Csicsmann v. Sallada , 211 F. App'x 163 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-2087
CARLOS G. CSICSMANN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL S. SALLADA, JR.; CGI-AMS,
INCORPORATED, formerly known as American
Management Systems, Incorporated,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (CA-04-1094-GBL)
Submitted: August 21, 2006 Decided: December 12, 2006
Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and Richard L. VOORHEES,
United States District Judge for the Western District of North
Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Judge Voorhees wrote
a separate opinion dissenting in part.
Adam A. Carter, Robert S. Oswald, NOTO & OSWALD, P.C., Washington,
D.C., for Appellant. Christine N. Kearns, PILLSBURY, WINTHROP,
SHAW, PITTMAN, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Carlos Csicsmann (“Csicsmann”), an information
technology worker, took leave under the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B) (“FMLA”) after having hip surgery.
Following his return to work, Csicsmann brought this action against
CGI-AMS, Inc. (“CGI-AMS”) and co-worker Michael S. Sallada, Jr.
(“Sallada”) (together “Appellees”), alleging that the Appellees:
(1) failed to restore him to an “equivalent position” under the
FMLA; (2) “regard[ed] him as disabled” in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C)
(“ADA”); (3) failed to accommodate him under the ADA; and (4)
retaliated against him for engaging in “protected activity” under
the FMLA, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (“ERISA”).
The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment, and the
district court entered judgment in favor of Appellees on all
claims. Csicsmann appeals the district court’s disposition. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
Given the procedural posture of this case, we summarize the
facts in the light most favorable to Csicsmann. Evans v. Techs
Application, 80 F.3d 954, 958 (4th Cir. 1996). In November 2003,
Csicsmann was Server Group Manager in the Information Technology
2
Server Group at American Management Systems, Inc. (“AMS”).1 He
directly reported to Carl Warner (“Warner”), who in turn reported
to the Vice President of Information Technology, Don Hirsch
(“Hirsch”). Appellee Sallada also reported to Hirsch but did not
directly supervise Csicsmann. In early November 2003, Csicsmann
and Sallada engaged in a heated argument when some AMS offices lost
computer connectivity. Csicsmann allegedly reported the incident to
Vice President Hirsch and complained that Sallada “badger[ed]
certain types of people.” J.A. 328.
Soon after the argument with Sallada, in December 2003,
Csicsmann took FMLA leave to have hip surgery. He was out of the
office until February 25, 2004. After his return to AMS, Csicsmann
learned that his position had been eliminated and that he would be
working on the Disaster Recovery Project. Csicsmann’s supervisors
assert that they designed the Disaster Recovery position
specifically to suit his “vast skill set” and that they assigned
him the high-level responsibility of developing a disaster recovery
plan, as well as creating processes for recovering corporate IT
infrastructure in the case of a disaster. Csicsmann’s salary,
title, bonus eligibility, health care, and retirement benefits
remained the same as in his prior position, although his job
responsibilities varied.
1
AMS is pre-merger incarnation of appellee CGI-AMS. CGI and
AMS merged in March 2004.
3
On March 4, 2004, Csicsmann informed his supervisors and the
AMS Human Resources department that his hip was increasingly
painful and inquired about adjusting his work schedule and taking
long-term disability. Human Resources provided Csicsmann with an
application for long-term disability status which he never
submitted.
On March 10, 2004, AMS announced its impending merger with CGI
Group Inc., and a CGI employee was tasked with eliminating 10% of
the positions in the IT department in which Csicsmann worked. On
May 5, 2004, Csicsmann’s position was selected for termination. By
the end of 2004, all of the duties previously handled by
Csicsmann’s IT department were transferred to CGI facilities in
Toronto and all of the Server Group positions at AMS were
eliminated. Csicsmann has held other employment since his
termination.
II.
After his termination, Csicsmann filed suit challenging AMS’s
conduct towards him in several respects. He argued that AMS
retaliated and discriminated against him because he took FMLA leave
and complained about Sallada, and that AMS viewed him as disabled
and improperly denied him a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.
Csicsmann claimed that his new position was less prestigious and
had different responsibilities than the old one. According to
4
Csicsmann it was therefore not an equivalent position for FMLA
purposes, and his assignment to it constituted an adverse
employment action.
