Ngeusang v. Holder , 415 F. App'x 506 ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1676
MERCY NGEUSANG,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: February 15, 2011 Decided: March 7, 2011
Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Edward Neufville, III, MORAISNEUFVILLE LAW FIRM, LLC, Silver
Spring, Maryland, for Petitioner. Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General, Mary Jane Candaux, Assistant Director, Ashley Y.
Martin, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Mercy Ngeusang, a native and citizen of Cameroon,
petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“Board”) dismissing her appeal from the immigration
judge’s denial of her requests for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.
Before this court, Ngeusang challenges the
determination that she failed to establish her eligibility for
relief. She argues that the credibility determination was not
supported by specific and cogent reasoning and that the Board
erred in failing to consider the independent corroborative
evidence that she submitted in support of her claims.
A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of
fact, including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the
contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). Legal issues are
reviewed de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the
[Board]’s interpretation of the [Immigration and Nationality
Act] and any attendant regulations.” Li Fang Lin v. Mukasey,
517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008). This court will reverse
the Board only if “the evidence . . . presented was so
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compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the
requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at
483-84; see Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002).
Furthermore, “[t]he agency decision that an alien is not
eligible for asylum is ‘conclusive unless manifestly contrary to
the law and an abuse of discretion.’” Marynenka v. Holder, 592
F.3d 594, 600 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D)
(2006)).
We have reviewed the evidence of record and conclude
that substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility
finding. We further conclude that Ngeusang failed to present
sufficient independent evidence of past persecution,
notwithstanding the adverse credibility determination, as
discussed in Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 370 (4th Cir.
2004). We therefore uphold the denial of Ngeusang’s requests
for asylum and withholding of removal. See id. at 367 (“Because
the burden of proof for withholding of removal is higher than
for asylum — even though the facts that must be proved are the
same — an applicant who is ineligible for asylum is necessarily
ineligible for withholding of removal under [8 U.S.C.]
§ 1231(b)(3).”).
Finally, we find that substantial evidence supports
the finding that Ngeusang failed to meet the standard for relief
under the Convention Against Torture. To obtain such relief, an
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applicant must establish that “it is more likely than not that
he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country
of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2010). We find that
Ngeusang failed to make the requisite showing before the
immigration court.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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