United States v. Sturgis , 230 F. App'x 336 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4637
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
J. LEE STURGIS, a/k/a Jay Lee Sturgis,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees,
District Judge. (5:04-cr-00043-3)
Submitted: March 7, 2007 Decided: May 10, 2007
Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Aaron E. Michel, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen
C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Thomas Cullen, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
J. Lee Sturgis appeals his conviction following his
guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a
quantity of cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846 (2000). Sturgis argues that the district court erred in
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and in determining
that the Government did not breach the plea agreement and denying
his motion to vacate the plea agreement. Finding no error, we
affirm.
Sturgis entered into a written plea agreement with the
Government that included a clause that the Government may move to
reduce his mandatory life sentence if Sturgis cooperated and
rendered substantial assistance to the Government. The plea
agreement stated that it was within the Government’s sole
discretion to determine whether Sturgis’s assistance was
substantial. The plea agreement further provided that if Sturgis
gave false testimony, the United States would be relieved of its
obligations under the plea agreement.
In January 2005, Sturgis was debriefed and admitted to
multiple roles in a drug distribution network, including receiving
and distributing cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana. Sturgis
testified at the sentencing hearing of Roderick Williams in
December 2005, and stated under oath that he was only a drug
addict, and was not a drug dealer. Based on this testimony, which
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was inconsistent with his statements to the investigating case
agent, the Government decided that it would not move for a sentence
reduction based on substantial assistance.* Sturgis then moved to
withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate the plea agreement based on
the Government’s alleged breach. The district court denied the
motions, finding that Sturgis’s guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary and that the Government did not abuse its discretion in
failing to make the motion for a sentence reduction.
Sturgis contends that the district court erred in denying
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This court reviews the
district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for
an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421,
424 (4th Cir. 2000). Withdrawal of a guilty plea is not a matter
of right. Id. (citing United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248
(4th Cir. 1991)). The defendant bears the burden of showing a
“fair and just reason” for the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). “[A] ‘fair and just’ reason . . . is one
that essentially challenges. . . the fairness of the Rule 11
proceeding.” United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th
*
The Government also had reservations whether Sturgis’s
declarations that he knew a major player in drug trafficking, Alvis
Mosely, and that he did not have knowledge of or participate in the
murder of Bobby Houston were truthful. However, the Government’s
decision not to move for a sentence reduction was based on
Sturgis’s false testimony at the Williams sentencing hearing
regarding his own role in drug trafficking, and there is no
evidence that Sturgis’s statements concerning Mosely or Houston
were factors in the decision.
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Cir. 1992) (en banc). An appropriately conducted Rule 11
proceeding, however, raises a strong presumption that the guilty
plea is final and binding. Id. Courts consider six factors in
determining whether to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea:
(1) whether the defendant has offered credible evidence
that his plea was not knowing or otherwise involuntary;
(2) whether the defendant has credibly asserted his legal
innocence; (3) whether there has been a delay between
entry of the plea and filing of the motion; (4) whether
the defendant has had close assistance of counsel;
(5) whether withdrawal will cause prejudice to the
government; and (6) whether withdrawal will inconvenience
the court and waste judicial resources.
Ubakanma, 215 F.3d at 424 (citing Moore, 931 F.2d at 248 (footnote
omitted)).
Sturgis argues that the six-factor test should not apply
to his case because his guilty plea was made based upon unfulfilled
promises by the Government in violation of the due process clause.
Sturgis also argues that the breach by the Government made his plea
involuntary. We do not agree. Sturgis does not put forth
sufficient evidence to show that his plea was not voluntary and
knowing. Therefore it was not an abuse of discretion for the court
to find the plea was voluntary without consideration of the alleged
breach.
Sturgis also challenges the district court’s denial of
his motion to vacate the plea agreement for breach by the
Government. A plea agreement is breached when a government promise
that induces the plea goes unfulfilled. Santobello v. New York,
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404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ringling, 988 F.2d 504,
506 (4th Cir. 1993). The interpretation of a plea agreement is
“guided by contract law, and parties to the agreement should
receive the benefit of their bargain.” United States v. McQueen,
108 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1997). “It is well—established that the
interpretation of plea agreements is rooted in contract law, and
that ‘each party should receive the benefit of its bargain.’”
United States v. Peglera, 33 F.3d 412, 413 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Ringling, 988 F.2d at 506). A criminal defendant asserting that
the Government breached a plea agreement bears the burden of
proving such a breach by a preponderance of the evidence. United
States v. Snow, 234 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2000).
First, under the plea agreement, the Government had the
sole discretion whether to move for a reduction in sentence due to
substantial assistance. The plea agreement placed no obligation on
the Government in this regard, and no reasonable reading of the
agreement can support such a construction. See United States v.
Wallace, 22 F.3d 84, 87 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting plea agreement did
not include obligation to file departure motion, but reserved
discretion to file with Government). In fact, the plea agreement
states that “if the defendant gives false testimony, the United
States will be relieved of its obligations” under the plea
agreement. Furthermore, Sturgis failed to make “a substantial
threshold showing” that the Government’s refusal to file a
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substantial assistance motion was based on an unconstitutional
motive. Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992). We
conclude that the Government did not breach the plea agreement in
this case by failing to move for a substantial assistance reduction
under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (2004) or for a
downward sentencing variance, and therefore it was not error for
the district court to deny Sturgis’s motion.
We therefore affirm Sturgis’s conviction. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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