The district court rejected all of Csicsmann’s claims. The
court found that Csicsmann’s new position was equivalent under the
FMLA and that the assignment to it did not constitute an adverse
employment action. The district court found that there was a
legitimate business reason for eliminating Csicsmann’s original
position and that it was not eliminated in retaliation against
Csicsmann for taking FMLA leave or for engaging in any protected
activity under ERISA or Title VII. Finally, the court found that
Csicsmann was not regarded as disabled under the ADA and therefore
he had no claim for an accommodation.
On appeal Csicsmann challenges each of these conclusions,
which we consider in turn. This court reviews the district court’s
grant of summary judgment de novo. Med. Waste Assocs. v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 966 F.2d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1992). We do so bearing in
mind that summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no
genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1996).
5
III.
A.
We first consider whether the district court erred in granting
the Appellees summary judgment on Csicsmann’s FMLA claim. Because
we agree that Csicsmann received an “equivalent position” upon his
return to work, we find no error.
The FMLA allows an employee who takes qualifying leave to be
restored either to his original, pre-leave position or to “an
equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and
other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (a) (1)
(2000). We recently explained that an employee does not have an
absolute entitlement to restoration of his pre-leave position after
taking FMLA leave. See Yashenko v. Harrah’s NC Casino, Co., 446
F.3d 541, 549 (4th Cir. 2006). Further, federal regulations
clarify that the requirement of equivalent terms and conditions of
employment “does not extend to de minimis or intangible,
unmeasurable aspects of the job.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.215. Examples of
terms and conditions that should be equivalent are the employee’s
work schedule or his place of work: physical and temporal aspects
of the job. Id.Here, Csicsmann argues that the new position was not
equivalent to the one eliminated while he was on leave. He further
argues that summary judgment is per se inappropriate because
equivalency is a fact-dependent issue for the jury. These
6
arguments fail, however, because even viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to him it is undisputed that his salary,
title, bonus eligibility, health care, and retirement benefits
remained unchanged in his new position. He continued to work the
same schedule at the same physical office. Although Csicsmann
argues that the new position was less prestigious and less visible
than the pre-leave position, these are the very intangible aspects
of the position appropriately excluded from an equivalency
determination. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.215. The concrete and
measurable aspects of Csicsmann’s positions were exactly the same.2
We therefore hold that AMS restored Csicsmann to an equivalent
position under the FMLA.3
2
The dissent takes issue with our determination that
Csicsmann’s new position was an equivalent one. We note intially
that Csicsmann was not entitled to any position: AMS had no
obligation to create a new one for him, but did so anyway. Given
that and the fact, as we discuss below, that the tangible benefits
of his position--salary, health benefits, disability benefits,
bonus eligibility, retirement benefits, and his title of
“Principal”-- remain the same, summary judgment was appropriate
under our precedent.
3
Csicsmann also argues that the new position was ultimately
slated for layoff while the pre-leave position was not, which
requires us to find that the position was not equivalent under 29
C.F.R. § 825.215. This is unpersuasive. The pre-leave position had
already been eliminated when Csicsmann returned to work, and the
entire department was eventually closed after the merger with CGI.
There is nothing in the record to support his theory that the pre-
leave position would have survived.
7
B.
We next consider whether the district court erred in granting
the Appellees summary judgment on Cscicsmann’s claim that Sallada
“regarded him as disabled” in violation of the ADA. Again, we find
no error.
The ADA protects an employee against discrimination by an
employer if the employee is “a qualified individual with a
disability.” Pollard v. High’s of Baltimore, Inc., 281 F.3d 462,
467 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12112(a)). A
disability under the ADA is “(A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C)
being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
We have explained that in order to defeat summary judgment, an
employee must show that the employer “mistakenly believe[d] that an
actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one of more
major life activities.” Rhoads v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 257 F.3d
373, 390 (4th Cir. 2001)(quoting Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am.,
Inc., 252 F.3d 696, 704 (4th Cir. 2001)). Proof limited to mere
speculation and inferences that an employer believes an employee to
be disabled is not enough for the employee to survive summary
judgment. See Haulbrook, 252 F.3d at 704 (affirming summary
judgment for the employer because plaintiff failed to present any
concrete evidence that the employer regarded him as disabled).
