Rodney Parker v. Warden Stevenson , 625 F. App'x 196 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-6613
RODNEY PARKER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
WARDEN STEVENSON; MAJ. SUTTON; CPT. WASHINGTON; LT. SYLVIA
JACKSON; SGT. ESTERLINE; SGT. J. C. WILLIAMS; OFC. BECKETT;
OFC. MCCOY; OFC. SUAREZ; OFC. DOOLEY; NURSE K. MCCULLOUGH;
NURSE JANE DOE,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Orangeburg. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District
Judge. (5:13-cv-02795-TLW)
Submitted: August 31, 2015 Decided: September 23, 2015
Before AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Rodney Parker, Appellant Pro Se. Drew Hamilton Butler,
Charleston, South Carolina, Carmen Vaughn Ganjehsani, Caleb
Martin Riser, RICHARDSON PLOWDEN & ROBINSON, P.A., Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Rodney Parker appeals the district court’s order accepting
the recommendation of the magistrate judge and granting
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denying relief on
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint. Parker’s complaint
raises Eighth Amendment excessive force, cruel and unusual
punishment, and deliberate indifference claims. In his
complaint, Parker alleges that (1) an extraction team of
correctional officers beat him and used excessive force when
removing him from his cell and placing him in a restraint chair;
(2) his placement in a control cell without clothing, utensils,
bedding, or a mattress for an extended period of time
constituted cruel and unusual punishment and deliberate
indifference; and (3) Defendants were deliberately indifferent
for not providing adequate medical care for swelling in his
lower extremities.
The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, adopting the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation that concluded that (1) the extraction team used
reasonable force when removing Parker; (2) the record did not
substantiate Parker’s claim that the extraction team members
beat him; (3) Defendants acted reasonably in placing Parker in a
control cell given his conduct and history of prison violations;
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(4) medical records demonstrated that prison officials
repeatedly evaluated Parker’s medical condition; and (5)
Eleventh Amendment immunity barred Parker’s claims against
Defendants in their official capacities. We affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, viewing the facts and the reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011). “Summary
judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Hoschar v. Appalachian Power Co., 739 F.3d 163,
169 (4th Cir. 2014). Where the moving party makes an initial
showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the
nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and rely on some
form of evidence, including affidavits, to demonstrate that a
genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Finally, “[w]hen opposing
parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could
believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts
for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
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Turning first to Parker’s excessive force claim, “the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual
punishments’ [extends] to the treatment of prisoners by prison
officials . . . [,] forbid[ding] ‘the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.’” Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir.
2013) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986),
abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34
(2010) (per curiam)). In analyzing an excessive force claim,
we first inquire “whether the prison official acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective component) .”
Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008). “[T]he ‘core
judicial inquiry’ regarding the subjective component of an
excessive force claim is ‘whether force was applied in a good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm.’” Id. at 239 (quoting Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)).
We hold that the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, adopted by the district court, contains three
errors necessitating remand. First, the magistrate judge used
an incorrect standard to review the subjective component of
Parker’s excessive force claim, a standard that incorrectly
considered the “extent of the injury inflicted.” As the Supreme
Court held in Wilkins, there is no “significant injury”
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threshold to sustain an excessive force claim because a de
minimis injury, if the product of malicious and sadistic use of
force, can sustain the claim. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38 (“An
inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his
ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has
the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Id. at
38.). Accordingly, even assuming, as the magistrate judge
concluded, that Parker sustained only bruising, redness, and
scratches, the lack of further injury does not bar Parker from
prevailing if those injuries were the result of the extraction
team beating Parker or maliciously and sadistically
overtightening his restraints. On remand, the district court
should consider the following four nonexclusive factors when
analyzing the subjective component of Parker’s excessive force
claim:
(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the
relationship between the need and the amount of force
that was used; (3) the extent of any reasonably
perceived threat that the application of force was
intended to quell; and (4) any efforts made to temper
the severity of a forceful response.
Iko, 535 F.3d at 239 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321).
Second, and a product of the first error, the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation placed too much weight on the
injuries it concluded Parker sustained when determining the
extent of the force used by the extraction team. In determining
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the amount of force used and whether the force was excessive,
“the nature of the force, rather than the extent of the injury,
is the relevant inquiry.” Hill, 727 F.3d at 321. As
highlighted by the Supreme Court, although “the extent of injury
suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest whether the
use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a
particular situation,” injuries and the force used are
“imperfectly correlated.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38.
Accordingly, while Parker’s injuries are relevant to determining
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
force used by the extraction team, the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact does not rise and fall on this
consideration alone.
