Witthohn v. Federal Insurance , 164 F. App'x 395 ( 2006 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-1378
    CHRISTINE   WITTHOHN,    d/b/a   Green    Parrot
    Enterprises,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation;
    CHUBB & SON, INCORPORATED, a corporation,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr.,
    District Judge. (CA-04-848)
    Submitted:   December 16, 2005            Decided:   January 31, 2006
    Before WILKINSON and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Jeffrey V. Mehalic, LAW OFFICES OF JEFFREY V. MEHALIC, Charleston,
    West Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas V. Flaherty, Tammy R. Harvey,
    FLAHERTY, SENSABAUGH & BONASSO, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia,
    for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Christine Witthohn appeals from the district court’s
    order dismissing her complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on
    the basis of res judicata.               On appeal, Witthohn contends that the
    district court erred by considering documents not referred to in
    the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a
    motion for summary judgment.                 Witthohn also asserts that her
    complaint is not barred by res judicata.                     We affirm.
    In 2002, Christine Witthohn filed suit against EZNET in
    West Virginia state court, alleging that EZNET had breached certain
    contractual         obligations     in    connection         with   the    creation    and
    development of Witthohn’s website.                      In June 2003, the parties
    reached    a       settlement.       Pursuant      to    the    settlement,      Witthohn
    executed       a     “Settlement     Agreement      and        Release”    wherein     she
    specifically released “any and all claims that were or could have
    been asserted” against EZNET and its “insurers and adjusters.”
    Thereafter,       Witthohn     filed      a     motion     to   amend   her
    complaint to assert claims against Appellees, EZNET’s insurers, for
    violations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”)
    related to their handling of Witthohn’s suit against EZNET.                            The
    state court denied the motion, determining that any amendment of
    the complaint would be a “fruitless act” because Witthohn had
    released       any    claim   it    might    have       against     Appellees     in   the
    settlement agreement.              Witthohn’s appeal was denied.
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    Witthohn then filed the instant action against Appellees
    in West Virginia state court, again raising UTPA claims. Appellees
    removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to dismiss
    under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that Witthohn’s cause
    of action was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.
    Appellees attached the following to their motion:          the settlement
    agreement, the state court’s orders denying leave to amend and
    dismissing the action, the order of the West Virginia Supreme Court
    denying the petition for appeal, and the transcript of the state
    court motion hearing.      After considering these submissions, the
    district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the
    action was barred by res judicata.
    This court reviews a dismissal for failure to state a
    claim de novo.   Mylan Labs, Inc. v. Matkari, 
    7 F.3d 1130
    , 1134 (4th
    Cir. 1993).    Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is inappropriate unless
    it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of
    facts to support his or her allegations.         Revene v. Charles County
    Comm’rs, 
    882 F.2d 870
    , 872 (4th Cir. 1989).          Ordinarily, a court
    may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint,
    or   not   expressly   incorporated   therein,    unless   the   motion   is
    converted into one for summary judgment.             Alternative Energy,
    Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 
    267 F.3d 30
    , 33 (1st
    Cir. 2001).
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    However, there are exceptions to the rule that a court
    may   not     consider   any    documents     outside   of    the    complaint.
    Specifically,     a   court    may   consider   official      public   records,
    documents central to plaintiff’s claim, and documents sufficiently
    referred to in the complaint so long as the authenticity of these
    documents is not disputed. Alternative Energy, 
    267 F.3d at 33
    ; see
    also Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 
    190 F.3d 609
    , 618 (4th Cir. 1999)
    (permitting consideration of extraneous material if such materials
    are “integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint”);
    Gasner   v.    Dinwiddie,      
    162 F.R.D. 280
    ,   282     (E.D.   Va.   1995)
    (permitting district court to take judicial notice of public
    documents, such as court records, even when the documents are
    neither referenced by nor integral to plaintiff’s complaint).
    Witthohn marshalls no plausible argument that the state
    court records should not have been reviewed on a motion to dismiss.
    A district court may clearly take judicial notice of these public
    records, and Witthohn does not dispute their authenticity.                  See
    Blue Tree Hotels v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts, 
    369 F.3d 212
    , 217
    (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that courts “may also look to public
    records, including complaints filed in state court, in deciding a
    motion to dismiss”).      Consideration of the settlement agreement is
    a closer question, since it does not appear to have been filed in
    the state court action and Witthohn does not explicitly mention it
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    in her complaint.1   However, as discussed below, the fact that
    Witthohn’s complaint is barred by res judicata is evident from
    review of the state court documents, even without consideration of
    the settlement agreement.    Thus, the issue of the propriety of the
    review of the settlement agreement need not be resolved, and the
    court’s consideration of the prior judicial record did not convert
    Appellees’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.
    A lawsuit is barred by res judicata when three elements
    have been satisfied: (1) there was a prior final adjudication on
    the merits; (2) the two actions involve either the same parties or
    persons in privity with those parties, and (3) the cause of action
    identified for resolution in the subsequent proceedings either is
    identical to the cause of action in the first proceeding or is such
    that it could have been resolved in the prior action, had it been
    presented.   Slider v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 
    557 S.E.2d 883
    , 887 (W. Va. 2001).2    Witthohn does not dispute that the first
    two elements are satisfied; however, she claims that her UTPA
    claims raised in the present action are substantially different
    1
    In her complaint, Witthohn states that the state case was
    settled but does not mention a written agreement.
    2
    The issue of whether Witthohn’s claim is barred by res
    judicata is decided by application of West Virginia law.        See
    Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 
    344 F.2d 894
    , 896 (4th Cir.
    1965) (holding that, when case is presented in federal court solely
    on the basis of diversity of citizenship, the rights and
    obligations of the parties is governed by state law); Braxton v.
    Matthews, 
    883 F. Supp. 1068
     (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (applying West
    Virginia law on res judicata).
    - 5 -
    than her claims against EZNET and could not have been brought in
    that action.
    We conclude that Witthohn is focusing on the wrong issue.
    The issue is not whether the evidence required to prove Witthohn’s
    claims against EZNET is substantially different than that required
    to prove her claims against the Appellees.       Instead, the question
    is whether the current claim is substantially different from the
    claim sought to be raised against Appellees in Witthohn’s motion to
    amend in state court.   That question is easily resolved, because
    Witthohn does not dispute that her current complaint and her motion
    to amend raise the same cause of action.
    The denial of a motion to amend a complaint in one action
    is a final judgment on the merits barring the same complaint in a
    later action.   Professional Mgmt. Assocs. v. KPMG, 
    345 F.3d 1030
    ,
    1032 (8th Cir. 2003).   Thus, denial of leave to amend constitutes
    res judicata on the merits of the claims which were the subject of
    the proposed amended pleading.    
    Id.
        This is so even when denial of
    leave to amend was legally or factually erroneous. Conley v.
    Spillers, 
    301 S.E.2d 216
    , 219 (W. Va. 1983).        The parties do not
    dispute that the UTPA claim in the motion to amend is identical to
    the UTPA claim raised in the present lawsuit.         Thus, the state
    court’s denial of leave to amend on the basis of the settlement
    agreement bars the filing of the same pleading in this lawsuit.
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    Accordingly, the district court properly found the      present suit
    barred by res judicata.
    Thus, we affirm the district court’s order.    We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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