Prince-Garrison v. Maryland Department of Health & Mental Hygiene , 317 F. App'x 351 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-1090
LINDA PRINCE-GARRISON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE, MARYLAND
BOARD OF PHARMACY,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:07-cv-01165-CCB)
Submitted: December 17, 2008 Decided: March 13, 2009
Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Michael J. Snider, Jason I. Weisbrot, SNIDER & ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Douglas F. Gansler,
Attorney General of Maryland, John S. Nugent, Assistant Attorney
General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Linda Prince-Garrison appeals the district court’s
order dismissing her complaint against the Maryland Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene, Maryland Board of Pharmacy
(“DHMH”) alleging race, gender, and national origin
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000) (ATitle VII@),
and disability discrimination under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12117 (“ADA”) (2000).
We conclude Prince-Garrison pled sufficient facts to create a
reasonable inference of retaliation. Thus, this claim was
improperly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim. We find the district court properly dismissed
the claims of disparate treatment and hostile work environment. 1
This court reviews de novo a district court’s Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim.
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Tolson, 513 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2008).
“The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the
sufficiency of a complaint . . . .” Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). In ruling on a
12(b)(6) motion, all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint
1
Prince-Garrison concedes on appeal that the district court
properly dismissed her age discrimination claim, claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (2000), and state tort claim.
2
are to be taken as true and all reasonable factual inferences
are to be drawn in the plaintiff’s favor. Edwards, 178 F.3d at
244. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does
not need detailed factual allegations, [it] requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1964-65 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The
complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974.
Under the notice pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A
civil rights plaintiff need not plead facts that constitute a
prima facie case under the framework of McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), in order to survive a
motion to dismiss. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
511-15 (2002). Nevertheless, the plaintiff retains the burden
to allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of her
claim. Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332,
346-47 (4th Cir. 2006).
A plaintiff pursuing a Title VII claim may either
offer direct evidence of discrimination or rely on the burden—
3
shifting framework that was adopted by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas. To plead a case of disparate treatment
sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Prince-Garrison
must show: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she has
satisfactory job performance; (3) she was subjected to adverse
employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside
her class received more favorable treatment. See Holland v.
Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 214 (4th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 955 (2008).
Prince-Garrison contends that she was subject to
disparate treatment based upon race, gender, and national
origin. The district court properly determined that Prince-
Garrison failed to state a claim of disparate treatment because,
by her own description, Prince-Garrison’s performance at DHMH
was never satisfactory, as she consistently received reports of
deficient work performance. In addition, Prince-Garrison did
not plead significant adverse employment actions, in view of the
voluntary settlement she entered with DHMH and her voluntary
resignation.
The other actions complained of by Prince-Garrison,
such as her employer’s failure to provide her with office
supplies, reprimands for insubordination, meetings with
supervisors, and directions to attend counseling, do not
constitute adverse employment actions. See Thompson v. Potomac
4
Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 651-52 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding
that neither “disciplinary discussion” prompted by employee’s
insubordination nor performance evaluation unaccompanied by
tangible effects on employment were adverse employment actions
for purposes of a retaliation claim under Title VII).
The district court also properly dismissed Prince-
Garrison’s claim of discriminatory discipline. This court has
found that to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory
discipline under Title VII, the plaintiff must show: (1) she is
part of a class protected by Title VII; (2) her prohibited
conduct was comparably serious to misconduct by employees
outside the protected class; and (3) the disciplinary measures
taken against her were more harsh than those enforced against
other employees. See Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d 507,
511 (4th Cir. 1993). An allegation of discriminatory discipline
however, does not necessarily require proof of an adverse
employment action. See Cook, 988 F.2d at 511. Because Prince-
Garrison failed to identify a fellow employee who engaged in
misconduct similar to hers or was disciplined in any way, the
district court correctly dismissed this claim.
Next, to establish a hostile work environment
harassment claim, Prince-Garrison must show she was subjected
to: (1) unwelcome harassment; (2) based on a protected ground;
(3) “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions”
5
of her employment and create an abusive work environment; and
(4) imputable to her employer. See Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d
733, 745-46 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a hostile
work environment exists, courts view the totality of the
circumstances, including Athe frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee=s work performance.@
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). A
defendant must show both that she subjectively perceived her
workplace environment as hostile and also that it would be
objectively perceived as hostile or abusive. Id. at 22.
The district court correctly determined that Prince-
Garrison’s conclusory allegations of discrimination on the basis
of race, gender, and national origin were inadequate to state a
claim. Prince-Garrison’s complaint did no more than set forth
the legal standard for a hostile work environment and wholly
failed to provide factual allegations to support her assertion
that such a hostile environment existed at DHMH. Accordingly,
we conclude the district court properly dismissed this claim.
Finally, Prince-Garrison contends that the district
court erred in dismissing her retaliation claim. To establish a
prima facie case of retaliation, Prince-Garrison must prove that
she engaged in a protected act, DHMH acted adversely against
6
her, and there is a causal connection between the act and the
adverse action. See Holland, 487 F.3d 208, 218. Protected
activity within the meaning of Title VII includes opposing
discriminatory practices or participating in any manner in a
Title VII investigation, proceeding, or hearing. Kubicko v.
Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 1999). The
adverse action need not be an ultimate employment decision, but
must be “materially adverse,” meaning “it might well have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination.” Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Moreover, to state a claim of retaliation, an
employee must be complaining of an unlawful employment practice
or actions the employee reasonably believes are unlawful.
Jordan, 458 F.3d at 338-39.
The district court found that Prince-Garrison failed
to state a claim of retaliation because she did not show a
materially adverse employment action. The court noted the fact
that an internal settlement between the parties retracted a
five-day suspension and a prospective termination, and gave
Prince-Garrison backpay. The court found a one-day suspension
that remained was not objectively material. Moreover, the court
found that Prince-Garrison failed to allege a causal connection
between the protected activity and any adverse action because
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three months separated her initial complaint of discrimination
and the purported retaliatory conduct.
We conclude that under notice pleading requirements,
Prince-Garrison stated a claim of retaliation sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss. Prince-Garrison engaged in
protected activity during the complaint process with the
Maryland Commission on Human Rights and when she repeatedly
complained of discrimination to staff at MHDH. Prince-Garrison
states that after her complaints she was prospectively
terminated and immediately suspended. After these actions were
rescinded, Prince-Garrison contends, she was micromanaged and
treated with hostility. Prince-Garrison asserts she was also
threatened with a cultural discrimination complaint to be filed
by her supervisor if she did not rescind her complaints. While
the activities Prince-Garrison complained of do not amount to
actual discrimination or harassment prohibited by Title VII, it
is enough for a retaliation claim that Prince-Garrison
reasonably believed she was engaging in protected activity by
complaining about them. Jordan, 458 F.3d at 339-40. Moreover,
the district court is incorrect in concluding that the mediation
and settlement resolved all adverse employment actions. Prince-
Garrison was threatened with suspension at least three times and
with termination twice, and despite later remedial action, there
remains an inference of retaliation for engaging in a protected
8
act. We conclude that because Prince-Garrison’s complaint
sufficiently creates an inference that retaliation occurred, the
district court erred in finding that Prince-Garrison failed to
state a claim of retaliation.
Accordingly we vacate the district court’s order
dismissing her retaliation claim and remand for further
proceedings. 2 We affirm the remainder of the order. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED
IN PART, AND REMANDED
2
By the disposition, we intimate no view as to the
appropriate resolution of Prince-Garrison’s retaliation claim.
9