Manning v. Lambert , 140 F. App'x 446 ( 2005 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 04-6884
    DWAYNE MANNING,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    LAMBERT; REID; DULA; ROGERS; GREEN; CUTTER;
    BRENIZE; GRAY; NURSE SMITH; BORROC; GOURIOUX;
    ANDREWS; COX; CRUMP; JOHNSON; MOST; HOLLIER;
    NAVALANEY; SINES; HART; BERNAZOLLI; LEWIS;
    EZEKIEL; FINGER; BOGDAN; ASBOURN; SHEARIN;
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; BUREAU OF
    PRISONS; JOHN DOES; JANE DOES,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.
    (CA-03-2057-AW)
    Submitted:   December 20, 2004             Decided:   July 20, 2005
    Before WILLIAMS, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Dwayne Manning, Appellant Pro Se. Matthew Wayne Mellady, UNITED
    STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Annapolis Junction, Maryland, for
    Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
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    PER CURIAM:
    Dwayne Manning, a federal inmate, filed this Bivens*
    action alleging that he has suffered harm since 1999 and will
    suffer future harm from exposure to environmental tobacco smoke
    (“ETS”) during his incarceration at FCI Cumberland.                He alleged
    violations of his Eighth Amendment rights, as well as a claim under
    the   Federal    Tort   Claims   Act.     In   his   complaint    and    in   his
    declaration submitted in response to Defendants’ motion for summary
    judgment, Manning averred that staff and inmates routinely violate
    the   prison’s   smoking   policy   and     that   he   is   suffering   health
    consequences as a result of the high level of ETS to which he is
    exposed.    He also stated that prison guards do not enforce the
    smoking policy.     The district court granted summary judgment, and
    Manning appeals.
    Summary judgment is only appropriate when there is no
    genuine issue of material fact given the parties’ burdens of proof
    at trial.     See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
    Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 247-48 (1986).             In determining whether the
    moving party has shown that there is no genuine issue of material
    fact, a court must assess the factual evidence and all inferences
    to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
    party. Smith v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 
    84 F.3d 672
    , 675 (4th
    *
    Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
     (1971).
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    Cir. 1996).     We review the grant of summary judgment de novo.
    Stone v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
    105 F.3d 188
    , 191 (4th Cir. 1997).
    After a careful review of the record, we find that the
    district court inappropriately credited the Defendants’ evidence
    and discredited Manning’s evidence.            Viewing the evidence in the
    light most favorable to Manning, we find that he has raised
    material issues of fact as to whether he was being exposed to
    “unreasonably high levels of ETS” under Helling v. McKinney, 
    509 U.S. 25
    , 35 (1993), whether he suffered from a serious injury or
    medical need under Estelle v. Gamble, 
    429 U.S. 97
    , 106 (1976), and
    whether Defendants exercised ordinary diligence in enforcing the
    smoking policy. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant
    of   summary   judgment   and   remand   for    further   proceedings.   We
    dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
    are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
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