United States v. Horace Thompson, Jr. , 580 F. App'x 179 ( 2014 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-4984
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    HORACE SINCLAIR THOMPSON, JR.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
    Judge. (1:13-cr-00290-GBL-1)
    Submitted:   July 25, 2014                 Decided:   July 31, 2014
    Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    John O. Iweanoge, II, THE IWEANOGE’S FIRM, P.C., Washington,
    D.C., for Appellant.    Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney,
    Michael E. Rich, G. Zachary Terwilliger, Assistant United States
    Attorneys, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    After a jury trial, Horace Sinclair Thompson, Jr., was
    convicted    of    arson,     in    violation      of        
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2
    ,     844(i)
    (2012).     On appeal, Thompson challenges the sufficiency of the
    evidence    supporting        his    conviction         and       the    district       court’s
    admission of certain evidence.               We affirm.
    The denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal is
    reviewed de novo.            United States v. Jaensch, 
    665 F.3d 83
    , 93
    (4th Cir. 2011).         “We review the sufficiency of the evidence to
    support a conviction by determining whether there is substantial
    evidence in the record, when viewed in the light most favorable
    to the government, to support the conviction.”                                   
    Id.
     (quoting
    United States v. Madrigal–Valadez, 
    561 F.3d 370
    , 374 (4th Cir.
    2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).                          In conducting this
    analysis,    “circumstantial          evidence         is     treated      no     differently
    than direct evidence, and may be sufficient to support a guilty
    verdict     even    though     it     does       not    exclude          every     reasonable
    hypothesis       consistent        with   innocence.”                   United     States    v.
    Jackson, 
    863 F.2d 1168
    , 1173 (4th Cir. 1989).                             We can reverse a
    conviction       based   on       insufficient          evidence          only     when     “the
    prosecution’s failure is clear.”                   Burks v. United States, 
    437 U.S. 1
    , 17 (1978).
    To     support    a     conviction         for    arson       under    
    18 U.S.C. § 844
    (i), the government must prove that the defendant: “(1)
    2
    maliciously; (2) damaged or destroyed a building, vehicle, or
    other   real    or    personal         property;      (3)       by    means    of    fire   or
    explosive; and (4) the building, vehicle, or personal or real
    property was used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any
    activity    affecting       interstate         or    foreign         commerce.”        United
    States v. Gullett, 
    75 F.3d 941
    , 947 (4th Cir. 1996).                                 Thompson
    challenges only the evidence of malicious intent.
    After viewing the evidence as a whole and in the light
    most favorable to the government, we conclude that there was
    sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.                             The evidence
    that the damaged business was failing financially, that Thompson
    communicated frequently with the building’s owner on the night
    before the fire, and that he lied to police about his burns, as
    well as the manner in which the fire was started, entitled the
    jury to conclude that Thompson set the fire intentionally.
    Thompson        also        challenges          the       district        court’s
    admission of evidence regarding the financial condition of the
    damaged    business       and    the    owner’s       insurance        claims       after   the
    fire.      We   review     the    district         court’s      rulings       regarding     the
    admissibility        of   evidence       for       abuse   of     discretion.          United
    States v. Cole, 
    631 F.3d 146
    , 153 (4th Cir. 2011).                               A district
    court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, see 
    id.,
    or   applies    “erroneous       legal     principles           to    the   case,”     United
    States v. Mason, 
    52 F.3d 1286
    , 1290 (4th Cir. 1995).
    3
    The        challenged    evidence    was     relevant        to     proving
    Thompson’s motive, and raised no prejudice beyond that which was
    inherent in the charges against him.                See United States v. Boyd,
    
    53 F.3d 631
    , 637 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that evidence is not
    unfairly prejudicial if it does not “involve conduct any more
    sensational       or    disturbing    than    the    crimes    with      which    [the
    defendant] was charged”).            Therefore, the district court did not
    abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence. ∗
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
    court.     We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions       are   adequately     presented     in   the        materials
    before   this     court    and   argument    would     not   aid   the    decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    ∗
    Thompson also asserts that the challenged evidence was
    inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Rule 404(b)
    is inapplicable because the district court admitted the evidence
    under Rule 401, not under Rule 404(b)(2), and the challenged
    evidence was not character evidence under Rule 404(b)(1).
    4