James Raynor v. G. Pugh , 817 F.3d 123 ( 2016 )

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-7746
JAMES HERMAN RAYNOR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
G. PUGH, Housing Unit #1 Manager,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
HAROLD W. CLARK, Director of Department of Corrections;
MARIE VARGO, Ms.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema,
District Judge. (1:13-cv-01117-LMB-JFA)
Argued: December 8, 2015 Decided: March 17, 2016
Before MOTZ, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the
opinion, in which Judge King joined. Judge Keenan wrote a
separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.
ARGUED: Brian David Schmalzbach, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellant. Trevor Stephen Cox, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: John D. Adams, Katherine Mims Crocker, MCGUIREWOODS
LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Mark R. Herring,
Attorney General of Virginia, Cynthia E. Hudson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General, Linda L. Bryant, Deputy Attorney General,
Public Safety & Enforcement, Richard C. Vorhis, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, J. Michael Parsons, Assistant Attorney
General, Stuart A. Raphael, Solicitor General of Virginia,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellee.
2
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
James Herman Raynor, an inmate at a Virginia correctional
facility, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2012), alleging that a prison official violated the Eighth
Amendment by failing to protect Raynor from an attack by another
inmate. The district court granted the official’s motion for
summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we vacate and
remand for further proceedings.
I.
Raynor, an inmate at Sussex II State Prison, suffers from
medical ailments, including seizures, blackouts, “blood issues,”
“heart issues,” and “breath[ing] issues.” In November 2012,
Raynor, who was housed with inmate K. Mullins, asked prison
officials to move him to a different cell with a “caretaker”
inmate who had volunteered to assist him with his health
conditions. On January 10, 2013, Raynor renewed his request
with G. Pugh, the Prison Housing Manager for Raynor’s unit.
That day, Pugh informed Mullins that he, instead of Raynor,
would have to relocate to a different cell.
According to Raynor, Mullins then threatened Raynor in
front of Pugh, saying, “it’s on,” that they were both “going to
seg[regated housing],” and that he “would physically assault
[Raynor].” Raynor alleges that, in response, Pugh stated that
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he did not care what Mullins did and ordered both men back into
their cell. Soon after, Mullins smashed Raynor’s television and
punched him in the face multiple times, knocking him to the
ground. Raynor alleges that Pugh watched the entire assault and
did not call for assistance or take any action until after the
attack had ended. Raynor also alleges that he sustained a
significant injury from the assault. In addition to temporary
facial injuries and bruising, when Mullins knocked him to the
ground, the impact assertedly damaged his spine and tailbone.
As a result of that spinal injury, he alleges that he now
suffers constant and severe pain, numbness, and loss of control
of his legs, and will be confined to a wheelchair for the rest
of his life.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Raynor filed
this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Pugh. 1
Raynor alleges, and realleges in an amended complaint, that
Pugh’s deliberate indifference to Raynor’s safety, and the
resulting injuries, constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
1
Raynor also named as defendants Director of the Virginia
Department of Corrections Harold Clarke and Sussex II Warden
Marie Vargo. The district court dismissed the claims against
these defendants because Raynor had failed to allege facts
supporting supervisory liability. Raynor does not appeal those
dismissals.
4
As evidence of Pugh’s deliberate indifference, Raynor
submitted a verified complaint and a corroborating affidavit
from another inmate, who had witnessed the assault. To support
his claim of serious injury, Raynor offered copies of several
requests for medical attention for severe spinal pain, numbness,
and uncontrollable falling after January 10th, some of which
attribute these issues to the assault. Raynor also submitted
six doctors’ reports describing spinal x-rays before and after
the assault, which he maintains describe damage to a different
section of his spine post-assault than had already been injured.
In an effort to further substantiate his claim, Raynor moved for
production of the following materials from the prison: the
security video of the incident, all prison reports related to
the assault, any prison policies or procedures detailing staff
responsibility for inmate safety, and any documents from the
prison’s investigation of the incident.
