United States v. Leron Fuller , 477 F. App'x 991 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5019
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LERON J. FULLER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Arenda Wright Allen, District
Judge. (2:11-cr-00015-AWA-DEM-1)
Submitted: April 24, 2012 Decided: April 27, 2012
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Harry D. Harmon, Jr., Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H.
McBride, United States Attorney, Jennifer Cantrell-Sutor,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Leron J. Fuller appeals his four-month sentence and
conviction following a jury trial for obstruction of justice, in
violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-460(B) (2009), as assimilated
by 18 U.S.C. §§ 7, 13 (2006). Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
On appeal, Fuller first contends that the district
court erroneously denied his motion for judgment of acquittal.
We review de novo a district court’s decision to deny a motion
for a judgment of acquittal. United States v. Hickman, 626 F.3d
756, 762-63 (4th Cir. 2010). In reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence, this court’s “role is limited to considering
whether there is substantial evidence, taking the view most
favorable to the Government, to support the conviction.” United
States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 471 (4th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted). “[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable
finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to
support a conclusion of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.
1996) (en banc). “Reversal for insufficient evidence is
reserved for the rare case where the prosecution’s failure is
clear.” United States v. Ashley, 606 F.3d 135, 138 (4th Cir.
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-461(B) provides that “any person
who, by threats or force, knowingly attempts to intimidate or
impede . . . any law-enforcement officer . . . lawfully engaged
in his duties as such” is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. A
conviction for obstruction of justice requires proof of “acts
clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to
prevent the officer from performing his duty.” Rogers v.
Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 291 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ruckman v.
Commonwealth, 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (Va. Ct. App. 1998)).
“Generally, obstruction of justice does not require the
defendant to commit an actual or technical assault upon the
officer.” Brown v. City of Danville, 606 S.E.2d 523, 529 (Va.
Ct. App. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Words alone can support a conviction for obstruction of justice
if those words “contain some manner of a threat intended to
intimidate the police officers.” Id. at 529 (citing Polk v.
Commonwealth, 358 S.E.2d 770, 772 (Va. Ct. App. 1987)).
The record reflects that sufficient evidence existed
to support Fuller’s conviction. Although Fuller did not
physically assault any officers, Corporal Elizabeth Sheppard
testified that Fuller ignored her instructions to wait for his
point of contact when he arrived at the police precinct;
instead, Fuller entered the precinct’s second waiting room
through a secured door when another individual exited, in
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violation of precinct procedure. Fuller became very
argumentative, talkative, and loud, repeatedly asked, “Why can’t
I come in the door?”, and told Corporal Sheppard, “You are lucky
you’re behind this glass.” Corporal Sheppard felt threatened by
Fuller’s statement because she was unarmed and vulnerable due to
the cast on her right arm. During this time period, Corporal
Sheppard was unable to complete her duties. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we find
that the Government presented sufficient evidence to persuade a
reasonable factfinder that Fuller attempted to intimidate a law
enforcement official engaged in her duties through the use of
threats and aggressive conduct, as required to establish a
conviction for obstruction of justice.
Fuller next asserts that, as a member of the Moorish
Science Temple of America, the district court lacked
jurisdiction over him to conduct a trial. We review the
jurisdictional determination of a district court de novo.
United States v. Jones, 225 F.3d 468, 469 (4th Cir. 2000).
Federal district courts retain original jurisdiction over
offenses against the laws of the United States. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231 (2000). Accordingly, we find Fuller’s argument to be
without merit.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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