Sewell Coal Company v. Bragg ( 1997 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    SEWELL COAL COMPANY,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    BESSIE M. BRAGG, survivor of
    No. 96-2512
    Ronald Bragg; DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
    WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
    LABOR,
    Respondents.
    On Petition for Review of an Order
    of the Benefits Review Board.
    (96-394-BLA)
    Argued: June 6, 1997
    Decided: July 11, 1997
    Before HAMILTON and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and
    GARBIS, United States District Judge for the
    District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: William Steele Mattingly, JACKSON & KELLY, Mor-
    gantown, West Virginia, for Petitioner. G. Todd Houck, MOLER,
    STATON & HOUCK, Mullens, West Virginia, for Respondents. ON
    BRIEF: Kathy L. Snyder, JACKSON & KELLY, Morgantown, West
    Virginia, for Petitioner.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Sewell Coal Company appeals from the Benefits Review
    Board's affirmance of the Administrative Law Judge's award of bene-
    fits pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits Act, 
    30 U.S.C. § 901
     et seq.
    to appellee Bessie Bragg, the widow of Sewell's former employee
    Ronald Bragg. Because the ALJ failed to adequately explain its rea-
    sons for crediting certain witnesses and discrediting others, we vacate
    the Board's decision and remand with instructions to the Board to
    remand to the ALJ for further proceedings.
    Ronald Bragg worked in the coal mines for Sewell from 1969 to
    1984; he died on February 2, 1992. The cause of his death is disputed,
    with Bessie Bragg, his widow, claiming it to be the result, at least in
    part, of his work in the coal mines, and Sewell arguing that some
    other cause, possibly his exposure to moldy hay while working on a
    landscaping project long after he had left Sewell's employ and after
    which he developed pneumonia, led to Ronald Bragg's death. Conse-
    quently, Bessie Bragg brought this claim for benefits under the Black
    Lung Benefits Act, arguing that pneumoconiosis, or black lung dis-
    ease, was a substantially contributing cause of her husband's death.
    At the administrative hearing before the ALJ, evidence was pres-
    ented both in favor of and against Bessie Bragg's claim that her hus-
    band's work in the coal mines contributed to his death. As the ALJ
    noted,
    the following doctors thought [that Ronald Bragg] had pneu-
    moconiosis: Drs. Andrada (who signed the death certifi-
    2
    cate), Rasheed [who performed the autopsy on Ronald
    Bragg], Gaziano, Ranavaya and perhaps Fino[,]
    J.A. at 220-21, and that
    the doctors who thought [that Bragg] did not have pneumo-
    coniosis were the state Occupational Pneumoconiosis Board
    and Drs. Hansbarger, Kleinerman, Caffrey, Naeye, Hutchins
    and Bush.
    J.A. at 221.
    Based upon this conflicting evidence, it is possible that substantial
    evidence would support a ruling either in favor of Bessie Bragg or in
    favor of Sewell. That, however, is not the issue before us. Rather, as
    we have repeatedly held, even where an ALJ's decision would other-
    wise be supported by substantial evidence, that decision cannot stand
    unless it is accompanied by explicit reasoning from which we can dis-
    cern that the ALJ's decision is not arbitrary and capricious. Thus, in
    Arnold v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 
    567 F.2d 258
    (4th Cir. 1977), we reversed the ALJ's denial of benefits, finding that
    the ALJ had failed to adequately explain the basis for its decision:
    Unless the Secretary has analyzed all evidence and has suf-
    ficiently explained the weight he has given to obviously pro-
    bative exhibits, to say that his decision is supported by
    substantial evidence approaches an abdication of the court's
    "duty to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine
    whether the conclusions reached are rational."
    Thus, we hold that the Secretary, in determining an appli-
    cant's entitlement to black lung benefits, must consider all
    relevant evidence, . . . and must indicate explicitly that such
    evidence has been weighed and its weight.
    
    567 F.2d at 259
     (citations omitted). And, in Jordan v. Califano, 
    582 F.2d 1333
     (4th Cir. 1978), we reiterated:
    Before we determine the substantiality of the evidence to
    support the administrative determination, we first ascertain
    3
    whether the Secretary has discharged his duty to consider all
    relevant evidence. A bald conclusion, unsupported by rea-
    soning or evidence, is generally of no use to a reviewing
    court, except in the very rare instance when a case is so one-
    sided as to be obvious. This case is not within the exception.
    Moreover, conclusory administrative determinations may
    conceal arbitrariness.
    
