Joseph Torda v. Fairfax County School Board , 517 F. App'x 162 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1883
JOSEPH MICHAEL TORDA, by and through his guardians, Susan
Capuano Torda and Thomas Torda; SUSAN CAPUANO TORDA, mother
of Joseph Michael Torda,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
FAIRFAX COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (1:11-cv-00193-GBL-TRJ)
Submitted: March 18, 2013 Decided: April 4, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joseph Michael Torda, Susan Capuano Torda, Appellants Pro Se.
Patricia A. Minson, John Francis Cafferky, BLANKINGSHIP & KEITH,
PC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Susan Capuano Torda and her son, Joseph Michael Torda,
appeal the district court’s order denying their motion for
judgment on the record and entering judgment in favor of the
Fairfax County School Board on the Tordas’ civil action, which
challenged the decision of a due process hearing officer on
claims arising under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act of 2004 (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006).
We have reviewed the record and find no reversible
error. See M.S. ex rel. Simchick v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 553
F.3d 315, 323 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating standard of review). In
particular, we agree with the district court that the Tordas are
barred from challenging the Board’s eligibility determinations
by virtue of the pertinent statute of limitations as well as by
their own conduct, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B) (2006);
Patricia P. v. Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park, 203 F.3d 462, 469 (7th
Cir. 2000), and we conclude, in light of the conflicting
evidence, that the district court did not clearly err in finding
that Joseph does not possess a specific auditory processing
disorder that is not secondary to his cognitive challenges. See
MM ex rel. D.M. v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d 523,
538 (4th Cir. 2002). Likewise, we see no reason to disturb the
district court’s conclusion that Joseph received a free
appropriate public education during the pertinent time period.
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See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982); Sumter
Cnty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan ex rel. TH, 642 F.3d 478, 483
(4th Cir. 2011); Hall v. Vance Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629,
636 (4th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
Finally, we grant each of the Board’s pending motions
except for its motion to strike the Tordas’ informal reply
brief, which we deny. We deny each of the Tordas’ pending
motions except for their motion for leave to file an informal
reply brief exceeding the length limitations, which we grant.
See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a); United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d
318, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that Fed. R. App. P.
10(e)(2) allows for modification of record, but not introduction
of new evidence in appellate court). We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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