8
Csicsmann argues that he is protected by the ADA under part
(C) of the definition of “disabled,” see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2),
specifically that Sallada regarded him as disabled because he had
difficulty walking. Csicsmann argues that the reduced walking
required in his new position is “indirect proof” of such regard.
However, the record reflects no evidence that Csicsmann was put
into the different position because Sallada or other executives at
AMS felt that he could not perform the duties of his pre-leave job.
It is undisputed that the pre-leave position no longer existed:
there was no possibility of Csicsmann filling it. Moreover,
Sallada had even rated Csicsmann as a strong performer in a
performance review, and Csicsmann himself admitted that he did not
know what Sallada’s opinion was about his ability to walk. Even
viewed in the light most favorable to Csicsmann, these allegations
do not rise to the level of a genuine issue of material fact. We
therefore hold that summary judgment in the Appellee’s favor was
appropriate.4
4
It necessarily follows that summary judgment for the
Appellees on Csicsmann’s claim that they failed to acommodate his
disability as required by the ADA is also appropriate. To claim an
accomodation under the ADA, an employee must first show that he is
disabled. See Pollard, 281 F.3d at 467 (“[I]n order to come within
the ADA’s protected class, a plaintiff must first show that she is
disabled within the meaning of the Act.”) The facts that Csicsmann
failed to show that he was regarded as disabled and never argued
that he was actually disabled doom his claim for an accommodation
as well.
9
C.
We hold that because Csicsmann fails to make out a prima facie
case of retaliation under the FMLA, ERISA, or Title VII, the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Appellees on the
three retaliation claims was proper.
Our analysis of a retaliation claim under FMLA and ERISA is
similar to that under Title VII, requiring as a threshold matter
that the employee make out a prima facie case. See Yashenko, 446
F.3d at 550–51 (finding that retaliation analysis under the FMLA
follows the Title VII framework); Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 239 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that retaliation
analysis under ERISA follows the Title VII framework). To
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show
that “(1) [he] engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer took
adverse employment action against [him], and (3) a causal
connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse
action.” Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 242
(4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ross v. Comm. Satellite Corp., 754 F.2d
355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985)).
For the reasons discussed above, Csicsmann’s retaliation
claims founder on his inability to show an adverse employment
action. As we have explained, finding an adverse employment action
when an employer changes an employee’s job focuses on metrics like
the employee’s salary, benefits, and opportunity for promotion.
10
See James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 368 F.3d 371, 376 (4th Cir.
2004). The Supreme Court has recently clarified that to constitute
an adverse employment action, the “plaintiff must show that a
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action to be
materially adverse.” Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Rwy. Co. v.
White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006). Before White, “[i]n no case
in this circuit have we found an adverse employment action . . .
without evidence that the terms, conditions, or benefits of . . .
employment were adversely affected.” Munday, 126 F.3d at 243; see
also Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 255–57 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding
that transferring an employee to a new position is not an adverse
employment action “absent any decrease in compensation, job title,
level of responsibility, or opportunity for promotion” and that
these are only factors that should be considered in determining
whether an adverse employment action exists). White explains that
while factors other than the terms and conditions of employment may
be examined in determining whether an adverse employment action
occurred, this is still a heavy burden for the plaintiff: the
alleged adverse action must be material. See 126 S. Ct. at2412–15.
Here, Csicsmann argues that both the elimination of his pre-
leave position and his placement in the new Disaster Recovery job
are adverse employment actions for FMLA and Title VII purposes.
This court has never found an affirmative action on facts like
11
these where the terms and conditions of employment remained the
same. See Munday, 126 F.3d at 243. As White explains, trivial harm
is not enough to constitute an adverse action; rather, the harm
must be material. 126 S. Ct. at 2412–15. Cscismann fails to show
any material harm here–-indeed, he offers only evidence of
intangible alleged harms stemming from his preference for his
previous position. As an adverse employment action is a
requirement for a retaliation claim under FMLA and Title VII,
summary judgment to Appellees on these claims was appropriate.
