Dira v. Deutch ( 1998 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
THOMAS D. DIRA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 97-1119
JOHN M. DEUTCH, Director, Central
Intelligence Agency,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
T. S. Ellis, III, District Judge.
(CA-96-990-A)
Submitted: April 7, 1998
Decided: May 26, 1998
Before ERVIN, Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER and
HALL, Senior Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Edward J. Tolchin, FETTMANN, TOLCHIN & MAJORS, P.C., Fair-
fax, Virginia, for Appellant. Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney
General, Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Leonard Schaitman,
Wendy M. Keats, Appellate Section, Civil Division, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; John L.
McPherson, Office of General Counsel, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Thomas D. Dira was terminated from his employment as an agent
with the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"). Dira asserted that his
termination and subsequent revocation of his security clearance vio-
lated sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 1 because they
were based upon his status as a recovering alcoholic. The CIA moved
to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), contending that Dira's
employment was terminated and his security clearance revoked
because his psychological profiles indicated that he was no longer fit
for duty. After briefing and a hearing on the matter, the district court
found that since Dira's employment was terminated for legitimate
security reasons, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the
merits of his complaint. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss may be supported by a party's
assertion that, based on extrinsic evidence outside of the pleadings,
the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.2 When such "factual" chal-
lenges are asserted, a trial court may go beyond the allegations of the
complaint, weigh the evidence, and satisfy itself as to its jurisdiction
to hear the case. Contrary to Dira's contention, the district court, in
assessing the sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations, was not
required to convert the Rule 12(b)(1) evidentiary hearing to a sum-
mary judgment proceeding.3 Exercising plenary review over issues
raised under Rule 12(b)(1),4 we conclude that the record is suffi-
ciently developed to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction
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1 See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 791, 794 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
2 See Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982).
3 Id.4 See Williams v. United States , 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1995).
2
exists. Thus, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by denying Dira the opportunity to conduct additional discovery.5
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's order dis-
missing Dira's complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of
jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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5 See Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393, 396-97 (4th Cir. 1986),
overruled on other grounds, Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392(1988).
3