32(1)(a)    and    43(a)    of    the    Trademark          Act    of    1946    (“Lanham
    Act”), 
    15 U.S.C. §§ 1114
    (1)(a) and 1125(a), and Virginia common
    law.     The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
    Kimberly-Clark, and McAirlaids appeals.                         Because questions of
    fact preclude summary judgment, we vacate and remand.
    I.
    A.
    McAirlaids    produces        “airlaid,”         a      textile-like         material
    composed of cellulose fiber.               Airlaid is used in a wide variety
    of     absorbent     goods,     including             medical        supplies,       hygiene
    products, and food packages.               To make airlaid, cellulose fiber
    is shredded into “fluff pulp,” which is arranged into loosely
    formed     sheets.      In    contrast          to     most     of    its    competitors,
    McAirlaids fuses these fluff pulp sheets through an embossing
    process that does not require glue or binders.
    McAirlaids     patented       its        pressure-fusion            process,     
    U.S. Patent No. 6,675,702
     (filed Nov. 16, 1998) (“702 Patent”), J.A.
    365–78, and the resulting product, 
    U.S. Patent No. 8,343,612
    (filed May 22, 2009) (“612 Patent”), J.A. 496–500.                                  In this
    process,    sheets    of     fluff    pulp       pass    at     very       high    pressures
    2
    between      steel   rollers     printed        with    a    raised     pattern.             The
    rollers leave an embossing pattern on the resulting material,
    and    the    high-pressure      areas     bond        the    fiber     layers        into     a
    textile-like product.           In order for McAirlaids’s fusion process
    to adequately hold together the airlaid, the embossed design
    must fall within certain general size and spacing parameters.
    McAirlaids has chosen a “pixel” pattern for its absorbent
    products:      the   high-pressure       areas       form    rows     of   pinpoint-like
    dots on the material.                McAirlaids registered this pattern as
    trade dress with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
    with    the     following       description:         “the      mark     is       a    [three-
    dimensional] repeating pattern of embossed dots” used in various
    types    of    absorbent       pads.      U.S.       Trademark        
    Registration No. 4,104,123,
     J.A. 249.
    B.
    McAirlaids initiated this lawsuit against Kimberly-Clark in
    the    Western    District      of     Virginia      after     Kimberly-Clark           began
    using   a     similar    dot    pattern    on     its       GoodNites      bed       mats,    an
    absorbent      product     manufactured         in     a     manner     different        from
    McAirlaids’s pads.
    The district court bifurcated the issues in this case.                                In
    the first phase, the only question before it was whether the dot
    pattern on McAirlaids’s absorbent products was functional, and
    thus    not    protectable      as     trade    dress.         At     this   stage,          the
    3
    district court found that the dot pattern was functional.                                        It
    determined that there were no disputes of material fact because
    McAirlaids’s           evidence             of      nonfunctionality              “consist[ed],
    essentially of its say-so.”                       McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark
    Corp., 
    2013 WL 3788660
    , No. 7:12-cv-00578-SGW-RSB, *4 (W.D. Va.
    July 19, 2013).            The district court therefore granted summary
    judgment in favor of Kimberly-Clark.                         McAirlaids appeals.
    II.
    We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment       based    on    its          finding      of   functionality.             Ga.     Pac.
    Consumer Prods., LP v. Von Drehle Corp., 
    618 F.3d 441
    , 445 (4th
    Cir. 2010).         Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no
    genuine       dispute    as       to   any       material       fact     and   the      movant    is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”                                  Fed. R. Civ. P.
    56(a).     It is an “axiom that in ruling on a motion for summary
    judgment, ‘[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed,
    and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’”
    Tolan    v.    Cotton,       134       S    Ct.    1861,     1863       (2014)    (per    curiam)
    (quoting Anderson            v.    Liberty         Lobby,       Inc.,    
    477 U.S. 242
    ,    255
    (1986)) (alteration in original).
