Briggs v. City of Norfolk ( 2002 )


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  •                           UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    DONNA M. BRIGGS,                         
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    CITY OF NORFOLK, a municipal
    corporation, organized under the
    laws of the Commonwealth of
    Virginia; PAUL D. FRAIM,
    individually, and officially in his
    capacity as mayor of Norfolk;
    MELVIN HIGH, individually, and
    officially as the chief of police for
    the City of Norfolk; JAMES
    BROWNLIE, individually, and
    officially as a lieutenant on the
    Norfolk police force; R. K. ABBOTT,
    in his individual capacity; JAMES B.        No. 02-1287
    OLIVER, individually, and as the city
    manager of the City of Norfolk;
    JAYWARD HANNA, individually, and
    officially as lieutenant of the
    Norfolk police force; THOMAS
    SPRINGER, individually, and officially
    as a police officer for the City of
    Norfolk; ALAN BOSTJANCIC,
    individually, and officially as a
    police officer for the City of
    Norfolk; MARK RAILLING,
    individually, and officially as a
    police officer for the City of
    Norfolk; KAMALA HALLGREN
    LANNETTI, individually, and
    
    2                      BRIGGS v. CITY OF NORFOLK
    officially as the former assistant       
    attorney for the City of Norfolk;
    HAROLD P. JUREN, individually, and
    officially as the assistant city
    attorney for the City of Norfolk;
    JAMES PRENTICE, individually, and
    officially as a police officer for the
    City of Norfolk; CAPTAIN CROWDER,
    in his individual capacity,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    and
    THOMAS BALDWIN, in his individual
    capacity; LEONARD MERRITT,
    individually; TWO UNNAMED POLICE
    OFFICERS OF THE NORFOLK POLICE
    DEPARTMENT, in their individual
    capacities; JOHN B. GOODMAN,
    individually and in his official
    capacity as a magistrate for the
    
    Commonwealth of Virginia,
    Defendants,
    FEDERAL BUREAU   OF INVESTIGATION,
    Party in Interest,
    WACHOVIA BANK, N.A.,
    Garnishee,
    CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH; EVERETTE
    MARTIN, Judge of the Circuit Court
    for the City of Norfolk; PATRICK
    NORSK; BETTY BLACK; CHARLES
    CLOUD; MASON ANDREWS; DEBBIE
    MILLER; EUGENE REAGAN; MARVIN D.
    MILLER; CLIENTS AND PROSPECTIVE
    CLIENTS OF THE LAW OFFICES OF
    MARVIN D. MILLER; LAW OFFICES OF
    MARVIN D. MILLER; CLIENTS AND
    
    BRIGGS v. CITY OF NORFOLK                   3
    PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS OF THE JOYNES     
    & GAIDIES LAW GROUP, PC; LOUIS
    N. JOYNES, II; JOYNES & GAIDIES
    LAW GROUP, PC; DALE GAUDING;          
    DEREK YOUNG,
    Movants.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
    Jerome B. Friedman, District Judge.
    (CA-98-288-2, CA-99-83-2)
    Submitted: May 7, 2002
    Decided: July 31, 2002
    Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    COUNSEL
    Donna M. Briggs, Appellant Pro Se. Alan Brody Rashkind, James
    Arthur Cales, III, Krista Ann Griffith, FURNISS, DAVIS, RASH-
    KIND & SAUNDERS, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    4                     BRIGGS v. CITY OF NORFOLK
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Donna Briggs appeals the district court’s order granting the Defen-
    dant’s motion for attorney’s fees and sanctions based on Briggs’ con-
    duct during proceedings associated with her civil action against
    Defendants. In July 2000, the district court dismissed the last of
    Briggs’ numerous claims against Defendants based on Briggs’ "ex-
    treme misconduct" during trial. After we affirmed the rulings of the
    district court in Briggs v. City of Norfolk, Nos. 00-1839, 00-2014,
    