Csicsmann’s ERISA arguments are somewhat different: he argues
that AMS’s final termination of him in May 2004 was an adverse
employment action in retaliation against his request for a long-
term disability application in March 2004. Even assuming that
requesting a long-term disability application is a protected
activity, Csicsmann offers no evidence to show that AMS’s proffered
business reason was pretext for discrimination. See Munday, 126
F.3d at 242 (explaining that an employee must prove that an
employer’s proffered legitimate business reason for taking the
alleged adverse employment action is pretext for discrimination).
It is undisputed that AMS-CGI moved the IT department to Toronto
and ultimately let go all of the former Server Group workers that
Csicsmann worked with. The merger and subsequent reorganization is
clearly a legitimate business reason for terminating Csicsmann’s
12
employment and he offers no evidence beyond speculation to refute
this conclusion.
Because Csicsmann does not meet his burden of proving a prima
facie case of retaliation under ERISA, FMLA, or Title VII, we hold
that the district court’s grant of summary judgment should be
affirmed on these counts.
IV.
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that the order of
the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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VOORHEES, District Judge, dissenting in part:
I dissent only with respect to the panel’s decision affirming
summary judgment in favor of Appellees on Appellant’s FMLA
“interference” or “entitlement” claim. I concur with the panel
majority on all other issues.
The FMLA requires an employer to restore an employee to “the
same or an equivalent position with equivalent benefits, pay and
other conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. §§2614(a)(1)(A) and
(B); Yashenko v. Harrah’s NC Casino Co., LLC, 446 F.3d 541,546 (4th
Cir.2006)(§2614(a) prescribes a “substantive floor” for employer’s
conduct and creates “entitlements for employees”)(internal
citations omitted). Section 825.215(a)of the Code of Federal
Regulations defines “equivalent position” and explains:
An equivalent position is one that is virtually
identical to the employee’s former position in terms of
pay, benefits and working conditions, including
privileges, perquisites and status. It must involve the
same or substantially similar duties and
responsibilities, which must entail substantially
equivalent skill, effort, responsibility, and authority.
29 C.F.R. §825.215(a)(emphasis supplied). “The requirement that an
employee be restored to the same or equivalent job with the same or
equivalent pay, benefits and terms and conditions of employment
does not extend to de minimis or intangible, unmeasurable aspects
of the job.” 29 C.F.R. §825.215(f).
In light of these criteria, Appellant Csicsmann contends that
CIG-AMS violated the FMLA by failing to offer him “equivalent”
14
employment following the elimination of his pre-leave position as
Server Group Manager (“SGM”). Csicsmann argues that the facts
presented in this case give rise to a jury question and that the
district court erred by deciding this issue as a matter of law. As
discussed in greater detail below, a review of the record reveals
that the differences between the SGM position and the Disaster
Recovery (“DR”) position are not merely de minimis, intangible or
unmeasurable. Because a reasonable jury could find that the jobs
are not “virtually identical” or “substantially similar” in one or
more ways expressly contemplated by the statute, a jury question
exists with respect to FMLA equivalency.
The Server Group was responsible for most of AMS’s corporate
server equipment for all AMS locations in the United States. As
Server Group Manager, Csicsmann was tasked with primary
responsibility for keeping AMS’s servers up and running around-the-
clock, three hundred and sixty-five days a year. Csicsmann managed
and supervised a team of approximately twenty-four (24) people, was
responsible for a multi-million dollar budget, had limited
purchasing authority for the Server Group, and reviewed monthly
expenditures with AMS’s Financial Advisor to the Information
Technology department. Csicsmann had partial responsibility for
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance and was also the technical lead for
corporate disaster recovery planning and implementation.
15
On February 27, 2004, the day after he returned from FMLA
leave, Csicsmann was notified that he was being reassigned to DR.
After reassignment, Csicsmann retained the same level of
compensation, bonus eligibility, health care, and pension benefits.
However, Csicsmann presents evidence that his role in DR was much
narrower in scope than his role as SGM. It is undisputed that
Csicsmann was no longer responsible for overseeing a departmental
budget, he had no purchasing authority, he had less contact with
the finance department, and had no role in the company’s Sarbanes-
Oxley compliance. Appellees similarly concede that Csicsmann no
longer managed or supervised anyone.