    Functionality--the only issue presented by this case--is a
    question       of   fact      that,          like       other     factual        questions,       is
    generally put to a jury.                     In re Becton, Dickinson & Co., 675
    
    4 F.3d 1368
    ,       1372    (Fed.     Cir.        2012);        Clicks      Billiards,       Inc.    v.
    Sixshooters, Inc., 
    251 F.3d 1252
    , 1258 (9th Cir. 2001).                                              “A
    genuine question of material fact exists where, after reviewing
    the record as a whole, a court finds that a reasonable jury
    could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”                                       Dulaney v.
    Packaging       Corp.      of     Am.,    
    673 F.3d 323
    ,      330     (4th    Cir.    2012).
    Because       “[c]redibility             determinations,              the     weighing       of     the
    evidence,       and      the    drawing       of        legitimate       inferences         from    the
    facts    are     jury      functions,             not    those     of    a    judge,”       we     must
    determine       whether         the      evidence          in     this       case    “presents       a
    sufficient          disagreement         to       require       submission to          a    jury     or
    whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
    matter of law.”            Liberty Lobby, 
    477 U.S. at 255
    , 251–52.
    III.
    Trademark law indefinitely protects designs that “identify
    a product with its manufacturer or source.”                                    TrafFix Devices,
    Inc.    v.    Marketing         Displays,          Inc.,        
    532 U.S. 23
    ,     28    (2001).
    Patent       law,     on    the     other         hand,     “encourage[s]            invention      by
    granting       inventors        a     monopoly           over    new     product       designs      or
    functions for a limited time.”                          Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods.
    Co., 
    514 U.S. 159
    , 164 (1995).                             The so-called “functionality
    doctrine       prevents         trademark           law,        which       seeks     to     promote
    competition         by     protecting         a    firm’s        reputation,         from    instead
    5
    inhibiting          legitimate          competition      by     allowing         a    producer          to
    control    a     useful         product     feature.”           
    Id.
            Therefore,            when     a
    company    wants          to    protect     a    functional       feature            of   a    product
    design, it must turn to patent law rather than trademark law.
    Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 
    676 F.3d 144
    , 161 (4th Cir.
    2012).         It    also       follows     that       proof     of    a    design          element’s
    functionality is a complete defense in a trademark-infringement
    action.     Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 
    9 F.3d 1091
    ,
    1102    (4th     Cir.          1993).      Although       the    functionality                doctrine
    originated in the common law, it has now been incorporated into
    the Lanham Act, which prohibits registration of trade dress that
    is “as a whole . . . functional.”                      
    15 U.S.C. § 1052
    (e).
    A   product             feature      is     functional--and               therefore              not
    protectable as a trademark or trade dress--“if it is essential
    to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost
    or     quality       of    the     article.”            Qualitex,          
    514 U.S. at 165
    (citation       and       internal       quotation       marks        omitted).             In     other
    words, a feature is functional if “it is the reason the device
    works,”    or        its       exclusive     use       “would    put       competitors             at    a
    significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.”                                     TrafFix, 
    532 U.S. at 34, 32
     (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    On appeal, the parties agree that the pressurized bonding
    points are themselves functional because these areas actually
    fuse the layers of fluff pulp into a textile-like material.                                         The
    6
    parties, however, dispute whether McAirlaids’s chosen embossing
    pattern     is    functional.      McAirlaids           argues    that    the    district
    court erred by misapprehending the significance of its utility
    patents under TrafFix and by failing to consider the facts in
    the light most favorable to McAirlaids, the nonmoving party.                            We
    address each contention in turn.
    A.
    In TrafFix, the Supreme Court emphasized that a “utility
    patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are
    functional.”       
    532 U.S. at 29
    .       In that case, Marketing Displays,
    Inc. (“MDI”) created a mechanism to hold outdoor signs upright
    in    windy      conditions,    and     MDI       brought       suit     for    trademark
    infringement against TrafFix Devices, a competitor that copied
    its signs’ “dual-spring design.”                      