Although Pugh does not dispute that Mullins attacked
Raynor, he disputes essentially every other fact alleged by
Raynor. According to Pugh, Mullins made no threatening comments
in Pugh’s presence before the assault, and because the two
inmates had gotten along in the past, he had no reason to
anticipate one would attack the other. Pugh contends that he
was in a different part of the housing unit during the alleged
assault and was only “later informed” of an “altercation.” Pugh
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also maintains that, even if he had been present during an
attack, prison policy would have prevented him from physically
intervening without additional guards. He maintains that Raynor
suffered only minor facial abrasions, as reflected in the “mild
abrasions” noted in the medical report from the day of the
assault. Pugh argues that Raynor suffered ongoing spinal
problems due to a 2005 accident, so that to the extent Raynor
does currently suffer from chronic back pain, that pain is not
attributable to the asserted assault. Finally, Pugh points to
the lack of any written grievances or medical forms from Raynor
complaining of back pain before August 2013, seven months after
the assault.
Pugh moved for summary judgment, arguing that “Raynor did
not suffer a serious or significant physical injury for which
Pugh would be liable under the Eighth Amendment,” that “Pugh did
not have a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” and that Pugh
was entitled to qualified immunity. On the same day, Pugh also
moved for a protective order to stay discovery based on his
qualified immunity defense. Raynor opposed both motions,
reasserted his discovery requests, and filed a motion for an
examination by a back specialist.
The district court denied Raynor’s motions and granted
Pugh’s discovery protective order without reaching the merits of
the qualified immunity defense. Seven months later, still
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without resolving the issue of Pugh’s asserted immunity from
suit or ordering any discovery, the district court granted Pugh
summary judgment. The court acknowledged that the parties
“dispute[d]” both “defendant’s motivation in not breaking up the
fight between plaintiff and Mullins” and whether Raynor
“suffered a severe injury to his spinal cord.” However, it
concluded that these disputes were not “genuine,” due to an
asserted lack of evidentiary support for Raynor’s claims.
Raynor timely noted this appeal.
II.
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual
punishments” imposes certain basic duties on prison officials.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). These include
maintaining humane conditions of confinement, including the
provision of adequate medical care and, relevant to this case,
“reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically,
corrections officers have “a duty to protect prisoners from
violence at the hands of other prisoners,” for “[b]eing
violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty
that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”
Id. at 832, 834 (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted).
7
However, “not every injury suffered by a prisoner at the
hands of another translates into constitutional liability for
prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Makdessi
v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A plaintiff must satisfy a two-part test,
consisting of both an objective and a subjective inquiry, for
liability to attach.
First, the inmate “must establish a serious deprivation of
his rights in the form of a serious or significant physical or
emotional injury,” or a substantial risk thereof. Danser v.
Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. This
objective inquiry “requires a court to assess whether society
considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave
that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose
anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling v. McKinney, 509
U.S. 25, 36 (1993).
Second, an inmate must show that the prison official had a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which, in this context,
consists of “deliberate indifference to inmate health or
safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks
omitted). This subjective inquiry requires “evidence suggesting
that the prison official had actual knowledge of an excessive
risk to the plaintiff’s safety.” Danser, 772 F.3d at 347. The
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defendant must “be aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837
(emphasis added). An inmate can, however, prove an official’s
actual knowledge of a substantial risk “in the usual ways,
including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 842.
In other words, “a factfinder may conclude that a prison
official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the
risk was obvious.” Id.
However, “prison officials who actually knew of a
substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free
from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk.” Id.
at 844. In failure-to-protect cases, “prison guards have no
constitutional duty to intervene in the armed assault of one
inmate upon another when intervention would place the guards in
danger of physical harm.” Prosser v. Ross, 70 F.3d 1005, 1008
(8th Cir. 1995); see also Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 532
(4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“[S]uch heroic measures are not
constitutionally required.”). But “completely failing to take
any action” to stop an ongoing assault on a prisoner can amount
to deliberate indifference. Winfield, 106 F.3d at 532; see
also, e.g., Odom v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 773 (4th
Cir. 2003) (“[A] correctional officer who stands by as a passive
observer and takes no action whatsoever to intervene during an
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assault violates the [Eighth Amendment] rights of the victim
inmate.”); Williams v. Mueller, 13 F.3d 1214, 1216 (8th Cir.
1994) (“A prison official acts with deliberate indifference to
an inmate’s safety when the official is present at the time of
an assault and fails to intervene or otherwise act to end the
assault.”); cf. Prosser, 70 F.3d at 1008-09 (finding no
deliberate indifference where prison guard ran to get help
immediately after inmate threw first punch at plaintiff). Thus,
courts have found that “a corrections officer’s failure to
intervene in a beating can be the basis of [§ 1983] liability”
if the officer had a reasonable opportunity to act and “simply
refused to do so.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d.
Cir. 2002).
III.
