United States v. Benjamin , 31 F. App'x 290 ( 2002 )


Menu:
  •                           UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,              
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                              No. 01-4671
    MARLON STAFFORD BENJAMIN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
    N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Chief District Judge.
    (CR-01-125)
    Submitted: March 21, 2002
    Decided: March 29, 2002
    Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr.,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
    Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Sandra J.
    Hairston, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Caro-
    lina, for Appellee.
    2                     UNITED STATES v. BENJAMIN
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Marlon Stafford Benjamin appeals his conviction after a condi-
    tional plea of guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine
    base ("crack") in violation of 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 841
    (a)(1), (b)(1)(A)
    (West 1999 & Supp. 2001), and possession of a firearm during a drug
    trafficking crime in violation of 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(i) (West
    2000). Benjamin challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evi-
    dence obtained during the allegedly illegal investigatory stop of his
    vehicle. We affirm.
    Benjamin contends that the information provided to the officers
    was not sufficiently reliable to provide reasonable suspicion to sup-
    port the stop of his vehicle. We disagree. Although an anonymous tip,
    by itself, is not sufficient to form the basis for an investigative stop
    under Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
     (1968), "there are situations in which
    an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits sufficient indicia of
    reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory
    stop." Florida v. J.L., 
    529 U.S. 266
    , 270 (2000) (citing Alabama v.
    White, 
    496 U.S. 325
     (1990)).
    Here, in addition to the anonymous tip, the officers had information
    which had been provided by Benjamin’s girlfriend, Ms. Walker. Ben-
    jamin argues that her statement was not reliable because she provided
    the information out of anger or to get revenge on Benjamin. However,
    some of the information provided by Ms. Walker was consistent with
    the officer’s knowledge. Also, because Ms. Walker provided the
    information in person, the officer had the opportunity to judge her
    credibility, and Ms. Walker could have been held accountable if she
    had made false accusations to the officer. As in United States v.
    Christmas, 
    222 F.3d 141
     (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
    531 U.S. 1098
    (2001), we find that "these factors make the information provided in
    this case more trustworthy and reliable than the anonymous tip at
    UNITED STATES v. BENJAMIN                        3
    issue in J.L." 
    Id. at 144
    ; see United States v. Salazar, 
    945 F.2d 47
    , 50-
    51 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that "face-to-face informant must, as a
    general matter, be thought more reliable than an anonymous tele-
    phone tipster"); United States v. Gorin, 
    564 F.2d 159
    , 160-61 (4th
    Cir. 1977) (same).
    We find no error by the district court in finding that, based on the
    two tips provided to officers—corroborated as they were by each
    other and by the officers’ independent knowledge and further
    corroboration—there was sufficient articulable suspicion to stop Ben-
    jamin’s vehicle. See United States v. Rusher, 
    966 F.2d 868
    , 873 (4th
    Cir. 1992) (providing standard). Accordingly, we affirm the district
    court’s order denying Benjamin’s motion to suppress evidence seized
    as a result of the investigatory stop. We dispense with oral argument
    because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED