United States v. Ledbetter , 381 F. App'x 292 ( 2010 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 09-4605
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    DENNIS EARL LEDBETTER,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria.   Liam O’Grady, District
    Judge. (1:08-cr-00482-LO-1)
    Submitted:   May 21, 2010                 Decided:   June 7, 2010
    Before SHEDD and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Michael S. Arif, MARTIN, ARIF & GREEN, PLC, Springfield,
    Virginia, for Appellant.      Neil H. MacBride, United States
    Attorney, Benjamin L. Hatch, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    A federal grand jury indicted Dennis Earl Ledbetter,
    charging   him    with     conspiracy       to   commit    armed       robbery,   in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
     (Count 1); armed bank robbery, in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2113
    (a) and (d) and (2) (Count 2); and
    use of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2
        and 924(c)(1)(A)       (Count     3).         Ledbetter    pleaded
    guilty to Count 2 and was convicted, after a bench trial, of
    Counts 1 and 3.      On appeal, Ledbetter contests the sufficiency
    of the evidence supporting the convictions on Counts 1 and 3
    and, for the following reasons, we affirm.
    I.
    On the morning of October 23, 2008, at approximately
    10 a.m., a short, somewhat heavyset black male, later identified
    as John Wayne Morton, entered the Commerce Bank in Dumfries,
    Virginia, wearing sunglasses and a ski mask.                   The man brandished
    a   firearm,    ordered    all   of   the     patrons     on     the   ground,    and
    commanded the tellers to empty their tills.                At least one teller
    handed Morton money that included a dye pack.                    Morton also took
    a black shaving kit that a customer had left on the counter,
    which    contained        roughly     $1100      in      cash,     mostly     small
    denominations.     In total, Morton took about $8500 from the bank.
    2
    A second black male, later identified as Ledbetter,
    wore a mask over his face and stood by the door, holding it open
    for their escape.        One of the tellers made eye contact with
    Ledbetter   during    the     robbery,   and     the   teller    testified      that
    Ledbetter was looking into the bank.               Ledbetter also drove the
    getaway car, a Lincoln Town Car belonging to Morton’s mother,
    from the bank.      While in the car, one of the dye packs exploded,
    burning Morton’s leg.
    About thirty minutes prior to the robbery, an employee
    with a self-storage facility located on the street behind the
    bank saw a dark-colored Lincoln Town Car or Cadillac parked on a
    small incline on the street.                 After the car sat for fifteen
    minutes,    the    employee    became    concerned,      and     approached      the
    vehicle, where he saw two men:               a heavy-set black male in the
    front seat and another person in the back seat, who appeared to
    be putting something over his face and then taking it off.                      The
    employee watched the car move down the hill and park near his
    own vehicle; he returned to the self-storage facility to assist
    a customer and, by the time he returned, the car was gone.
    Later that day, around 3 p.m., Ledbetter entered the
    Rent-A-Center in Landover, Maryland, near his home, to pay an
    overdue account.      According to the clerk, Ledbetter, who worked
    at an International House of Pancakes (IHOP) restaurant, was
    wearing    his    uniform.      The   clerk      requested      three   weeks    of
    3
    payments, but Ledbetter informed her that he was low on money;
    they     eventually       agreed        to   a        two-week       payment    of    $99.48.
    Ledbetter paid the amount in mostly tattered five and ten dollar
    bills, although the clerk saw Ledbetter holding a one-and-a-half
    inch roll of money.
    One week later, on October 31, 2008, agents with the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Morton, who lived
    in Prince George’s County, Maryland, for the crime.                                    Several
    days    later,       Ledbetter,      Morton’s             cousin,   turned     himself   into
    authorities for his participation in the robbery.
    Based upon these events, a federal grand jury indicted
    Ledbetter on December 4, 2008, charging him with conspiracy to
    commit armed robbery, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
     (Count 1);
    armed bank robbery, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2113
    (a) and (d)
    and    (2)   (Count     2);    and     use   of       a    firearm    during    a    crime   of
    violence, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2
     and 924(c)(1)(A) (Count
    3).     On January 23, 2009, Ledbetter pleaded guilty to Count 2,
    armed    bank       robbery.      As    part         of    the   guilty     plea,    Ledbetter
    agreed    to    a    statement     of    facts        that       provided    that    “[b]efore
    entering the bank, John Wayne Morton put on a mask and Dennis
    Earl Ledbetter tied a shirt around his face to disguise his
    identity.”          The statement of facts also provided that Morton
    brandished a firearm during the robbery, that Ledbetter stood by
    4
    the front door to act as a lookout, and that Ledbetter drove the
    getaway car, Morton’s mother’s vehicle.
