United States v. Jones , 174 F. App'x 791 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4814
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ORLANDO JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. Frank W. Bullock, Jr.,
District Judge. (CR-00-320)
Submitted: March 15, 2006 Decided: April 10, 2006
Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert L. McClellan, J. Marshall Shelton, IVEY, MCCLELLAN, GATTON
& TALCOTT, LLP, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna
Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Lisa B. Boggs, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Orlando Jones appeals the imposition of a 120-month term
of incarceration following his plea of guilty to disqualified
possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2000).
Because we find that Jones’ claims of sentencing error are without
merit, we affirm.
Jones first asserts his convictions at ages nineteen and
twenty for which he was placed in the South Carolina Department of
Corrections, Youthful Offender Division, should be considered
juvenile convictions and not used to compute his criminal history.
We find that the district court properly applied the Sentencing
Guidelines in determining Jones’ criminal history. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(d) (2003).
Jones next asserts the district court erred by enhancing
his offense level two points for reckless endangerment during
flight pursuant to USSG § 3C1.2. We review the district court’s
determination of the facts for clear error; its decision that the
adjustment applied based on those facts is reviewed de novo.
United States v. Chong, 285 F.3d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 2002). The
district court found that when Jones fled from a traffic stop he
reached speeds of seventy-five miles per hour in a residential
neighborhood on icy roads and ignored traffic signals in his
flight. See USSG § 3C1.2, comment (n.2). We find the enhancement
was properly applied.
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Moreover, we find that Jones’ South Carolina conviction
for burglary second degree (dwelling) is a “violent felony” for
purposes of computing his base offense level pursuant to USSG
§ 2K2.1. Burglary of a dwelling is a listed offense in the
definition of a crime of violence, USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2). See USSG
§ 2K2.1, comment (n.5). We reject Jones’ contention that whether
the South Carolina burglary offense is a “violent felony” for
purposes of determining his base offense level is controlled by
South Carolina’s characterization of the offense as non-violent.
See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590 (1990) (noting that
elements of state offenses are determinative regardless of
technical definitions and labels under state law); see also United
States v. Sacko, 247 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting that
“because a state’s classification of a crime generally reflects
different policy considerations than the federal classification, it
is simply not relevant to the determination of whether a crime is
a ‘violent felony’” under federal law).
Jones’ arguments relating to enhancements not imposed at
sentencing are not properly before this court. See Texas v. United
States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998). Because the district court
properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines and considered the
relevant sentencing factors before imposing the 120-month sentence,
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West Supp. 2005); see United States v.
Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005), we find that the
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sentence imposed was reasonable. See United States v. Green, 436
F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[A] sentence imposed within the
properly calculated [g]uidelines range . . . is presumptively
reasonable.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Accordingly, we affirm Jones’ sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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