Peter Akaoma v. Supershuttle International Corporation , 436 F. App'x 250 ( 2011 )


Menu:
  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-1602
    PETER N. AKAOMA,
    Plaintiff – Appellant,
    v.
    SUPERSHUTTLE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION; WASHINGTON SHUTTLE,
    INCORPORATED; DOUG CLARKE, General Manager - Supershuttle,
    Defendants – Appellees,
    and
    KAVARD MOORE, JR.,
    Defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
    Judge. (1:04-cv-01464-GBL-BRP)
    Submitted:   June 1, 2011                  Decided:   June 22, 2011
    Before GREGORY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    John Hopkins, LAW OFFICE OF JOHN HOPKINS, Washington, D.C., for
    Appellant.   Ralph E. Kipp, THE LAW OFFICES OF RALPH E. KIPP,
    P.L.C., Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    2
    PER CURIAM:
    Peter    N.    Akaoma     appeals       the    district   court’s         oral
    ruling    on    April    23,     2010,       and   subsequent       judgment       granting
    Defendants’ motion to confirm the arbitration award and denying
    his motion to vacate that award.                   The arbitrator concluded that
    the   arbitration        proceedings          were     binding,     rejected       all     of
    Akaoma’s       claims,       except    one    tort     claim,      awarded    Defendants
    attorney’s      fees,    and     ordered      Akaoma     to    return    to   Washington
    Shuttle, Inc., the van he used as an airport shuttle driver.                               On
    appeal, Akaoma raises nine claims, only one of which is properly
    before us. *     We affirm.
    Akaoma        challenges        the      determination         that        the
    arbitration      proceedings          are    binding.         We   review     de    novo    a
    district court’s decision to confirm an arbitration award and
    review    for    clear       error    the    court’s    factual     findings.        First
    Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 
    514 U.S. 938
    , 947-48 (1995).
    However, “judicial review of arbitration awards is . . . ‘among
    *
    Claims designated A-C and E-I in Akaoma’s brief are not
    properly before us because Akaoma failed to present them to the
    district court. See Muth v. United States, 
    1 F.3d 246
    , 250 (4th
    Cir. 1993) (noting that issues raised for first time on appeal
    generally are not considered absent exceptional circumstances,
    not present here).     To the extent Akaoma also urges us to
    reevaluate the validity of the Federal Arbitration Act, we
    decline to do so.   See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 
    532 U.S. 105
    , 112 (2001) (noting that Act repeatedly has been held
    constitutional).
    3
    the narrowest known to the law.’”                   U.S. Postal Serv. v. Am.
    Postal Workers Union, 
    204 F.3d 523
    , 527 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting
    Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 
    439 U.S. 89
    , 91 (1978)).                              A court
    “must determine only whether the arbitrator did his job — not
    whether he did it well, correctly, or reasonably, but simply
    whether he did it.”           Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic
    Workers Int’l Union, 
    76 F.3d 606
    , 608 (4th Cir. 1996).
    Akaoma     asserts     that       the   district         court   erred      by
    confirming the arbitrator’s award because the arbitration clause
    neglected to include the word “binding.”                           To the extent that
    this claim may be construed as alleging a common law ground for
    vacatur    of    the   arbitration    award,        see       Choice    Hotels     Int’l,
    Inc. v. SM Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 
    519 F.3d 200
    , 207 (4th Cir. 2008)
    (setting forth statutory and common law grounds for vacatur), we
    conclude that      the   claim    fails.        Federal        law     strongly    favors
    arbitration and interprets arbitration provisions under ordinary
    contract principles.           AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
    131 S. Ct. 1740
    , 1745-46 (2011) (citing                Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.
    Mercury Constr. Corp., 
    460 U.S. 1
    , 24 (1983)).                         The arbitration
    clause in the franchise agreement provided that “any controversy
    arising    out    of   this    [a]greement      shall         be    submitted     to   the
    American    Arbitration        Association      .   .     .    for     arbitration     in
    accordance with its commercial rules and procedures.”                               (J.A.
    195).     We previously have found that similar references to such
    4
    rules are sufficient to show that the parties to an arbitration
    agreement     intended   the   arbitrator’s     decision   to   be   binding.
    Qorvis Commc’ns, LLC v. Wilson, 
    549 F.3d 303
    , 308 (4th Cir.
    2008).   Thus, Akaoma is not entitled to relief on this claim.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
    Akaoma   v.    SuperShuttle    Int’l   Corp.,   No.   1:04-cv-01464-GBL-BRP
    (E.D. Va. filed Apr. 28, 2010 & entered Apr. 29, 2010).              We deny
    Akaoma’s motion for oral argument because the facts and legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    5