Digaffa Urga v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 461 F. App'x 319 ( 2012 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-1581
    DIGAFFA BALCHA URGA,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals.
    Submitted:   October 31, 2011               Decided:   January 9, 2012
    Before MOTZ, KING, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
    Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    David A. Garfield, GARFIELD LAW GROUP, LLP, Washington, D.C.,
    for Petitioner. Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, James E.
    Grimes, Senior Litigation Counsel, Walter Bocchini, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Digaffa Balcha Urga, a native and citizen of Ethiopia,
    petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals (“Board”) denying her motion to reconsider the denial of
    her motion to reopen.                Because we conclude that the Board did
    not    abuse        its     discretion       in     finding        that    Urga        was    not
    sufficiently          diligent      to    support         equitable       tolling       of    the
    ninety-day period in which to file a motion to reopen, we deny
    the petition for review.
    The denial of a motion to reconsider is reviewed for
    abuse of discretion.               Narine v. Holder, 
    559 F.3d 246
    , 249 (4th
    Cir. 2009); Jean v. Gonzales, 
    435 F.3d 475
    , 481 (4th Cir. 2006);
    
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (a) (2011).                 A motion to reconsider asserts the
    Board made an error of fact or law in its earlier decision. 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (b).          This     court    will    reverse       a    denial       of   a
    motion       to    reconsider       “only    if     the    Board     acted      arbitrarily,
    irrationally, or contrary to law.”                          Narine, 
    559 F.3d at 249
    (internal         quotation       marks   omitted).          A   motion        to    reconsider
    must “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors
    of    fact     or    law    in     the    prior     Board    decision          and    shall       be
    supported by pertinent authority.”                    
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (b)(1); see
    also     8     U.S.C.       §     1229a(c)(6)(C)          (2006)     (“The          motion    [to
    reconsider]         shall       specify   the     errors    of     law    or    fact    in    the
    previous order and shall be supported by pertinent authority.”).
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    “[A]dministrative       findings   of    fact    are    conclusive      unless   any
    reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
    contrary.”     
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B) (2006).
    A motion to reopen “shall be filed within 90 days of
    the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.”
    8   U.S.C.    §   1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)          (2006);     see     also    
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(2) (2011).           In the order denying reconsideration,
    the Board assumed that the ninety day period in which to file a
    motion to reopen was tolled until Urga’s current counsel was
    retained.      The     Board   found    Urga    did    not    provide   sufficient
    reasons to continue to toll the ninety day period after she
    retained     counsel    and    discovered      her    first    counsel’s     alleged
    ineffectiveness.        We conclude that the Board did not abuse its
    discretion in finding that Urga did not establish extraordinary
    circumstances that would warrant tolling the ninety day period
    any further.      See Harris v. Hutchinson, 
    209 F.3d 325
    , 330 (4th
    Cir. 2000) (equitable tolling may be appropriate if the litigant
    can show some extraordinary circumstance beyond her control that
    prevented her from complying with the statutory time limit); see
    also Hernandez-Moran v. Gonzales, 
    408 F.3d 496
    , 499-500 (8th
    Cir. 2005) (equitable tolling is granted sparingly and alien
    must demonstrate extraordinary circumstances).                    We find there
    was nothing extraordinary about the reasons Urga offered to show
    why it took her new counsel longer than ninety days to file the
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    motion   to    reopen.      Counsel’s      delay      in   filing       the   motion     to
    reopen does not entitle Urga to equitable tolling.                            See, e.g.,
    Rouse v.      Lee,   
    339 F.3d 238
    ,    248-49     (4th       Cir.    2003)      (habeas
    petitioner’s counsel’s mistake does not serve as a ground for
    equitable tolling because counsel’s actions are attributable to
    petitioner).
    Accordingly,    we    deny       the   petition      for     review.       We
    dispense      with   oral    argument       because        the     facts      and    legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    PETITION DENIED
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