United States v. Bell , 318 F. App'x 225 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4085
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TOBY MAURICE BELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:06-cr-00059-RLV-DCK-1)
Submitted: February 25, 2009 Decided: March 19, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lisa S. Costner, LISA S. COSTNER, P.A., Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina; Amy E. Ray, Assistant
United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a conditional guilty plea, Toby Maurice
Bell was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2006),
and was sentenced to 70 months in prison. On appeal, Bell
argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence secured as a result of a warrantless search of
the vehicle he was driving. Finding no error, we affirm.
This court reviews the factual findings underlying the
denial of a motion to suppress for clear error, and the legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337
(4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2009 WL 56500 (U.S.
Jan. 12, 2009). The evidence is construed in the light most
favorable to the Government, the prevailing party below. United
States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 704 (4th Cir. 2006).
The Supreme Court has defined the test for probable
cause as “whether, given all the circumstances, . . . there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238 (1983). When police rely on an anonymous tip to provide
probable cause for a search, the tip must be assessed under the
totality of the circumstances. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,
328 (1990). Bell contends that the anonymous tip relied on in
this case had no indicia of reliability, and therefore, the
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officers lacked probable cause to conduct the warrantless
search. He argues that the only corroboration of the tip
involved the detectives’ observation of Bell engaging in
entirely innocent behavior.
Bell argues that this case is controlled by the
Supreme Court’s holding in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
In J.L., officers frisked a man based solely on an anonymous tip
that a young man wearing a plaid shirt and standing at a
particular bus stop had a gun. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268-69. The
Court rejected reliance on the tip because it contained “no
predictive information” that the police could use to corroborate
“the informant’s knowledge or credibility.” Id. at 271. We
have held that corroboration of “predictive information is [not]
the only way to assess the reliability of an anonymous tip.”
United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 324-25 (4th Cir. 2004).
Where an officer has objective reasons to believe such a tip has
indicia of reliability, the officer can act on the tip to
investigate further “even without the presence of predictive
information.” Id.We conclude that, under the totality of the
circumstances, probable cause existed to support the warrantless
search. Police had confirmation of many details of the
anonymous tip reporting the presence of cocaine in the car
driven by Bell. Further corroboration was provided by the
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officers’ knowledge of prior drug trafficking by Bell and others
named by the anonymous caller, with specific reference to drug
trafficking by these parties between Statesville, North
Carolina, and Dublin, Georgia. Bell’s inaccurate response about
ownership of the vehicle and an alert by a trained drug dog in
the area near Bell’s car also were properly considered. We
therefore conclude the district court did not err in refusing to
suppress the evidence obtained during the search of the car or
Bell’s subsequent statement.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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