With these principles in mind, we consider whether the
district court ignored genuine disputes of material fact and so
erroneously granted summary judgment to Pugh. We review a
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. PMB Prods., LLC v.
Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011). Summary
judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact
10
exists, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
For the objective-injury prong, Raynor alleges specific
facts describing the facial trauma and spinal injury caused by
Mullins’ attack. Raynor also submitted his verified complaint,
describing the assault and his injuries in detail; several of
written requests to the prison for medical attention,
complaining of severe back pain and numbness; and six medical
reports interpreting x-rays of his spine before and after the
assault. 2 He offered a witnessing inmate’s affidavit, which
describes the impact from Mullins’ final blow that allegedly
caused Raynor’s spinal injury. The witness swore that Raynor
“fell backwards and hit the floor on his buttocks. He hit so
hard he bounced off the floor and then landed again after going
about three or four inches off the floor. Mr. Raynor then
2 Our friend in concurrence suggests that Raynor “has not
yet raised a genuine dispute” regarding his injury because his
x-ray reports would be difficult for a lay person to interpret.
However, when faced with documents purportedly related to a
material issue but inscrutable to the court, we cannot
“eliminate the possibility that genuine issues of material fact
exist.” Matherly v. Andrews, No. 14-7691, slip op. at 20 (4th
Cir. March 16, 2016). Rather, summary judgment “should be
granted only when it is perfectly clear that no issue of
material fact exists.” Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., 252 F.3d
696, 702 (4th Cir. 2001).
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proceeded to slowly get up off the floor and had a dazed, pain
[sic] look on his face.”
Of course, Pugh does not concede the truth of these facts.
Rather, Pugh maintains that Raynor suffered no more than “mild
abrasions on [his] face and cheeks.” Appellee’s Br. at 6. Pugh
contends that, to the extent Raynor does suffer chronic back
pain, it is attributable to a 2005 accident. Pugh also points
to the lack of written complaints about back pain from Raynor in
the first seven months following the assault, suggesting that
Raynor began concocting a written record of this pain only after
he filed his § 1983 complaint in August 2013. A fact finder
might ultimately agree with Pugh, but Raynor has offered
contrary evidence as to material facts concerning the
seriousness of his injury which, at present, preclude the grant
of summary judge to Pugh on this prong.
Similarly, as for the subjective inquiry -- whether Pugh
acted with deliberate indifference –- Raynor has also offered
evidence preventing the grant of summary judgment. 3 In his
3 Part and parcel of our review of the district court’s
grant of summary judgment is Raynor’s claim that the court
improperly disregarded most of Raynor’s evidence. We agree that
the court erred in doing so. For example, in assessing the
deliberate-indifference prong, the court ignored Raynor’s
factual assertions about Mullins’ comments, concluding that
“nothing in plaintiff’s evidentiary submissions [] show[s] that
Pugh knew that Mullins posed a risk to plaintiff’s health or
safety.” The court then stated that, “[i]n fact, Pugh stated
(Continued)
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verified complaint, Raynor alleges two independent grounds for
establishing Pugh’s subjective knowledge of the risk of assault.
First, in his verified complaint, Raynor alleges that Mullins
told Pugh he was going to attack Raynor and that Pugh responded
that he did not care what Mullins did. This allegation, taken
as true, establishes that Pugh had “actual knowledge of an
excessive risk to the plaintiff’s safety.” Danser, 772 F.3d at
347; see e.g., Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir.
2000); Street v. Corr. Corp. of America, 102 F.3d 810, 815-16
(6th Cir. 1996).
Independent of this fact, Raynor also alleges that Pugh had
actual knowledge of the attack as it was happening because Pugh
watched the entire incident. Because he did so without radioing
for assistance or taking any other action, in Raynor’s view Pugh
did not respond reasonably to the substantial risk to Raynor’s
safety. The witnessing inmate’s affidavit corroborates Raynor’s
allegations, stating that during the assault Pugh stood watching
that the plaintiff had never mentioned having any problems with
Mullins, and that the two men ‘got along well’” -- apparently
crediting only Pugh’s factual assertions while ignoring
Raynor’s. But, of course, the nonmoving party is entitled “to
have . . . his version of all that is in dispute accepted, all
internal conflicts in it resolved favorably to him, [and] the
most favorable of possible alternative inferences from it drawn
in his behalf.” Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406,
414 (4th Cir. 1979).
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“behind the first set of chase doors smil[ing] with a two way
radio in his hand . . . which he never used.”