Third, the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, in
concluding that the record did not substantiate Parker’s
allegations, failed to view the facts and the inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to Parker. See Bonds, 629
F.3d at 380. To support his claim that the extraction team beat
him and used excessive force, Parker proffered (1) an affidavit
attesting that when “officers entered [his] cell they commenced
to beating [him] severely” and that they punched, kicked,
choked, and dropped knees on him; (2) a prison grievance he
submitted detailing his injuries in a manner consistent with the
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allegations in his affidavit; and (3) an affidavit from a fellow
inmate who attested that he could hear the extraction team
beating Parker and that Parker was “moaning and groaning.”
Although several pieces of evidence offered by Defendants may
significantly draw into question Parker’s allegations, a
district court has limited ability to discount evidence offered
by a nonmoving party in support of his allegations. See Scott,
550 U.S. at 378-80 (noting that courts usually must adopt the
plaintiff’s version of events for purposes of summary judgment
except where evidence “blatantly contradicted” nonmoving party’s
allegations and permits grant of summary judgment).
Because the district court did not apply the correct
standard when viewing the record, it is possible that a genuine
issue of material fact exists with respect to the amount of
force and the reasonableness of the force used by the extraction
team. Accordingly, on remand, the district court should
consider not whether the record substantiates the evidence put
forward by Parker but whether the record, including the
videotape offered by Defendants (but not made part of the
record) and any other evidence the parties may present on
remand, “blatantly contradict[s]” the evidence Parker proffered.
Having noted the above errors in the district court’s summary
judgment analysis, we vacate the district court’s grant of
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summary judgment with respect to Parker’s excessive force claim
against the extraction team in their individual capacities and
remand for further proceedings. 1
We next turn to Parker’s cruel and unusual punishment and
deliberate indifference claims stemming from the conditions of
his confinement in a control cell. The Eighth Amendment
“provides protection with respect to ‘the treatment a prisoner
receives in prison and the conditions under which he is
confined.’” Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 165 (4th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). For
Parker to prevail on his claims stemming from the conditions of
his confinement, he “must prove (1) that the deprivation of a
basic human need was objectively sufficiently serious, and
(2) that subjectively the officials acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind.” De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525
(4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis and brackets omitted). However,
unlike an excessive force claim that may be sustainable where
only a de minimis injury resulted, “[o]nly an extreme
deprivation, that is, a serious or significant physical or
1
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgement
to the extraction team in their official capacities because
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars suit and recovery
from the state “even though individual officials are nominal
defendants.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
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emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions, or
substantial risk thereof, will satisfy the objective component
of an Eighth Amendment claim challenging the conditions of
confinement.” Id.
In an effort to satisfy this objective component, Parker
first alleges that he suffered mental and emotional problems
from his confinement in the control cell. Parker’s one line
allegation, however, is conclusory and fails to sufficiently
allege any specific mental or psychological condition that was
caused or aggravated by his time in the control cell. Parker’s
bald assertion that he suffered mental and emotional problems
from his confinement in the control cell is insufficient to
demonstrate a serious or significant emotional injury adequate
to survive summary judgment. See Thompson v. Potomac Elec.
Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding
“[c]onclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice” to
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact).
Second, Parker alleges that he suffered swelling in his
lower extremities because Defendants refused him a mattress in
the control cell. The uncontroverted record shows that, over a
month after being placed in the control cell, Parker presented
to the prison medical staff with diffuse edema in his lower
extremities. X-rays of Parker’s lower extremities confirmed the
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diagnosis of diffuse level 1-2+ edema but showed no injury to
any of his bones, no evidence of trauma, and no evidence of
osseous abnormalities. Finally, medical records submitted by
Defendants and Parker demonstrate that Parker received Tylenol
and Lasix for the swelling, which resolved within 11 days of
Parker reporting the condition to prison medical staff.
Accordingly, although the swelling Parker experienced is a
physical injury arguably stemming from the conditions of his
confinement, it is not a “serious or significant” physical
injury capable of sustaining an Eighth Amendment claim based on
conditions of confinement.
Therefore, although we vacate the district court’s grant of
summary judgment with respect to Parker’s excessive force claim
against Defendants in their individual capacities, we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to
Parker’s excessive force claim against Defendants in their
official capacities and with respect to his cruel and unusual
punishment and deliberate indifference claims stemming from his
conditions of confinement. 2 We dispense with oral argument
2 We also affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Nurse K. McCullough and Nurse Jane Doe because
Parker does not present any arguments in his informal brief
regarding why the tests and treatments administered by prison
medical staff did not satisfy Eighth Amendment requirements.
(Continued)
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because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the material before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
See 4th Cir. R. 34(b) (“The Court will limit its review to the
issues raised in the informal brief.”).
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