    582 F.2d at 1335
    .
    Here, the ALJ credited the testimony of the autopsy prosector over
    that of the non-examining pathologists, simply because the prosector,
    unlike the non-examining doctors, had the opportunity to perform a
    gross examination of Ronald Bragg's body; the ALJ, however,
    nowhere explained why such gross examination made the prosector's
    testimony more credible. Thus, in its original opinion, the ALJ recited
    in detail the various conflicting testimony over the cause of Ronald
    Bragg's death, but then explained that because Dr. Rasheed, the
    autopsy prosector, and Dr. Andrada, the pathologist who signed the
    death certificate, "actually examined the miner immediately after his
    death[,] . . . [they were] more credible tha[n] . . . the Employer's doc-
    tors who did not examine the miner, but only reviewed his [medical]
    records." J.A. at 221. Finding this explanation inadequate, the Board
    vacated the ALJ's decision, stating that, in addition to "first deter-
    min[ing] the credibility and weight of the reviewing pathologists'
    contrary opinions before according deference to the opinion of the
    autopsy prosector," J.A. at 228 (emphasis added), the ALJ was
    required to "provide an adequate rationale for concluding that the pro-
    sector's gross examination provide[d] an advantage over the opinions
    of the reviewing pathologists," J.A. at 228. On remand, however, the
    ALJ merely stated that it had "consider[ed] all the medical evidence,
    both pro and con . . . [and] assigned greater weight to the opinion of
    Dr. Rasheed . . . [because] Dr. Rasheed examined [Ronald Bragg] and
    performed the autopsy while the reviewing pathologists did not exam-
    ine [him] and only reviewed his medical records and slides." J.A. at
    225. The Board affirmed, J.A. at 235, and Sewell appealed.
    It is possible that the ALJ might have believed that the testimony
    of examining pathologists is always more credible than the testimony
    of non-examining pathologists on the issues of both the existence of
    4
    pneumoconiosis and whether the pneumoconiosis contributed to the
    coal miner's death; such belief on the existence of pneumoconiosis,
    however, would have at least been drawn into question by the testi-
    mony of the examining pathologist in this case. As Dr. Rasheed
    explained, the determination of whether pneumoconiosis is present
    depends largely on a microscopic examination of the decedent's
    organs, as "[s]ometimes it[ ] [is] difficult to evaluate the[ ] features
    [of pneumoconiosis] on a gross diagnosis. That's why sometimes you
    will find quite a bit of discrepancies between a preliminary gross
    diagnosis and a final diagnosis when it comes to pneumoconiosis."
    J.A. at 154-55. And, as Dr. Rasheed herself confirmed, the non-
    examining pathologists in this case had available to them all of the
    information upon which she (Dr. Rasheed) based her conclusion, and,
    consequently, the pathologists had sufficient information to evaluate
    her conclusion as well as to form their own:
    Q. In your report, d[id] you describe all of your findings
    . . . both gross and microscopic? And then d[id] you
    preserve all of the slides for other pathologists.
    A. Yes.
    Q. As the original prosector, do you have any maybe
    secret findings, something you haven't described in
    your report or preserved on the slides?
    A. I should hope not. Why would I want to keep anything
    secret.
    Q. In view of that, would you say that someone who is
    reviewing your report or reviewing the autopsy slides,
    the microscopic slides, would be able to see and know
    everything that you'd know from doing the autopsy
    yourself?
    A. They would see everything I see and they should . . .
    be able to see everything I see, but people see and
    describe things differently. I mean, I don't think you
    can get two pathologists to say the same thing on any
    single slide . . . .
    5
    Q. And aside from that fact that pathologists disagree, its
    your testimony that you've provided everything in your
    written report that you . . . ascertained?
    A. Yes.
    J.A. at 157-59.
    From the foregoing, it appears at least arguable, though perhaps not
    unassailable, that the non-examining pathologists in this case were in
    at least as good a position to evaluate whether Ronald Bragg had
    pneumoconiosis as it is defined in the regulations, see 
    20 C.F.R. § 718.201
    . However, Dr. Rasheed also noted that, as the autopsy pro-
    sector, she was in a better position than the non-examining patholo-
    gists to evaluate the destruction caused by Ronald Bragg's
    pneumoconiosis. Therefore, it would have been permissible for the
    ALJ to rely on Dr. Rasheed's opinion as the autopsy prosector to
    resolve the conflict over the cause of Ronald Bragg's death but not
    to resolve the conflict over the existence of pneumoconiosis in Ronald
    Bragg's lungs in the first instance.*
    We need not, however, decide this issue of whether the ALJ should
    have accorded the non-examining pathologists more credit than it
    actually did, or Dr. Rasheed less; that is not our concern. Rather, our
    concern is with the ALJ's failure to confront this and other testimony
    found throughout the record, and to explain the basis for his belief
    that the examining pathologist in this case was in a better position to
    determine both the existence of pneumoconiosis in Ronald Bragg's
    lungs and whether that pneumoconiosis, if it existed, contributed to
    Ronald Bragg's death, beyond the fact that only the examining
    pathologist had the opportunity to perform a gross examination of the
    decedent's body. Without such explanation, we cannot determine
    whether the ALJ's bald conclusion was based on an arbitrary belief
    that examining pathologists are necessarily better positioned to deter-
    _________________________________________________________________
    *Even Dr. Kleinerman, one of the experts relied on by Sewell, noted
    the existence of a single nodule of silicosis, which is sufficient to meet
    the definition of pneumoconiosis under the applicable regulation, see 
    20 C.F.R. § 718.210
    .
    6
    mine cause of death, or on a belief arrived at through consideration
    of the competing evidence on the issue in this case.
    Accordingly, we vacate the Board's decision, and remand to the
    Board with instructions to remand the case to the ALJ for further pro-
    ceedings consistent with this opinion.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96-2512

Filed Date: 7/11/1997

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021