    Id.
     at 25–26.        MDI’s dual-
    spring mechanism was the “central advance” of several expired
    utility patents, which were of “vital significance in resolving
    the   trade      dress   claim.”       
    Id.
           at    29–30.     Given    the    utility
    patents and other evidence of functionality, the Court concluded
    that the dual-spring mechanism was functional rather than “an
    arbitrary flourish.”           
    Id. at 34
    .             The Court then held that it
    need not “speculat[e] about other design possibilities” because
    it    had   already      established    that          the   design   feature     “is   the
    reason the device works.”          
    Id.
     at 33–34.
    7
    The parties dispute the proper application of TrafFix to
    the present case.       Kimberly-Clark argues that McAirlaids’s pixel
    pattern is analogous to the dual-spring mechanism in TrafFix,
    and thus not protectable as trade dress.            McAirlaids, however,
    argues     that   TrafFix   is    inapplicable.     Although      TrafFix   is
    certainly instructive, we agree with McAirlaids that it can be
    distinguished on two grounds.
    First, the burden of proof is different.              In TrafFix, the
    dual-spring mechanism in question was not registered as trade
    dress with the PTO.         Therefore, under the Lanham Act, MDI had
    the “burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected
    [wa]s not functional.”           
    15 U.S.C. § 1125
    (a)(3).    In this case,
    however, McAirlaids’s pixel pattern was properly registered as
    trade dress.        J.A. 32.     Its registration serves as prima facie
    evidence     that     the   trade    dress   is   valid,    and     therefore
    nonfunctional.       
    15 U.S.C. § 1057
    (b); Christian Louboutin S.A. v.
    Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, 
    696 F.3d 206
    , 224 (2d Cir.
    2012).     The presumption of validity that accompanies registered
    trade dress “has a burden-shifting effect, requiring the party
    challenging the registered mark to produce sufficient evidence”
    to show that the trade dress is invalid by a preponderance of
    8
    the evidence. 1         Retail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publishing, 
    364 F.3d 535
    , 542 (4th Cir. 2004).                         Therefore, Kimberly-Clark--the
    party challenging a registered mark--has the burden of showing
    functionality by a preponderance of the evidence in this case,
    whereas        in   TrafFix,    MDI--the         party     seeking   protection     of    an
    unregistered mark--had the burden of proving nonfunctionality.
    Second, the utility patents in TrafFix protected the dual-
    spring         mechanism,    which    was        the    same   feature    for   which    MDI
    sought trade-dress protection.                    See TrafFix, 
    532 U.S. at 30
    .           In
    contrast, McAirlaids’s utility patents cover a process and a
    material, but do not mention a particular embossing pattern as a
    protected element.             J.A. 365–78, J.A. 496–500.                  The Court in
    TrafFix acknowledged that “a different result might obtain” when
    “a   manufacturer           seeks    to    protect        arbitrary,     incidental,     or
    ornamental aspects of features of a product found in the patent
    claims, such as arbitrary curves in the legs or an ornamental
    pattern painted on the springs.”                       TrafFix, 
    532 U.S. at 34
    .           In
    such       a   case,   the    court       must    “examin[e]     the     patent   and    its
    1
    “If sufficient evidence . . . is produced to rebut the
    presumption, the presumption is neutralized and essentially
    drops from the case.” Retail Servs., 
    364 F.3d at 543
     (citation
    and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ga.-Pac.
    Consumer Prods., LP v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 
    647 F.3d 723
    , 727
    (7th Cir. 2011).
    9
    prosecution history to see if the feature in question is shown
    as a useful part of the invention.”               
    Id.
