United States v. Reginald Belton ( 2021 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4065
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
REGINALD HILTON BELTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:18-cr-00113-FL1)
Submitted: September 30, 2021 Decided: November 16, 2021
Before KING, QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Sophia L. Harvey, LIAO HARVEY PC, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Evan M. Rikhye,
Assistant United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Reginald Belton pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to one count of
possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). At the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, the magistrate judge read the
pre-Rehaif indictment but did not otherwise advise Belton of the mens rea element or
explain the elements of a § 922(g) offense. ∗ On appeal, Belton challenges the validity of
his guilty plea based on the magistrate judge’s alleged failure to explain the interstate nexus
element and that he must have known of his felon status when he possessed the firearm in
light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). We affirm.
First, Belton argues that the magistrate judge’s failure to explain the interstate nexus
element of a § 922(g) offense invalidates his guilty plea. Because Belton did not seek to
withdraw his guilty plea before the district court, we review his claim for plain error. See
United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). To establish plain error, a
defendant must satisfy three requirements: (1) there is an error; (2) the error is plain; and
(3) “the error must affect substantial rights, which generally means that there must be a
reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different.” Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2021) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “If those three requirements are met, [we] may grant relief if [we]
∗
Belton consented to a magistrate judge conducting the Rule 11 hearing. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
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conclude[] that the error had a serious effect on the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 2096–97 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A guilty plea is valid if the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
pleads guilty “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.” United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[A] plea does not qualify as intelligent unless a criminal
defendant first receives real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and
most universally recognized requirement of due process.” Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In evaluating the constitutional
validity of a guilty plea, courts look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding it,
granting the defendant’s solemn declaration of guilt a presumption of truthfulness.” United
States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 278 (4th Cir. 2010) (brackets and internal quotation
marks omitted).
In advising a defendant of the nature of the charges against him, a “trial court is
given a wide degree of discretion in deciding the best method to inform and ensure the
defendant’s understanding.” United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 117 (4th Cir. 1991).
We have “repeatedly refused to script the Rule 11 colloquy” and “to require the district
courts to recite the elements of the offense in every circumstance,” because “[i]n many
cases, such a procedure would be a formality and a needless repetition of the indictment,
which often tracks the essential elements of the offense.” United States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d
1300, 1307 (4th Cir. 1996). Therefore, “although the defendant must receive notice of the
true nature of the charge rather than a rote recitation of the elements of the offense, the
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defendant need not receive this information at the plea hearing itself.” DeFusco, 949 F.2d
at 117 (citation omitted). Rather, “detailed information received on occasions before the
plea hearing” may be sufficient to render a guilty plea knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A review of the record shows that the indictment language tracked the pre-Rehaif
elements of a § 922(g) offense, including the interstate nexus requirement. During the Rule
11 hearing, Belton confirmed that he discussed the charge with his attorney and fully
understood it. Belton also confirmed that he discussed the plea agreement with his
attorney, that he read it, and that he understood its provisions. The agreement contained a
detailed explanation of the pre-Rehaif elements of a § 922(g) charge, including the
interstate nexus element. Because Belton received detailed notice of the charge against
him and its elements well before the Rule 11 hearing, there was no plain error.
Belton also claims that the magistrate judge’s failure to advise him of the mens rea
element of the § 922(g) charge requires vacatur of his guilty plea. Shortly after Belton’s
indictment but before the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif
v. United States, in which the Court held that “[t]o convict a defendant [under § 922(g)],
the Government . . . must show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also
that he knew he had the relevant status when he possessed it.” 139 S. Ct. at 2194. Here,
the district court failed to ensure prior to the entry of the guilty plea that Belton understood
that “the Government must prove both that [Belton] knew he possessed a firearm and that
he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.”
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Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200. This error satisfies the first two prongs of the plain error test.
See Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2096-97.
Belton has not, however, met his burden of showing that the error affected his
substantial rights. See id. at 2096-97 (applying plain error standard to unpreserved Rehaif
mens rea claim and noting that a “defendant has the burden of establishing each of the four
requirements for plain-error relief.”). Belton had two felony convictions at the time he was
indicted on the § 922(g) charge, and he admitted, during the Rule 11 colloquy, that he was
aware of his status as a felon prior to his arrest. Moreover, even though it is not required
under Rehaif, Belton also admitted that “he knew he was not [permitted] to be around
firearms.” Based on these admissions, Belton cannot credibly claim that he would not have
pled guilty had the magistrate judge advised him prior to the entry of his guilty plea that
the Government had to prove that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.
See id. at 2097-98 (concluding that defendant did not meet burden when he had been
convicted of multiple felonies, admitted at the plea colloquy that he was a felon, and did
not argue on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not know he
was a felon when he possessed the firearm). We conclude that Belton’s guilty plea remains
valid after Rehaif.
Accordingly, we affirm Belton’s conviction. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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