United States v. Curtis Madina , 474 F. App'x 919 ( 2012 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-4481
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    CURTIS ANTHONY MADINA,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.     Robert J. Conrad,
    Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:09-cr-00128-RJC-DSC-1)
    Submitted:   March 19, 2012                 Decided:   April 10, 2012
    Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    W. Rob Heroy, TIN, FULTON, WALKER & OWEN, Charlotte, North
    Carolina, for Appellant.      Anne M. Tompkins, United States
    Attorney, Richard Lee Edwards, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Curtis     Anthony     Madina      was   convicted    of:     possession
    with    intent    to    distribute      marijuana,       
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1)
    (2006)      (Count     One);   possessing        or     carrying    a    firearm   in
    furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)
    (2006) (Count Two); and possession of an unregistered firearm,
    
    26 U.S.C. §§ 5841
    , 5861(d) (2006) (Count Three).                       He received an
    aggregate sentence of ninety-three months.                     Madina now appeals
    his    convictions      on   Counts    One    and     Two,    contending    that   the
    district court erroneously denied his Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion
    for judgment of acquittal on those counts.                   We affirm.
    We review de novo the district court’s decision to
    deny a Rule 29 motion.            United States v. Hickman, 
    626 F.3d 756
    ,
    762 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
    132 S. Ct. 469
     (2011).                          We
    will sustain the jury’s verdict if, viewing the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the Government, “any rational trier of
    fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
    a reasonable doubt.”           United States v. Green, 
    599 F.3d 360
    , 367
    (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 340
       (2010).      We     “assume    that    the    jury    resolved   all
    contradictions in testimony in favor of the Government.”                       United
    States v. Penniegraft, 
    641 F.3d 566
    , 572 (4th Cir.) (internal
    quotation marks and alteration omitted), cert. denied, 
    132 S. Ct. 564
     (2011).
    2
    Evidence at trial established that officers conducting
    a pat-down search of Madina in connection with a traffic stop
    recovered      a    bag     containing     a     digital    scale      and    twenty-eight
    smaller     bags      of     marijuana.            Officers        also      recovered    an
    unregistered, .22 caliber sawed-off shotgun from the floorboard
    where Madina had been seated.                  Madina claimed that the marijuana
    was for his personal use.                He also admitted that the firearm was
    his.
    A    forensic    analyst        testified        that   she     tested     the
    contents of nine of the smaller bags, and the net weight of the
    contents of those bags alone was over forty-nine grams.                                   She
    also     stated      that     the    contents       of    the      remaining     bags     was
    marijuana.          A special agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
    and Firearms testified that the quantity of marijuana and the
    method    of       packaging    were     consistent        with     drug     dealing,     not
    personal use.         He further stated that the presence of the scale
    suggested      distribution,         not   mere     use,     and    that     drug   dealers
    often    carry       firearms       in   order     to    intimidate       others    and    to
    protect their drugs.
    “To convict a defendant of possession with the intent
    to distribute, the government must prove: (1) possession of a
    narcotic controlled substance; (2) knowledge of the possession;
    and (3) the intent to distribute.”                        United States v. Collins,
    
    412 F.3d 515
    , 519 (4th Cir. 2005).                      There is no dispute that the
    3
    first    two    requirements          are     met.     Whether      Madina      intended     to
    distribute the marijuana is the only issue before us.                              Intent to
    distribute narcotics may be inferred from the packaging of drugs
    in   a   manner      that      would     facilitate       their     sale     or     from    the
    presence of a quantity of drugs larger than needed for personal
    use.     United States v. Fisher, 
    912 F.2d 728
    , 730-31 (4th Cir.
    1990).          Possession          of        firearms     constitutes            “additional
    circumstantial           evidence        of    . . .     involvement         in     narcotics
    distribution.”           
    Id. at 731
    .          Finally, possession of a scale also
    is circumstantial evidence of intent to distribute narcotics.
    United States v. Harris, 
    31 F.3d 153
    , 157 (4th Cir. 1994).
    We    conclude         that      the      evidence     established           the
    requisite      intent         to   distribute.           The   amount   and        method    of
    packaging of the marijuana are consistent with drug dealing, as
    are the presence of the shotgun and digital scale.                              Accordingly,
    we find the evidence sufficient to convict Madina on Count One.
    This finding defeats Madina’s related claim that his
    
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1) conviction is infirm because there was
    insufficient evidence to find that he possessed the firearm in
    furtherance         of    a    drug      trafficking       crime.          We     previously
    observed, however, that “[p]ossession with intent to distribute
    is unquestionably a drug trafficking crime.”                          Fisher, 912 F.3d
    at 731.        Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was sufficient
    to convict Madina on Count Two.
    4
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions   are   adequately   presented    in   the    materials
    before   the   court   and   argument   would   not   aid   the   decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
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