United States v. Dean Seagers , 635 F. App'x 132 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4502
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEAN NELSON SEAGERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:06-cr-00967-PMD-1)
Submitted: March 23, 2016 Decided: March 29, 2016
Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Sean Kittrell, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dean Nelson Seagers appeals the district court’s judgment
revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to a
term of 24 months’ imprisonment, to run concurrent with his
state sentence. In accordance with Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), Seagers’ counsel has filed a brief certifying
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Although
informed of his right to file a pro se brief, Seagers has not
done so. We affirm the district court’s judgment.
“We review a district court’s ultimate decision to revoke a
defendant’s supervised release for abuse of discretion.” United
States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015). Here, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Seagers’
supervised release because the revocation was based on Seagers’
arrest and convictions for several state narcotic offenses. See
United States v. Spraglin, 418 F.3d 479, 480-81 (5th Cir. 2005)
(per curiam) (relying on constitutional protections afforded a
defendant at a criminal trial, including higher standard of
proof for criminal conviction, to conclude that criminal
conviction pending appeal satisfies preponderance standard for
finding supervised release violation).
Turning to the sentence imposed by the district court,
“[w]e will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the
statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United
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States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We first review the district court’s
sentence for “significant procedural error.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Next, we review the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the totality of the
circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its
discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied
the standards set forth in § 3553(a),” United States v. Gomez-
Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 382 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks
omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 305 (2014), as applicable to
a revocation of supervised release proceeding, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e). When reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a
revocation sentence, an appellate court may apply a presumption
of reasonableness where the imposed term falls within the
Sentencing Guidelines policy statement range. United States v.
Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d 416, 425 (4th Cir. 2015). Finally,
because Seagers did not object to the imposed term of
imprisonment before the district court, our review is for plain
error. Webb, 738 F.3d at 640-41. Our review of the record
reveals neither a procedural error nor anything overcoming the
applicable presumption of reasonableness that accompanies the
district court’s imposition of a within-Guidelines sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
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appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Seagers, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Seagers requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Seagers.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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