    2001 WL 265154
     (4th Cir. March 19, 2001), which represented the
    fifth appeal associated with this litigation, Defendants renewed their
    motion for attorney’s fees in the district court. The court awarded
    $2536.50 in attorney’s fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    16(f) based on Briggs’ failure to attend a pretrial attorney’s confer-
    ence, contribute to the preparation of the Final Pretrial Order, or par-
    ticipate in good faith in the final pretrial conference. Additionally, the
    court sanctioned Briggs for attorney’s fees of $28,196 based on attor-
    ney time necessary to respond to Briggs’ vexatious filings and behav-
    ior during the course of the proceedings.
    On appeal, Briggs contends there is inadequate legal basis for the
    court’s actions. Rule 16(f), however, authorizes the imposition of
    sanctions, including attorney’s fees, for a variety of conduct, includ-
    ing failure to appear at a scheduling or pretrial conference, participate
    in good faith in such proceedings, or for being substantially unpre-
    pared. See Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 
    769 F.2d 996
    , 999-1000 (4th Cir.
    1985). Moreover, the court possessed inherent power to impose sanc-
    tions for bad faith or vexatious conduct. See Chambers v. NASCO,
    Inc., 
    501 U.S. 32
    , 43-44 (1991). We review for abuse of discretion a
    district court’s decision to sanction under either the Rule, see
    National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 
    427 U.S. 639
    , 642 (1976), or its inherent authority. See Cooter & Gell v. Hart-
    marx Corp., 
    496 U.S. 384
    , 400-01 (1990). A district court abuses its
    discretion if its ruling is based on either an erroneous view of the law
    or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Brubaker v. Rich-
    mond, 
    943 F.2d 1363
    , 1374 (4th Cir. 1991).
    Briggs identifies no legal error in connection with the imposition
    of sanctions under the Rule but disputes the court’s assessment of the
    BRIGGS v. CITY OF NORFOLK                        5
    evidence. To prevail on this ground, Briggs must identify evidence in
    the record that leaves this court with the definite and firm conviction
    that the district court has made a mistake. United States v. United
    States Gypsum Co., 
    333 U.S. 364
    , 395 (1948). Briggs contends that
    the court ignored her inability to attend the attorney’s conference and
    contribute to production of the Final Pretrial Order for medical rea-
    sons. The court, however, noted that Briggs provided various excuses
    for her failure to attend, but added that chief among them was her lack
    of preparation. Moreover, there is no dispute that Briggs did attend
    the final pretrial conference, but came unprepared, not even having
    read the Final Pretrial Order prior to the conference. She then repeat-
    edly requested permission to leave the conference, which the court
    granted midway through the proceeding. While Briggs avers it was
    inappropriate for the court to hold her departure against her in light
    of its grant of permission to leave, the court stated it did so "based on
    her apparent heightened emotional state," and clearly saw no point in
    forcing her continued presence in light of her lack of preparation.
    Ultimately, the court determined that Briggs "attended the conference
    in bad faith because she had no intention of ever contributing to the
    conference." We will not second guess this determination by the dis-
    trict court, particularly in the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
    and accordingly find no abuse of discretion in its imposition of sanc-
    tions under the Rule.
    Under its inherent power, the court imposed sanctions based on
    Briggs’ vexatious and bad faith conduct. The court found that Briggs
    "repeatedly delayed and disrupted the orderly resolution of her claims
    by filing duplicative motions and memoranda, in addition to her
    steadfast refusal to accept any adverse rulings. Moreover, the plaintiff
    often failed to comply with the orders of this court and generally
    abused the litigation process."
    Briggs contends that her voluminous filings were necessary
    because the Defendants repeatedly objected to her discovery requests
    and the court repeatedly denied them. This argument effectively sup-
    ports the court’s observation that Briggs refused to accept adverse rul-
    ings and harassed the court with duplicative filings. Further, we agree
    with the district court that the docket sheet itself, reflecting Briggs’
    responsibility for over 300 filings, facially demonstrates the unwar-
    ranted strain that Briggs’ conduct placed on the resources of the court
    6                     BRIGGS v. CITY OF NORFOLK
    and the Defendants in a civil action that was not exceptionally com-
    plex. Briggs also expounds at length on the propriety of the district
    court’s discovery rulings, effectively rearguing the merits of her prior
    appeal. We decline, however, to address these contentions as we have
    already affirmed the lower court’s judgment and the propriety of the
    court’s pretrial orders is outside the scope of this appeal.
    Briggs next avers that the court’s failure to impose sanctions earlier
    in the proceedings evinces that sanctions were unwarranted. The
    court, however, in fact sanctioned Briggs $190 during the discovery
    phase based on her repeated filing of motions. Briggs also posits the
    flip side of this argument, that the court’s "prior penalties" against
    her, which appear to primarily consist of adverse rulings, ought to be
    enough and should preclude further monetary sanctions against her.
    The court, however, noted that the vexatious conduct continued
    despite numerous warnings and threats of sanctions by the court, and,
    indeed, even after imposition of a lesser monetary sanction.
    Briggs also appears to suggest that this court’s failure to seek trans-
    mission of the entire record to this court, and issue a more substantive
    opinion in her prior appeals, somehow divested the district court of
    jurisdiction to decide the sanctions issues before it. She also attacks
    the court’s jurisdiction on the grounds that the court failed to protect
    her witnesses and that public policy dictates against imposition of
    sanctions in civil rights or racketeering cases. Briggs cites no author-
    ity, nor are we aware of any, that would support these contentions.
    Briggs also complains, as she has in prior appeals, that the district
    judge was biased against her. Briggs demonstrates no basis for relief,
    however, as she identifies no extrajudicial source for the alleged bias.
    See In re Beard, 
    811 F.2d 818
    , 827 (4th Cir. 1987).
    Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
    imposition of sanctions in this case. The district court’s order is there-
    fore affirmed. In light of our disposition of this appeal, Briggs’
    motions for a stay of the district court’s order and for a continuance
    of this proceeding are denied. Similarly, Briggs’ motion to expedite
    is denied as moot. Briggs’ motions for release of funds and cancella-
    tion of garnishment are denied because they are outside the scope of
    this appeal, which relates to the district court’s order imposing sanc-
    tions. Finally, we deny Briggs’ motion for oral argument because the
    BRIGGS v. CITY OF NORFOLK                     7
    facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
    before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED