Jensvold v. Shalala, Sec ( 1998 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
MARGARET JENSVOLD, M.D.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 96-1964
DONNA E. SHALALA, SECRETARY OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge.
(CA-90-3123-DKC)
Submitted: January 27, 1998
Decided: March 30, 1998
Before MURNAGHAN and ERVIN, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Margaret Jensvold, Appellant Pro Se. Kathleen McDermott, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Margaret Jensvold, M.D., appeals from the district court's final
order dismissing her employment discrimination action pursuant to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-2(a) (West 1994). Jensvold alleged discrimination on the
basis of her gender and retaliation. Jensvold also appeals the district
court's pre-trial dismissal of her claim of sexually hostile work envi-
ronment.
Our review of the record and the district court's opinions discloses
that this appeal is without merit. As a preliminary matter, we affirm
the district court's dismissal of Jensvold's claim of sexually hostile
work environment on the reasoning of the district court. Jensvold v.
Shalala, No. CA-90-3123-DKC (D. Md. Mar. 29 & May 3, 1996).
We next address Jensvold's appeal of the district court's dismissal
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), of the remainder of her claims. It is the
function of the trial judge under Rule 52(a) to make findings of fact
which will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. See Tidewater
Equip. Co. Inc., 650 F.2d 503, 507 (4th Cir. 1981). Findings of dis-
crimination, discriminatory intent, and causation are findings of fact.
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (dis-
crimination); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-90
(1982) (discriminatory intent). "Where there are two permissible
views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot
be clearly erroneous." Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574. Nor will this Court
second-guess the district court's determinations as to the credibility
of witnesses. See Murdaugh Volkswagen, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of
S.C., 801 F.2d 719, 725 (4th Cir. 1986). We reject Jensvold's claims
on appeal that the district court's ultimate finding of nondiscrimina-
tion, which was based in large part on credibility determinations, was
clearly erroneous.
2
We find that while the district court's dismissal of Jensvold's
claims arising from Appellee's post-employment conduct on the basis
of this Court's decision in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325 (4th
Cir. 1995) (en banc), was in error,* such error was rendered harmless
by the court's determination of Jensvold's post-employment Title VII
claims on the merits. Such adverse determination was not clearly
erroneous. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573.
We similarly reject Jensvold's claims of judicial bias, see In re
Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 827 (4th Cir. 1987), and abuse of discretion as
to the district court's evidentiary rulings. See Persinger v. Norfolk &
W. Ry., 920 F.2d 1185, 1187 (4th Cir. 1990). The disposition of this
appeal renders a determination of Jensvold's claim regarding the con-
stitutionality of Title VII remedies unnecessary. Finally, to the extent
Jensvold raised other claims not specifically addressed here, we find
such claims to be without merit. We therefore affirm the district
court's order dismissing Jensvold's case pursuant to Rule 52(a) on the
reasoning of the district court.
We grant Appellee's motion to strike Jensvold's appendix, which
contains affidavits and other documents which are not part of the
record in the action in the district court. See Federal Rule of Appellant
Procedure 10(a).We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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*We note that the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson, 117 S. Ct.
843 (1997), was rendered while this case was pending on appeal. Hence,
the district court's reliance on this court's decision in Robinson in dis-
missing Jensvold's post-employment Title VII claims was not misplaced.
3