    Here, McAirlaids’s patents cover a production process and a
    material, while the trade dress claimed is a particular pattern
    on    the   material     that    results    from    the    process.           Unlike    in
    TrafFix, therefore, the pattern is not the “central advance” of
    any     utility    patent.        See    
    532 U.S. at 30
    .      Neither       of
    McAirlaids’s patents refer to a particular embossing pattern.
    Both patents reference line-shaped as well as point- or dot-
    shaped pressure areas, but the patents also directly acknowledge
    that embossing studs of different shapes can be used, including
    lines,      pyramids,     cubes,        truncated        cones,     cylinders,         and
    parallelepipeds.         J.A. 365, 374–77, 499.            In fact, the diagrams
    of the 702 Patent show hexagonal shapes rather than circles.
    J.A. 368, 372.        Therefore, while McAirlaids’s patents do provide
    evidence      of   the   dots’   functionality,          they     are   not    the   same
    “strong evidence” as the patents in TrafFix.                        See 
    532 U.S. at 29
    .
    Because the facts of this case are different from those
    presented to the Supreme Court in TrafFix, TrafFix’s holding
    about    alternative     designs    is     inapplicable         here.     As    we   have
    noted,      TrafFix   instructed     that       courts    need    not   consider       the
    availability of design alternatives after the functionality of a
    design element has been established.                
    532 U.S. at
    33–34.           As the
    10
    Federal Circuit has observed, however, TrafFix did not hold that
    “the availability of alternative designs cannot be a legitimate
    source of evidence to determine whether a feature is functional
    in the first place.”         Valu Engineering, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp.,
    
    278 F.3d 1268
    , 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002).                      Thus, TrafFix did not
    alter     our   precedents      that        look     to     the      availability       of
    alternative     designs   when    considering,            as    an   initial       matter,
    whether     a   design    affects          product    quality         or      is    merely
    ornamental.     See, e.g., Tools USA & Equipment Co. v. Champ Frame
    Straightening Equipment Inc., 
    87 F.3d 654
    , 659 (4th Cir. 1996).
    Therefore, when we address the alleged factual disputes below,
    we consider evidence of alternative designs.
    B.
    Next, McAirlaids argues that the district court improperly
    weighed the evidence in the record when it determined that the
    pixel pattern is functional.               Kimberly-Clark contends that the
    record    clearly    indicates    that       McAirlaids         selected      its   pixel
    pattern due to functional considerations and that the embossing
    design affects the pads’ strength, absorbency, and elongation
    (i.e., stretchiness).        McAirlaids counters that it has presented
    sufficient evidence to create a genuine factual question as to
    whether    their    selection    of    a    pattern       was   a    purely    aesthetic
    choice among many alternatives.             We agree.
    11
    When       assessing       a    design    element’s          functionality,       courts
    often     look     at     (1)    the       existence        of    utility     patents,       (2)
    advertising focusing on the utilitarian advantages of a design,
    (3) the availability of “functionally equivalent designs,” and
    (4)     the      effect     of       the     design     on        manufacturing.            Valu
    Engineering,        
    278 F.3d at
       1274    (citing        In    re   Morton-Norwich
    Prods., Inc., 
    671 F.2d 1332
    , 1340–41 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).                                We thus
    review    the     evidence       relating      to     these       factors,    taken    in    the
    light     most    favorable          to    McAirlaids,       as    the    nonmoving     party,
    noting     at    the    outset        that    the     PTO    already       determined       that
    McAirlaids’s embossing pattern is not functional by registering
    it as trade dress. 2            J.A. 32.
    McAirlaids’s         fiber-fusion            process       and    resulting     material
    are patented; however, as we have pointed out, the patents do
    not extend to any specific embossing pattern or the shapes used
    therein.         See J.A. 365–78, J.A. 496–500.                          Patents for other
    nonwoven products specify that dot-shaped patterns are preferred
    for embossed bonding, but such patents also indicate that many
    designs can also be used.                  E.g., J.A. 212.