    On   February    10,   2009,     Ledbetter,     who    had   waived    a
    jury, was tried by the district court on Counts 1 and 3.                            Both
    Morton       and    Ledbetter     testified      extensively     at     the    trial,
    although their accounts differed dramatically as to the planning
    of the crime, the ownership of the gun used in the crime, and
    the aftermath of the robbery.             Specifically, Morton, testifying
    for the Government, stated that Ledbetter supplied the gun for
    the robbery and chose the bank. 1             According to Morton, Ledbetter
    forced Morton to commit the robbery, drove the getaway car, and
    burned the stained clothing and money behind Morton’s apartment
    in Suitland, Maryland.             Morton also testified that after the
    robbery Ledbetter took $500 in cash when he left for work and
    that       Ledbetter   returned    one   week    later   and    advised       Morton’s
    mother to remove the license plates from her car.
    In   contrast,     Ledbetter     testified      that    he     did   not
    supply the gun for the robbery, did not know that Morton was
    going to use a gun, did not see Morton brandishing the gun
    during the robbery, and did not want Morton to rob the bank.
    1
    In support of the claim that Ledbetter chose which bank to
    rob, Morton noted that Ledbetter had previously lived in
    northern Virginia, while Morton had never lived outside of
    Prince George’s County, Maryland, and was unfamiliar with the
    northern Virginia area.
    5
    Ledbetter conceded that he pulled his shirt over his face and
    assisted Morton by holding the door and driving the getaway car.
    Ledbetter testified that he made the decision to help Morton
    just prior to the robbery.             Ledbetter also testified that he did
    not   receive     any      money   from    the   robbery     and    that    when    they
    returned to Morton’s apartment he left to report for work at
    IHOP.
    Ledbetter testified that when he returned to Morton’s
    apartment one week after the robbery, he advised Morton’s mother
    to take off her car’s tags and then removed them while she
    watched.        Ledbetter     also    admitted     that,     during      his   pretrial
    incarceration,        he    told    his    grandmother       what   he     termed    the
    “original truth,” that he knew Morton was going to use a gun in
    the robbery and that it made him nervous.
    The      district      court   found   Ledbetter        guilty     on   both
    counts.     The district court first announced that it did not
    “credit    Mr.       Morton’s      testimony     that   he    was     threatened      by
    [Ledbetter] or that this was purely [Ledbetter’s] idea and that
    he went kicking and screaming into his participation.”                         Instead,
    the district court found “the evidence makes clear . . . that
    this was a bank robbery committed by two cousins who have known
    each other for 25 years who together planned and executed this
    robbery    in    a    conspiracy.”         The   district      court     first      found
    Ledbetter guilty under the principles announced in Pinkerton v.
    6
    United      States,          
    328 U.S. 640
    ,       646-47    (1946),    because          Morton
    brandished a gun in furtherance of their conspiracy to rob the
    bank.           In     the    alternative,         the     district      court       found    that
    Ledbetter knew that Morton had a gun and was going to use it
    during the robbery.                     The district court noted that the bank
    surveillance video showed Ledbetter looking into the bank during
    most of the robbery and that Morton consistently displayed the
    gun during the robbery.
    The     district         court     also      found      that    portions       of
    Ledbetter’s              testimony           were         “undermined           by       several
    inconsistencies.”              These inconsistencies included the testimony
    of Aaron Hammond, the self-storage facility employee, that he
    saw Ledbetter pulling a shirt over his face trying out disguises
    thirty minutes before the robbery — testimony that suggested to
    the district court “a plan, a calm and calculating participation
    . . . long before you’ve admitting knowing that there was going
    to    be    a    bank    robbery.”          Moreover,         the   district     court       found
    Ledbetter’s testimony that he did not know the area inconsistent
    with       his       ability       to    drive     “without       error”    back      onto      the
    interstate after the robbery.                       In addition, the district court
    found incredible Ledbetter’s testimony that he did not see the
    bank proceeds in Morton’s hands as he exited the bank.                                          The
    district court stated that the surveillance video clearly showed
    the    money         “literally         taking    up    his     entire   midsection”          while
    7
    Ledbetter “[was] looking at him and making sure that he gets out
    of that door.”
    Furthermore, the district court found that Ledbetter’s
    testimony that he did not take any of the robbery proceeds was
    undermined     by     his    presence         at       the     Rent-A-Center          with      small
    denominations        of     money    and       an           additional       stack    of        bills.