Csicsmann asserts that the DR job was a “made-up job with no
real responsibilities associated with it.” More importantly,
Csicsmann contends that reassignment to the DR position was more
akin to a demotion than reinstatement to an equivalent position as
prescribed by the FMLA. In addition to the differences in actual
duties already noted, viewed in the light most favorable to
Csicsmann, the following facts tend to support Appellant’s claim:
1) the DR position was never advertised or posted; 2) the new
position had no “Job Description” or identifiable duties; 3)
historically, DR as a whole was underfunded and had experienced
little success; 4) the decision to reassign Csicsmann to DR was a
last-minute decision; 5) Csicsmann had no DR job assignments for
approximately 2 weeks following the reassignment; and 6)the DR
16
position did not require the skill or effort that the SGM position
required.
In addition, the loss of supervisory or managerial authority
cannot neatly be classified as de minimis, intangible, or
unmeasurable. The loss of management or supervisory
responsibilities affected Csicsmann’s duties in a concrete manner.
Csicsmann no longer had any input regarding hiring or firing
decisions and was not responsible for performing annual employee
evaluations. Contrast the facts here with those presented in
Montgomery v. Maryland where this court explained that “[t]he
difference between “truly administrative” tasks and “answering the
phone, taking messages, typing simple correspondence, and the like”
is not of sufficient magnitude . . . to constitute an FMLA
violation.” Montgomery v. Maryland, 266 F.3d 334, 341 (4th Cir.
2001)(“Montgomery I”), vacated on other grounds, 535 U.S. 1075(2002); But see, Montgomery v. Maryland, 72 Fed. Appx. 17, **2
(2003)(unpublished)(although Montgomery I is not binding, “we are
persuaded that our reasoning remains valid”)(“Montgomery II”).
Relief from all supervisory duties would seem to be of greater
import than the purported differences in duties previously
addressed by this Circuit.
Csicsmann also became one step removed from his pre-leave
corporate hierarchal status. Piscottia, formerly Csicsmann’s peer
in terms of hierarchy of management, avers that he did not consider
17
Csicsmann’s transfer to be a lateral move. Likewise, Carl Warner,
Csicsmann’s former supervisor, was under the impression that
Csicsmann would be heading up the DR project and that Piscottia
would be reporting to Csicsmann rather than the other way around.
Warner testified via deposition that he would not consider it a
lateral move for Csicsmann to begin reporting to Piscottia. Warner
also testified that he had concerns that Csicsmann would quit
rather than accept the DR position. Warner’s testimony tends to
show that a reasonable jury could find that the DR position was not
equivalent to the SGM position. At minimum, this evidence creates
a triable jury issue regarding the equivalency of the DR position.
Moreover, Yashenko does not govern Csicsmann’s entitlement
claim. Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 546-550(“[T]he FMLA provides no
absolute right to restoration to a prior employment position.”) In
Yashenko, this court was not asked to consider the equivalency of
a post-leave reassignment because the plaintiff-employee did not
pursue any of the then vacant positions after his previous position
was eliminated. Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 550. As a result, the
court’s analysis focused on whether, and under what circumstances,
an employee may be entitled to return to the same position
following FMLA leave. Id. The Court also found, based upon
undisputed evidence, that the plaintiff-employee would have been
discharged even if he had not taken FMLA leave. Id., at 550. Thus,
Yashenko can be distinguished on multiple grounds.
18
Finally, the fact that Csicsmann’s compensation and benefits
remained the same is not necessarily determinative. Given the
objectives of the FMLA,“the restoration of salary, title, and
benefits does not necessarily constitute restoration to the same
position within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §2614(a)(1)(A) when the
job duties and essential functions of the newly assigned position
are materially different from those of the employee’s pre-leave
position.” Cooper v. Olin Corp., Winchester, 246 F.3d 1083, 1090-
92 (8th Cir.2001)(summary judgment improper on FMLA entitlement
claim where locomotive engineer was restored to position with same
job title, classification, pay, and benefits but limited to office
/ clerical duties).
For these reasons, I would REVERSE and REMAND on the FMLA
entitlement claim only, finding that genuine issues of material
fact preclude judgment as a matter of law.
19