    2
    This case is not an anomaly--the PTO regularly registers
    embossing   patterns  on   nonwoven  products   as  ornamental,
    nonfunctional trade dress.    E.g., U.S. Trademark 
    Registration No. 1,968,976,
     J.A. 568; U.S. Trademark 
    Registration No. 1,924,873,
     J.A. 576; U.S. Trademark 
    Registration No. 2,988,862,
    J.A. 588.
    12
    McAirlaids officials, including the engineer who selected
    the company’s pixel pattern, have stated under oath that the
    pattern was chosen “[b]ecause it looked nice” and “[w]e liked
    it.”     J.A.    320.         Yet    the    company       has    arguably       touted   the
    pattern’s functional attributes.                  In one marketing presentation,
    McAirlaids      described        its    pads’      “unique       bonding      pattern”    as
    increasing      absorbency,         J.A.    184,    and     images       of   McAirlaids’s
    pixel pattern appeared on an advertisement referring to “German
    engineering,” J.A. 208.
    McAirlaids executives and both parties’ experts testified
    that   the    company     could      have    used    many       shapes    for    the   high-
    pressure areas that fuse the fibrous layers together: squares,
    triangles, wavy or straight lines, hearts, flowers, and so on.
    J.A.   351–52,        1427,     1478–80,      1666–68.           In   fact,     McAirlaids
    formerly produced airlaid imprinted with an embossing design of
    intersecting diagonal lines, known as the “Harschur” pattern.
    J.A. 252.     During the three-year period when it produced airlaid
    with   both     the     pixel     and      the    Harschur       patterns,      McAirlaids
    conducted quality control tests on each type of absorbent pad,
    measuring      their      weight,       thickness,         tensile        strength,      and
    elongation.       The pads’ performance tests for three measures--
    13
    weight, thickness, and tensile strength--were nearly identical. 3
    Although the elongation figures varied, both measurements were
    within the normal range for absorbent pads. 4
    Despite the wide variety of available shapes and patterns,
    the parties agree that any embossing design would be “[s]ubject
    to the suitable matching of cellulose fiber length, compression
    elements    spacing,    and    sufficient      compression    forces   to   cause
    []fiber fusion.”       J.A. 507; see also J.A. 792, Appellee’s Br. at
    29.   In other words, an embossing design must meet general size
    and spacing specifications to successfully bond the layers of
    fluff pulp.    J.A. 1373–76.
    In light of the foregoing, we determine that McAirlaids has
    presented    sufficient       evidence    to    raise   a    genuine   issue   of
    material fact regarding the functionality of its pixel pattern.
    In this particular case, deciding whether McAirlaids’s embossing
    3
    There was a one percent difference in the tensile strength
    of the two patterns. The parties agree that this difference is
    not statistically significant. J.A. 1466-68; 1559; 1669–71.
    4
    Kimberly-Clark   also   presented  evidence   from  tests
    conducted on their own absorbent products, which are made using
    a similar fiber-bonding process.        However, the scientific
    validity of these tests is disputed for two reasons. First, the
    tests were conducted on a single day by a student intern without
    supervision.   J.A. 1745–51.    Second, the products tested may
    have come from different foreign manufacturing facilities, so
    there is no proof that the products were identical but-for their
    embossing patterns.    J.A. 814–15, 1754, 1767.    Even Kimberly-
    Clark’s expert agreed that the samples used “were not rigorously
    prepared for testing.” J.A. 1701.
    14
    pattern    affects   the   quality   of    its   pads    requires    weighing
    evidence    and   making   credibility     determinations.          These   are
    functions for a jury, not the judge.             See Liberty Lobby, 
    477 U.S. at 255
    .      In sum, there remains a dispute of material fact
    as to whether a specific embossing pattern is “the reason the
    device works” or “merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary
    aspect of the device.”      TrafFix, 
    532 U.S. at 34, 30
    .            Therefore,
    summary judgment was inappropriate.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the
    district court and remand for further proceedings.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    15