United States v. Garcia ( 1996 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                                        No. 96-4125
    FERNANDO GARCIA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
    Benson E. Legg, District Judge.
    (CR-95-126-L)
    Argued: October 30, 1996
    Decided: December 9, 1996
    Before RUSSELL and WIDENER, Circuit Judges, and BULLOCK,
    Chief United States District Judge for the Middle District of
    North Carolina, sitting by designation.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Susan Marie Bauer, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
    Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Andrea L. Smith, Assistant
    United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON
    BRIEF: James K. Bredar, Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Mary-
    land, for Appellant. Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Balti-
    more, Maryland, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Following the district court's denial of his motion to suppress,
    Defendant Fernando Garcia entered a conditional plea of guilty to a
    one-count indictment charging him with possession with intent to dis-
    tribute heroin. He appeals the denial of his motion to suppress, con-
    tending that the random boarding of a bus by law enforcement
    officers who directed passengers to identify their luggage was an
    unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We
    affirm.
    I.
    On February 9, 1995, agents of the Drug Enforcement Administra-
    tion and Maryland State Police were stationed at the Maryland House
    rest area located on I-95 in Harford County, Maryland. At approxi-
    mately 5:20 p.m. they approached a Greyhound bus driver whose bus
    had stopped at the rest area and asked if they could enter the bus.
    Upon obtaining permission from the driver, three officers boarded the
    bus. The officers were dressed in plain clothes with their weapons
    concealed.
    Upon boarding the bus, the officers identified themselves, said that
    they were part of a drug interdiction team, and asked the passengers
    for their cooperation in identifying their luggage. One of the officers
    started in the back of the bus and moved forward, and another officer
    started in the front and moved toward the rear, asking each passenger
    to identify his or her luggage. The entire process took about five min-
    utes. The agents talked to the passengers in a normal conversational
    tone of voice and spent only enough time with each passenger to
    determine which bags were owned by them. Defendant Garcia was
    sitting in the front right seat. When asked whether he had any bags
    on the bus Garcia gave a negative response.
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    After the process had been completed, a red-and-black duffle bag,
    near the front of the bus, had not been identified. One of the officers
    removed the bag from the overhead rack and used the bus intercom
    to ask whether the bag belonged to anyone. No one claimed the bag
    and it was removed from the bus. Outside the bus, a trained narcotics
    dog reacted positively to the bag after sniffing it. The officers then
    opened the bag and found heroin. The contents of the bag led the offi-
    cers to believe that it belonged to Garcia, and they arrested him.
    At the suppression hearing, the district court heard testimony from
    two of the officers, the bus driver, and a passenger, Jean Schwartz.
    Defendant presented Schwartz's testimony to support his argument
    that a "reasonable person" would have felt unable to decline the
    request of the officers and thus a "seizure" had occurred. However,
    the trial court discounted much of Schwartz's testimony, finding that
    it was based on a faulty recollection of events and that she was con-
    fused. The court also found the two officers who testified concerning
    the interdiction process to be credible.
    Finding the encounter to be similar to those approved by this court
    in United States v. Flowers, 
    912 F.2d 707
     (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
    denied, 
    501 U.S. 1253
     (1991), and by the Supreme Court in Florida
    v. Bostick, 
    501 U.S. 429
     (1991), the district court denied Defendant's
    suppression motion, finding that no unlawful seizure had occurred
    and that the duffle bag had been abandoned.
    II.
    We review legal conclusions de novo, and factual findings for clear
    error. United States v. Han, 
    74 F.3d 537
    , 540 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
    
    116 S. Ct. 1890
     (1996). The evidence before the trial court clearly
    supported its findings and conclusion. Police may seek the voluntary
    cooperation of citizens without violating the Fourth Amendment.
    Flowers, 
    912 F.2d at 709
    . It is undisputed that the officers talked in
    a professional tone, without raising their voices, and at no point did
    they touch any of the passengers. They were not threatening in their
    appearance and demeanor nor were any weapons displayed. Garcia,
    who was sitting in the front of the bus, had easy access to the door.
    The entire encounter took approximately five minutes and did not sig-
    nificantly delay the bus schedule. Officers are permitted to seize and
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    search abandoned property, and when a person denies ownership of
    a bag that is subsequently searched he cannot later argue that his
    Fourth Amendment rights have been violated. United States v. Clark,
    
    891 F.2d 501
    , 506 (4th Cir. 1989). Because this case is factually
    indistinguishable from Flowers, the decision of the district court in
    denying Defendant's motion to suppress is
    AFFIRMED.
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