Shirley Stewart v. United States , 690 F. App'x 141 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-2221
SHIRLEY ANN STEWART,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge. (1:15-cv-01362-CMH-JFA)
Submitted: April 28, 2017 Decided: May 30, 2017
Before MOTZ and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Shirley Ann Stewart, Appellant Pro Se. Dennis Carl Barghaan, Assistant United States
Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shirley Ann Stewart appeals the district court’s orders dismissing as untimely her
case under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671-80 (2012), and denying her
motions to alter or amend and to vacate that judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and
60(b), respectively. This FTCA case arose from Stewart’s arrest following a search of
her home by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents. Time
limitations for FTCA actions appear in FTCA § 2401(b), which provides that:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is
presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years
after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after
the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial
of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.
We review de novo the dismissal of Stewart’s complaint under § 2401(b). See In
re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2014). Because Stewart filed
this lawsuit on October 19, 2015, over a year after she received a letter from ICE denying
her claim on September 11, 2014, the six-month limitations period set forth in § 2401(b)
bars this action.
Stewart protests that the district court should have considered the start of this
action to be the date she filed a prior lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. Stewart filed that lawsuit within the six-month limitations period,
but the D.C. District Court found venue improper in its district. Where, as here, a
plaintiff has timely brought an action in the wrong district in federal court, the court saves
the case through transfer to a proper venue. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S.
424, 430 (1965). Consistent with that procedure, the D.C. District Court attempted to
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transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
and when that transfer failed, the D.C. District Court directed Stewart to resubmit her
complaint to it for proper transfer. Stewart’s remedy was therefore not through this
separate, belated action in the Eastern District of Virginia, but through compliance with
the instructions of the D.C. District Court. Her failure to take advantage of that remedy
indicated a lack of diligent pursuit, and therefore, the D.C. lawsuit cannot serve as the
basis for the timeliness of this separate action. Cf. id. (recognizing that timely filing suit
against federal government in wrong district in federal court indicates diligent pursuit of
lawsuit, and therefore, lawsuit should continue through transfer to proper venue).
Stewart also questions whether the six-month limitations period ever commenced.
Stewart argues that the ICE denial letter did not trigger the six-month period because she
had complained to other agencies and never received a response. Section 2401(b)
requires plaintiffs to file their complaints with the “appropriate Federal agency,” meaning
the “agency whose activities gave rise to the claim.” 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 (2008). The
activities of ICE gave rise to Stewart’s claim because ICE agents conducted the search,
seizure, and arrest at issue in Stewart’s complaint. Thus, ICE’s denial commenced the
six-month period for filing an action in court, and the other agencies’ lack of response is
irrelevant.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not err when it dismissed
Stewart’s FTCA case. Based on our review of the district court’s ruling, we also
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Stewart’s Rule
59(e) and 60(b) motions. Thus, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We also deny
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Stewart’s motion to appoint or assign counsel. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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