United States v. Swain ( 1997 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                                     No. 96-4041
    JOSE SWAIN, a/k/a Little Jack,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley.
    Elizabeth V. Hallanan, District Judge.
    (CR-95-73)
    Submitted: March 27, 1997
    Decided: April 8, 1997
    Before RUSSELL, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL,
    Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    E. Ward Morgan, WHITE, SMITH, MORGAN & SCANTLEBURY,
    L.C., Bluefield, West Virginia, for Appellant. Rebecca A. Betts,
    United States Attorney, John C. Parr, Assistant United States Attor-
    ney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Jose Swain appeals the district court's calculation under the Sen-
    tencing Guidelines of his criminal history points in determining
    Swain's eligibility for the safety valve provision of 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (f) (1994). Swain contends that the district court violated his
    "substantive and procedural rights to due process of law" in that the
    court did not make sufficient factual findings regarding his criminal
    history. Specifically, Swain claims that the district court erred in fail-
    ing to conduct an independent inquiry regarding the reliability of two
    juvenile adjudications in Georgia. Finding no error, we affirm.
    Swain presented no evidence in the district court, and advances no
    argument in this court, that would suggest that the juvenile adjudica-
    tions are somehow deficient. "Without an affirmative showing the
    information is inaccurate, the court is free to adopt the findings of the
    [presentence report] without more specific inquiry or explanation."
    United States v. Terry, 
    916 F.2d 157
    , 162 (4th Cir. 1990) (internal
    quotations and citation omitted). Here, the district court stated that it
    found the information reliable and appropriately included in the crim-
    inal history score.
    Swain attempts to rely on Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) for the proposi-
    tion that a more specific finding by the district court was necessary.
    However, even assuming that the district court's statement finding the
    information reliable was somehow deficient, Swain's objection to the
    use of the juvenile adjudication, without more, is insufficient to create
    a controverted matter requiring any more specific finding. It was
    Swain's burden to show that the information in the presentence report
    was unreliable and "articulate the reasons why the facts contained
    therein are untrue or inaccurate." Terry, 
    916 F.2d at 162
    ; see also
    United States v. Gilliam, 
    987 F.2d 1009
    , 1013 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he
    Government carries its burden if a defendant fails to properly object
    2
    to a recommended finding in a presentence report that the court deter-
    mines to be reliable."). Swain did no more than suggest to the district
    court that the inclusion of the juvenile adjudications would overrepre-
    sent his criminal history. Without more, the district court did not err
    in calculating Swain's criminal history by including those offenses.
    The two juvenile adjudications gave Swain more than one criminal
    history point, which made him ineligible for the safety valve provi-
    sion. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (f). There was no error in sentencing Swain
    according to the statutory minimum. 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1)(A)(iii)
    (1994). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court
    and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96-4041

Filed Date: 4/8/1997

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021