Pugh again disputes this version of events. He asserts
that he was outside of the housing unit during the assault and
saw no part of it. But where “affidavits present conflicting
versions of the facts which require credibility determinations,”
summary judgment cannot lie. Davis, 600 F.2d at 459-60
(reversing summary judgment where inmate alleged that “the guard
watched the knifing attack without acting to protect him,” but
the guard claimed he was not present); see also Pressly v.
Hutto, 816 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1987). 4
In sum, genuine disputes of material fact underlie both
prongs of Raynor’s claim. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248
(explaining that factual disputes are “genuine” “if the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
4 These factual disputes also defeat Pugh’s claim to
qualified immunity at this early stage, for Raynor has alleged
facts that make out a violation of a clearly established
constitutional right. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
232 (2009). Long before this 2013 attack, we had specifically
determined that a prison official who passively watches an
inmate assault without taking any action in response “violates
the rights of the victim inmate.” Odom, 349 F.3d at 773; see
also, e.g., Winfield, 106 F.3d at 532; Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of
Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010); Davis v. Zahradnick,
600 F.2d 458, 459-60 (4th Cir. 1979); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d
1147, 1152 (4th Cir. 1978).
14
nonmoving party”). Thus, on this record, the district court
erred in granting summary judgment to Pugh. 5
IV.
For the forgoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the
district court and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED
5 Raynor also argues that the district court erred in
denying him any discovery. Generally, a court should not grant
summary judgment when, as here, outstanding discovery requests
on material issues exist. See Ingle ex rel. Estate of Ingle v.
Yelton, 439 F.3d 191, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2006). The district
court stayed Raynor’s discovery requests pending resolution of
Pugh’s qualified immunity defense, in accord with Crawford-El v.
Britton. See 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998). But, without ruling on
the (meritless at this stage) qualified immunity claim, the
court granted summary judgment on evidentiary grounds, faulting
Raynor for “not provid[ing] any evidence, other than his own
affidavit, to support his allegations.” In so doing, the court
erred. On remand the district court should permit appropriate
discovery before entertaining any additional motions for summary
judgment.
15
BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the district
court erred because Raynor should have been afforded an
opportunity to conduct discovery, and because a genuine dispute
exists regarding whether Pugh acted with a culpable state of
mind. I write separately to state my view that given Raynor’s
complex medical history and his improper reliance on lay
causation opinion, he has not yet raised a genuine dispute
regarding the cause of his alleged injury. Nevertheless,
because that defect may be remedied during the course of future
discovery in this case, Raynor is entitled to have the district
court’s summary judgment award vacated.
I do not think that a reasonable jury could conclude from
the present record that Mullins’ attack, rather than other
factors, caused Raynor’s alleged back injury. Raynor’s complex
medical history includes seizures, cardiovascular issues, and a
back impairment that existed long before the attack. Prior to
that event, Raynor had fallen multiple times, seeking medical
treatment for his back pain. Moreover, various medical reports
both before and after the attack describe Raynor’s back
condition as being “degenerative” in nature.
A nonmoving party seeking to prevent summary judgment must
show a genuine dispute of fact using admissible evidence, not
16
merely conclusory or speculative statements. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c). Raynor’s own interpretation of his x-ray reports, and
his speculation regarding the causes of his back pain and his
falls after the attack, constitute conclusory and inadmissible
lay opinion on issues requiring “scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge.” Fed. R. Evid. 701(c). A layperson
could not determine whether the “multilevel spondylosis” and the
“facet arthropathy” described in a post-attack report differs
from the “multilevel lower lumbar facet arthrosis” and the
“spondylosis” described in pre-attack reports. Thus, without
expert testimony, a lay juror would be unable to determine
whether any change in Raynor’s spinal condition was attributable
to Mullins’ attack.
Although, in many cases, an inference of causation may be
drawn based on temporal proximity between violent contact and a
particular injury, such an inference is unavailable here.
Raynor’s medical history is sufficiently complex that a lay
juror could not rationally infer the cause of his existing back
problems. Unlike an injury that appears immediately following a
violent impact, Raynor’s degenerative spinal condition existed
before the attack and worsened after multiple falls during the
seven months following the attack. Nothing in the record
indicates that this type of spinal condition can be caused by
acute physical trauma.
17
Nevertheless, evidence revealed during future discovery may
yet establish material facts supporting Raynor’s claim of
causation. Therefore, I respectfully concur in the judgment in
this appeal.
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