United States v. Carroll , 100 F. App'x 898 ( 2004 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-4793
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RICHARD TIMOTHY CARROLL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Richard L. Voorhees,
District Judge. (CR-02-227-V)
Submitted: May 17, 2004 Decided: June 15, 2004
Before LUTTIG, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
R. Deke Falls, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J.
Conrad, Jr., United States Attorney, Keith M. Cave, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Richard Timothy Carroll of being a felon
in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2000). Carroll appeals, challenging the admission of certain
evidence and the propriety of the district court’s denial of his
motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial. We affirm.
Carroll first contends that the district court erred by
admitting evidence of “other crimes” under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
Evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) if it is necessary,
reliable, relevant to an issue other than character, and more
probative than prejudicial. United States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d 305,
311-12 (4th Cir. 2004). “Limiting jury instructions explaining the
purpose for admitting prior bad acts evidence and advance notice of
the intent to introduce such evidence provide additional protection
to defendants.” Id. Our review of the trial transcript convinces
us that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting evidence under Rule 404(b). See id. (stating standard of
review).
Next, Carroll asserts that the district court erred by
denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim.
P. 29, by failing to prove that he possessed the firearms charged
in the indictment. Where, as here, the motion was based on
insufficient evidence, “[t]he verdict of a jury must be sustained
if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to
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the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 80 (1942). In order to prove a § 922(g) violation, the
Government had to show that Carroll voluntarily and intentionally
possessed the firearms.* United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134,
136 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing elements of the offense). Our de
novo review of the trial transcript leads us to conclude that the
evidence established that Carroll possessed the firearms. See
United States v. Ryan-Webster, 353 F.3d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 2003)
(stating standard of review).
Finally, Carroll asserts that the district court erred by
denying his motion for a new trial under Rule 33 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure based upon the sufficiency of the
evidence. We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 33 motion
for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Perry, 335 F.3d 316,
320 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating standard of review), cert. denied, 124
S. Ct. 1408 (2004). “[A] court should exercise its discretion to
grant a new trial sparingly . . . and . . . should do so only when
the evidence weighs heavily against the verdict.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). We find no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s denial of Carroll’s motion for
a new trial.
*
The Government also must prove that Carroll was previously
convicted of a felony and that the firearms had traveled in or
affected interstate commerce. Gallimore, 247 F.3d at 136. Carroll
stipulated to these elements of the offense at trial.
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Accordingly, we affirm Carroll’s conviction. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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