United States v. Chadriquez Williams , 481 F. App'x 851 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5131
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHADRIQUEZ DEVON WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Danville. Samuel G. Wilson, District
Judge. (4:09-cr-00039-sgw-1)
Submitted: May 18, 2012 Decided: May 31, 2012
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lawrence H. Woodward, Jr., Charles Lustig, SHUTTLEWORTH, RULOFF,
SWAIN, HADDAD & MORECOCK, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for
Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, R. Andrew
Bassford, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Chadriquez Devon Williams appeals his conviction and
360-month sentence after a jury convicted him of one count each
of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006); and use and possession of a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011). *
Williams asserts that the district court committed reversible
error when it: (1) classified him as a career offender because
he claims that the predicate convictions underlying the
classification were part of the same course of conduct; (2)
instructed the jury on an aiding and abetting theory of guilt
because he argues that the evidence did not warrant such an
instruction; and (3) on remand, increased his sentence from 120
months to 342 months on his first § 924(c) conviction because he
alleges that none of the 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2011) factors changed between his initial sentencing
hearing and his resentencing. Finding no error, we affirm.
*
Williams was originally convicted on two § 924(c) counts,
for which he was sentenced to 120 months on one and 300 months
on the other. After Williams appealed to this court, the
Government moved to dismiss the latter § 924(c) count, and this
court vacated Williams’ sentence and remanded the matter for
resentencing. On remand, the district court increased Williams’
sentence on the remaining § 924(c) count from 120 months to 342
months in prison.
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First, this court reviews a district court’s decision
whether to give, and the content of, a jury instruction for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207,
221 (4th Cir. 2009). An aiding and abetting instruction is
permissible where the evidence establishes that a defendant
assisted in the commission of a crime, even if he was charged as
a principal. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619-
20 (1949); United States v. Duke, 409 F.2d 669, 671 (4th Cir.
1969). Although it is preferable for a district court to tailor
an aiding and abetting instruction to a particular count, a
general instruction may be acceptable in certain circumstances.
See United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 398 (4th Cir. 2006)
(finding that district court acted within its discretion when it
declined to further highlight the aiding and abetting
instruction by tailoring it to a particular count). We have
reviewed the district court’s aiding and abetting instruction in
light of the evidence presented at trial and conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it instructed
the jury in the manner in which it did.
We also review Williams’ sentence under the
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “The first step in this review
requires us to ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating the
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Guidelines range.” United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377, 387
(4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks, citations and
alterations omitted). The court must then consider the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into
account the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at
51. If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, we presume
on appeal that the sentence is reasonable. United States v. Go,
517 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 2008); see Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 346-56 (2007) (permitting presumption of
reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentence).
We reject Williams’ assertion that he should not have
been classified as a career offender. Under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a) (2010), a defendant qualifies as a
career offender if: (1) the defendant is older than eighteen
years of age at the time of the instant offense; (2) the instant
offense is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two felony
convictions for either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense. Williams concedes his situation satisfies
all of the requirements for career offender status. Despite his
concession, Williams summarily asks the court to find, “under
the unique facts of this case,” that the district court erred by
counting his prior convictions as proper career offender
predicate convictions. Because Williams concedes his situation
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satisfies the career offender requirements, and since he assigns
no error to the district court’s decision to classify him as a
career offender, we reject Williams’ request to have his
sentence vacated on this ground.
We also discern no error in the district court’s
decision to impose, on remand, a 342-month sentence on Williams’
undismissed § 924(c) conviction. Although Williams concedes
that his new sentence is within the Guidelines range with which
he was attributed at sentencing, and admits that his sentence
is, thus, presumptively reasonable, Williams summarily requests
that the court find the sentence unreasonable under the
§ 3553(a) factors.
Williams’ summary request for this court to vacate his
sentence is insufficient to rebut the presumption of
reasonableness this court affords his within-Guidelines
sentence. Go, 517 F.3d at 218. We nonetheless conclude that
because this court’s mandate remanding the matter to the
district court for resentencing was unrestricted, the district
court was well-within its rights to conduct a de novo proceeding
on remand. See United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 67 (4th Cir.
1993) (“[T]o the extent that the mandate of the appellate court
instructs or permits reconsideration of sentencing issues on
remand, the district court may consider the issue de novo[.]”).
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Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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