Margaret Aaron v. Kroger Limited Partnership I , 496 F. App'x 362 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1809
MARGARET M. AARON,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
KROGER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP I,
DEFENDANT - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Robert G. Doumar, Senior
District Judge. (2:10-cv-00606-RGD-FBS)
Submitted: November 6, 2012 Decided: November 13, 2012
Before MOTZ, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John S. Wilson, WILSON & MCINTYRE, PLLC, Norfolk, Virginia, for
Appellant. Cathleen Kailani Memmer, Victor S. Skaff, III,
GUYNN, MEMMER & DILLON, P.C., Salem, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM
Margaret M. Aaron appeals from the district court’s
judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict in favor of Kroger
Supermarket, and its order denying her motion for a new trial.
Aaron sued Kroger for injuries she sustained in a slip and fall
at one of their stores. The jury returned a verdict for Kroger,
and Aaron moved for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.
On appeal, Aaron renews her arguments from the motion for a new
trial that the trial judge’s interventions into her case and
comments to the jury compromised her right to a fair trial and
that the district court improperly instructed the jury. We
affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a
new trial based on partiality or bias for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 237 (4th
Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1272
(4th Cir. 1995)). A new trial will only be granted “if the
resulting prejudice was so great that it denied any or all the
appellants a fair, as distinguished from a perfect,
trial.” United States v. Villarini, 238 F.3d 530, 536 (4th Cir.
2001) (quoting United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 776 (4th
Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Upon review of the record, we find that the district
court’s comments did not result in the necessary prejudice to
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warrant a new trial. We note that “the judge has the right, and
often an obligation, to interrupt the presentations of counsel
in order to clarify misunderstandings or otherwise insure that
the trial proceeds efficiently and fairly.” United States v.
Cole, 491 F.2d 1276, 1278 (4th Cir. 1974) (citing United
States v. Casiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 879 (4th Cir. 1971)). The
district court’s interventions into Aaron’s case were for the
purpose of clarifying the evidence for the jury and ensuring
that evidence was properly presented without undue delay.
Further, any prejudice created by the district court’s other
comments to the jury was adequately cured. See United States v.
Quercia, 289 U.S. 466, 472 (1933).
Aaron next argues that the district court’s
instruction to the jury that it could find for the defense if
the unsafe condition was open and obvious was improper. Aaron
contends that the district court’s instruction did not
adequately distinguish between the condition and the hazard
created by the condition. We review the decision to give or
refuse a proposed jury instruction for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 377 (4th Cir.
2010). We consider “whether taken as a whole and in the context
of the entire charge, the instructions accurately and fairly
state the controlling law.” United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d
207, 221 (4th Cir. 2009). We conclude that the instructions
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given did not misstate the law and that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by concluding that the distinction
sought by Aaron would likely be more confusing than clarifying.
Finally, Aaron argues that the district court erred by
giving an insufficient instruction to the jury that it could
find for the defense if the condition was so slight that a
reasonable person would not anticipate any danger from it.
Aaron did not object to the exclusion of this instruction during
the trial, raising it for the first time in her motion for a new
trial. We therefore review for plain error. See United
States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 953 (4th Cir. 2010). Aaron
cites to no authority that indicates that the language she
desired was necessary to correctly reflect Virginia law. Thus,
the district court did not commit plain error by declining to
modify its instruction in the manner sought by Aaron.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment
and order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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