United States v. Pruess , 416 F. App'x 274 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5061
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GREGORY ROLAND PRUESS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:08-cr-00054-RLV-DSC-1)
Submitted: February 15, 2011 Decided: March 14, 2011
Before KING, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Claire J. Rauscher, Executive Director, Ann L. Hester, Peter
Adolf, Assistant Federal Defenders, Charlotte, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Amy E.
Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gregory Roland Pruess pleaded guilty to possession of
ammunition after having been convicted of a crime punishable by
a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). His guilty plea was conditioned on
his retaining his right to appeal the district court’s denial of
his motion to dismiss the indictment. The district court
sentenced Pruess to twenty-one months of imprisonment and he now
appeals. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the district
court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Pruess first argues that the conviction violated his
rights under the Second and Fifth Amendments because his initial
predicate felony conviction is invalid. However, we need not
reach the constitutional question as we conclude that,
regardless of whether his initial felony conviction was invalid
or is invalidated, Pruess had several other felony convictions
not based on his status as a felon at the time of the commission
of the instant offense that qualify as predicate offenses under
§ 922(g)(1). Those offenses included convictions for dealing in
firearms and explosives without a license and unlawful transport
and possession of machineguns.
Pruess next argues that, after the Supreme Court’s
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008),
the prohibition in § 922(g)(1) on non-violent felons possessing
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firearms is unconstitutional as violative of the Second and
Fifth Amendments. Again, we do not reach the constitutional
question at this point. In United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d
673 (4th Cir. 2010), this court outlined a two-prong analysis to
determine whether a regulation violates a defendant’s Second
Amendment right to bear arms. A district court must first
determine whether the right sought to be regulated is within the
scope of the Second Amendment’s protection — that is “[i]n
accordance with the historical understanding of the scope of the
right . . . [whether the regulation extends to] weapons
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes.” Id. at 676 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). If the district court finds that the right is
protected by the Second Amendment, the court must then determine
whether the regulation is valid under the appropriate means-end
level of scrutiny. Id. at 678. In applying this prong of the
analysis to a regulation that prohibits the possession of
firearms by felons, a district court should apply intermediate
scrutiny to determine whether “there is a reasonable fit between
the challenged regulation and a substantial government
objective.” Id. at 683 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Here, the district court concluded, based on the
statement in Heller that “nothing in [the] opinion should be
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taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons,” that § 922(g)(1) was not
unconstitutional. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 571. However, as we
have determined that a district court must conduct an analysis
of a challenged regulation in light of Heller, we remand to the
district court with instructions to make this determination in
accordance with our decision in Chester.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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