Troy Petty v. Marvin Lumber and Cedar Company , 644 F. App'x 272 ( 2016 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-2208
    TROY D. PETTY; ANNAH A. PETTY,
    Plaintiffs – Appellants,
    v.
    MARVIN LUMBER AND CEDAR COMPANY, t/a MARVIN WINDOWS AND
    DOORS,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City. James C. Fox,
    Senior District Judge. (2:13-cv-00062-F)
    Submitted:   March 31, 2016                 Decided:   April 12, 2016
    Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Norman W. Shearin, Kevin A. Rust, VANDEVENTER BLACK, LLP,
    Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants.       Thomas H. Boyd,
    Michael E. Obermueller, WINTHROP & WEINSTINE, P.A., Minneapolis,
    Minnesota; Wes J. Camden, Brooks Pierce, Raleigh, North
    Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Troy D. Petty and Annah A. Petty appeal from the district
    court’s order dismissing their civil complaint as barred by the
    statute    of   limitations.         The    Pettys    sought     damages    under
    contract and warranty causes of action for damages caused by the
    Defendant’s allegedly defective windows.               Finding the complaint
    untimely filed, we affirm.
    I.
    On appeal, the Pettys do not dispute that their claims are
    barred by the statute of limitations.                Rather, they argue that
    the    Defendant    waived     the    protection       of    the     statute    of
    limitations by providing an express warranty of ten years.                      We
    review a district court’s dismissal of a pleading on statute of
    limitations grounds de novo.          Cruz v. Maypa, 
    773 F.3d 138
    , 143
    (4th Cir. 2014).
    The Pettys rely on Christie v. Hartley Constr., 
    766 S.E.2d 283
    , 287-88 (N.C. 2014), which affirmed the right of parties to
    contract around a statute of repose.               Christie offers the Pettys
    no    assistance.     The     instant       case    concerns     a   statute    of
    limitations which, as the Christie court recognized, “exhibit
    significant differences in both form and function” from statutes
    of repose.      
    Id. at 286.
       One way North Carolina treats statutes
    of    limitations   differently      from     statutes      of   repose    is   by
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    forbidding    parties       from     extending      the    four    year      statute   of
    limitations for contract claims.                 See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-
    725(1) (2015).       Thus, the district court correctly dismissed the
    Pettys’ complaint as untimely.
    II.
    Next, the Pettys assert that, even if the Defendant did not
    waive its statute of limitations defense, they were entitled to
    equitable    tolling     during      the    time    of    the    Defendant’s        repair
    attempts.     Where the district court denies equitable tolling as
    a matter of law, we will review the court’s determinations de
    novo.      
    Cruz, 773 F.3d at 143
    .                However, where the issue is
    whether facts bearing on the inquiry have been appropriately
    pled, the standard of review is abuse of discretion.                           See Chao
    v. Virginia Dep’t of Transp., 
    291 F.3d 276
    , 279-80 (4th Cir.
    2002).     Here, the district court found that the complaint lacked
    sufficient     detail        to     determine      whether        equitable       tolling
    applied.    We review that determination for abuse of discretion.
    Under the doctrine of equitable tolling, a party is barred
    from    asserting    a      technical      defense,       such    as    a   statute    of
    limitations,        “when         delay    has      been        induced      by      acts,
    representations,       or    conduct,      the     repudiation         of   which   would
    amount to a breach of good faith.”                 Nowell v. Great Atl. & Pac.
    Tea Co., 
    108 S.E.2d 889
    , 891 (N.C. 1959).                       However, a plaintiff
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    who seeks to obtain equitable tolling of a limitations period
    must show that he reasonably relied upon a representation made
    by the Defendant.   See Town of Pineville v. Atkinson/Dyer/Watson
    Architects, P.A., 
    442 S.E.2d 73
    , 74-75 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).   In
    this case, regardless of when the repairs took place or how long
    they took, the Pettys have failed to make any allegation that
    they relied on any representations by the Defendant.
    Contending that they were not required to do so, the Pettys
    rely on Haywood St. Redevelopment Corp. v. Harry S. Peterson,
    Co., 
    463 S.E.2d 564
    , 567 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995), which held that
    the limitations period for a breach of express warranty claim
    may be tolled “during the time the seller endeavors to make
    repairs to enable the product to comply with a warranty.”      In
    their complaint, the Pettys list dates that Defendant attempted
    to “assess” and “repair” the windows, ranging from October 2010
    until November 2012.   However, assuming Haywood stands for the
    proposition that repairs can toll the statute of limitations
    even in the absence of inducements and reliance, the Pettys have
    still, as the district court found, failed to specify how long
    each repair took, failed to explain the details of the testing
    and inspections, and failed to allege that the repairs were made
    in order to enable the product to comply with its warranty.
    Moreover, after the district court warned the Pettys about their
    insufficient pleading, they failed to offer any further details
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    in their amended complaint.              Absent the necessary details, we
    conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    not applying the equitable tolling doctrine.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
    district    court.     We     dispense    with   oral   argument   because     the
    facts   and   legal    contentions       are   adequately   presented     in   the
    materials     before   this    court     and   argument   would    not   aid   the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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