Regina Gosnell v. Michael Astrue , 468 F. App'x 313 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1831
REGINA GOSNELL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Richard Mark Gergel, District
Judge. (4:09-cv-03142-RMG)
Submitted: February 22, 2012 Decided: February 28, 2012
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Paul T. McChesney, Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellant.
William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Marshall Prince,
Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina;
Debra J Meachum, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
Denver, Colorado; John Jay Lee, Regional Chief Counsel, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Regina Gosnell appeals that district court’s order
denying her motion for the award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to
the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)
(West 2006 & Supp. 2011). Gosnell moved for fees after she
prevailed on one of her three claims challenging an
administrative law judge’s denial of her application for Social
Security disability benefits. On appeal, Gosnell claims that
the district court failed to sufficiently explain its
determination that the Commissioner’s defense of her claims was
substantially justified and requests remand to the district
court with directions to further explain its denial of fees. We
affirm.
The EAJA provides that “a court shall award to a
prevailing party other than the United States fees and other
expenses . . . incurred by that party” in certain varieties of
civil litigation “unless the court finds that the position of
the United States” in such litigation “was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.”
28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Whether a position was adequately
justified turns on whether “a reasonable person” could find it
to have “a reasonable basis in law and fact.” Cody v.
Caterisano, 631 F.3d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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When denying a motion for EAJA fees, a district court
should explain the reasoning supporting its finding of
substantial justification. Id. at 144-45. Where the court
wholly fails to do so, remand for further explanation is
appropriate. Id. Although a district court is not required to
“perform a certain kind of analysis, recite certain magic words,
or follow a particular formula,” the record must be sufficient
to allow the appellate court to determine whether the district
court abused its discretion. Id. at 141-45.
Here, the record, containing the parties’ briefs, the
district court’s orders and opinions, and the district court’s
determination, based on the proper “substantial justification”
standard, that the Commissioner’s position was justified and
well-briefed, is adequate to allow review of the district
court’s denial of EAJA fees. Furthermore, the record indicates
that the district court appropriately considered the merits of
the Commissioner’s defense of each of Gosnell’s claims and
applied the appropriate legal standard when denying her motion
for fees. See Cody, 631 F.3d at 144-45.
Because we are able to adequately discern the
rationale supporting the district court’s denial of EAJA fees,
we deny Gosnell’s request to remand the case, and affirm the
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judgment below. * We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
Gosnell does not argue in her opening brief that the
district court’s denial of fees constitutes an abuse of
discretion. Therefore, this claim is not before us. See United
States v. Al-Hamdi; 356 F.3d 564, 571 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004)
(noting claims not raised in opening brief are abandoned).
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