Copley v. United States ( 1997 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-7070
CRAIG O. COPLEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, District
Judge. (CA-90-47-HC)
Submitted: January 9, 1997 Decided: January 23, 1997
Before HALL and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Craig O. Copley, Appellant Pro Se. Eileen Coffey Moore, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Craig O. Copley appeals from the district court's order deny-
ing his motion for reconsideration of the court's earlier order
denying his motion for a transfer. Because Copley's motion was un-
timely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), his motion should be construed
as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. We review the district court's
denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion. Browder
v. Director, Dep't of Corrections , 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978).
Relief is not authorized under Rule 60(b) where the motion
raises no new arguments, but merely requests the district court to
"change its mind." United States v. Williams, 674 F.2d 310, 313
(4th Cir. 1982). Copley's motion provided no new grounds for relief
and only reflected his disagreement with the court's earlier deci-
sion. Where a motion is for reconsideration of legal issues already
addressed in an earlier ruling, the motion "is not authorized by
Rule 60(b)." Id. at 313. Therefore, the motion was "properly
rejected by the district court." Id.; see also Hartman v. Lauchli,
304 F.2d 431, 432 (8th Cir. 1962) ("Rule 60(b) was not intended as
a substitute for a direct appeal from an erroneous judgment. The
fact that a judgment is erroneous does not constitute a ground for
relief under that Rule.").
Accordingly, the order of the district court is affirmed. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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