    Likewise,      the    district       court             noted       Ledbetter’s       conduct         in
    telling      Morton’s       mother       to    remove             her     license    plates         was
    “consistent with somebody who is a knowing participa[nt] in the
    conspiracy to rob the bank.”                   Finally, the district court noted
    Ledbetter’s criminal history included the possession of firearms
    and   that    “the        version    of       events         as     you    laid     out    in       your
    discussion with your grandmother is a significant admission that
    in fact you knew that the gun was going to be used in the bank
    robbery.”
    The district court ultimately sentenced Ledbetter to
    108 months’ imprisonment, consisting of 24 months’ imprisonment
    for   Counts    1     and     2,    and       84       months       for     Count     3,       to   run
    consecutively        to    Counts    1    and          2.      Ledbetter      filed        a    timely
    notice of appeal.
    II.
    On appeal, Ledbetter contests the sufficiency of the
    evidence     supporting       his    convictions               on    Count    1     and    3.       “In
    8
    assessing the sufficiency of the evidence presented in a bench
    trial, we must uphold a guilty verdict if, taking the view most
    favorable to the Government, there is substantial evidence to
    support the verdict.”       Elliott v. United States, 
    332 F.3d 753
    ,
    760-61 (4th Cir. 2003).       “[S]ubstantial evidence” is “evidence
    that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
    sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
    a reasonable doubt.”      United States v. Burgos, 
    94 F.3d 849
    , 862
    (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).           We “consider[s] circumstantial as
    well as direct evidence, and allow[s] the government the benefit
    of   all   reasonable   inferences   from   the   facts    proven   to   those
    sought to be established,” United States v. Tresvant, 
    677 F.2d 1018
    , 1021 (4th Cir. 1982), and we assume that the fact finder
    resolved all contradictions in the testimony in favor of the
    Government.     United States v. Brooks, 
    524 F.3d 549
    , 563 (4th
    Cir.), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 519
     (2008).               We “can reverse a
    conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the prosecution's
    failure is clear.”       United States v. Moye, 
    454 F.3d 390
    , 394
    (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).
    Ledbetter first contests his conviction on Count 1,
    which charged Ledbetter with violating 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
    .                  That
    statute makes it a criminal offense if “two or more persons
    conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States,
    9
    . . . and one or more such persons do any act to effect the
    object of the conspiracy.”                
    Id.
         We have reviewed the evidence
    in     this      case   and    conclude         that   the   Government   produced
    sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
    conclude that Ledbetter conspired to rob the Commerce Bank with
    Morton.         In addition to Morton’s testimony regarding Ledbetter’s
    role       in     planning     the    robbery,         the   Government   produced
    circumstantial evidence supporting the verdict. 2                   For instance,
    Hammond testified that he saw a man, Ledbetter, attempting to
    put something on over his face while sitting in a car behind the
    bank.       This testimony corroborated Morton’s testimony that he
    and Ledbetter parked behind the bank for a period of time and
    that Ledbetter tried on different disguises in the back seat.
    Likewise, the fact that Ledbetter drove the getaway
    car and was able to drive directly to the interstate despite the
    presence of multiple turns supported Morton’s testimony that it
    was Ledbetter who chose the bank to rob, having previously lived
    in northern Virginia.            In addition, Ledbetter’s presence at the
    Rent-A-Center with small denomination bills and an additional
    stack      of    cash   as    well   as    his    comments   to   Morton’s   mother
    2
    The district court found incredible Morton’s testimony
    that Ledbetter forced him to rob the bank.         Contrary to
    Ledbetter's assertions, however, the district court did not
    discredit Morton’s testimony that the idea and planning for the
    bank robbery originated with Ledbetter.
    10
    regarding the car’s license plate were, as the district court
    found, “completely consistent with somebody who is a knowing
    participa[nt] in and taken part of the proceeds of the bank
    [robbery].”
    Ledbetter         also       challenges             the    sufficiency         of     the
    evidence supporting his conviction on Count 3, which charged him
    with   violating         
    18 U.S.C. § 2
           and    § 924(c)(1)(A).                Section
    924(c)(1)(A) creates a graduated penalty scheme for any person
    who “during and in relation to any crime of violence” “uses or
    carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime,
    possesses      a    firearm.”            Id.      Ledbetter            was    charged      with     a
    violation      of    subsection          (ii),    which         sets       forth    a    mandatory
    minimum     of      seven     years       imprisonment                if    the     firearm       was
    “brandished.”        
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(iii).
    Ledbetter contends that there is insufficient evidence
    to   convict       him   of   the    §     924(c)      violation             on    the   basis    of
    Pinkerton liability.            See Pinkerton v. United States, 
    328 U.S. 640
    ,   646-47       (1946)     (holding          fellow         conspirators          liable      for
    substantive         offenses        committed              by     a        co-conspirator          in
    furtherance of the conspiracy).                      “A defendant may be convicted
    of a § 924(c) charge on the basis of a coconspirator's use of a
    gun if the use was in furtherance of the conspiracy and was
    reasonably       foreseeable        to    the     defendant.”                United      States    v.
    Wilson, 
    135 F.3d 291
    , 305 (4th Cir. 1998).                                    See also United
    11
    States v. Cummings, 
    937 F.2d 941
    , 944 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying
    Pinkerton doctrine that “conspirators liable for all reasonably
    foreseeable acts of their co-conspirators done in furtherance of
    the conspiracy” to 924(c) convictions). 3
    We    have     reviewed      the    evidence      in    this    case     and
    conclude     that     the    Government     produced      sufficient        evidence    to
    sustain the conviction.               Ledbetter overlooks the fact that the
    district      court     did     not    discredit        Morton’s      testimony      that
    Ledbetter, not Morton, brought the gun.                        Indeed, the district
    court      plainly     stated       that   it     did    not    credit       Ledbetter’s
    testimony     regarding       the     presence     of   the    gun,   in     large   part
    because Ledbetter told his grandmother that he knew Morton had a
    gun.       Also, the district court found, both from testimony and
    the    surveillance         videos,    that      Ledbetter     was    not    testifying
    truthfully when he said that he did not see Morton using the gun
    3
    Ledbetter argues that Pinkerton liability for 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) offenses requires the Government to prove to a
    “practical certainty” that Ledbetter knew Morton would have a
    firearm.   Ledbetter culls this language from United States v.
    Spinney, 
    65 F.3d 231
    , 239 (1st Cir. 1995), which required the
    Government to meet that burden of proof in aider and abettor
    liability under § 924(c). In contrast, every circuit, including
    this court, has applied the familiar Pinkerton liability
    standard to § 924(c) conspiracy charges.       See, e.g., United
    States v. Shea, 
    150 F.3d 44
    , 50-51 (1st Cir. 1998); United
    States v. Wilson, 
    135 F.3d 291
    , 305 (4th Cir. 1998); United
    States v. Washington, 
    106 F.3d 983
    , 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
    United States v. Masotto, 
    73 F.3d 1233
    , 1240 (2d Cir. 1996);
    United States v. Myers, 
    102 F.3d 227
    , 237 (6th Cir. 1996);
    United States v. Wacker, 
    72 F.3d 1453
    , 1464 (10th Cir. 1995).
    12
    during the robbery.                See United States v. Johnson, 
    444 F.3d 1026
    , 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2006) (denying motion for acquittal of
    § 924(c) charge for getaway driver who never entered bank during
    robbery because he was present at planning meetings and evidence
    was presented that the two robbers were wielding firearms in an
    obvious fashion during the entrance and exit from the bank).
    Ledbetter           also    overlooks         that,       prior          to    trial       on
    Counts 1 and 3, he pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery.                                          Armed
    bank    robbery      requires          the   Government          to    establish            that      the
    defendant, in committing bank robbery, “assaults any person, or
    puts    in   jeopardy        the    life       of    any     person         by    the      use     of    a
    dangerous weapon or device.”                    
    18 U.S.C. § 2113
    (d).                       It is thus
    somewhat incongruous for Ledbetter to plead guilty to a crime
    with the element of “use of a dangerous weapon” but then argue
    that he did not know Morton would have a gun.                                See, e.g., United
    States v. Burton, 
    126 F.3d 666
    , 679 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming
    sentence enhancement because it was reasonable foreseeable that
    bank    robbery      would       use    a    firearm       given       the       “nature         of   the
    offense”); United States v. Allen, 
    425 F.3d 1231
    , 1234 (9th Cir.
    2005)     (affirming        § 924(c)         conviction          under           Pinkerton        where
    defendant was present at a “morning of” meeting where guns were
    present      and     their       use     was        discussed;         had        a    longstanding
    friendship         with    a     co-conspirator            who        had        participated           in
    previous     armed        bank     robberies;         and,    finding            that      “it    [wa]s
    13
    reasonable to infer from the nature of the plan - the overtaking
    of   a   bank   by    force      and   intimidation     -    that     guns    would   be
    used.”).
    III.
    For      the   foregoing     reasons,      we    affirm    the    district
    court’s judgment.          Ledbetter’s motion to substitute counsel is
    denied.     We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions       are    adequately     presented      in    the     materials
    before    the   court      and    argument     would   not    aid    the     decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    14