Watkins v. Votaw ( 1998 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    ROGER L. WATKINS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    No. 97-2714
    CHARLES VOTAW; SHIRLEY VOTAW,
    his wife; OUTER BEACHES REALTY,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City.
    Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge.
    (CA-96-26-3-BO)
    Submitted: October 30, 1998
    Decided: November 30, 1998
    Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
    BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Kenneth Donald Cooper, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant.
    Charles M. Lollar, HEILIG, MCKENRY, FRAIM & LOLLAR, P.C.,
    Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellees Votaw. James Miller Stanley, Jr.,
    Jennefer Jane Cross, STANLEY & RHODES, L.L.P., Greenville,
    North Carolina, for Appellee Outer Beaches.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Roger L. Watkins brought this diversity action for dam-
    ages after a bedroom window in a house owned by Defendants
    Charles and Shirley Votaw and managed by Defendant Outer Beaches
    Realty slammed shut on his hand, severing one of his fingers. The dis-
    trict court granted the Defendants' summary judgment motions, con-
    cluding that Defendants satisfied their duty to warn of any latent
    defects by posting a warning sign and sealing the window. We affirm.
    We consider the facts in this case in the light most favorable to
    Watkins, the nonmovant.1 Transatlantic Builders, Inc. (TBI), a sub-
    contractor for Hatteras Island Construction (HIC), hired Watkins in
    April 1994 to assist in repairing structures damaged by a recent hurri-
    cane. As housing for Watkins and other temporary employees, HIC
    rented the Votaws' house from their rental agency, Outer Beaches. In
    1993, the Votaws informed Outer Beaches that one of the bedroom
    windows was broken and would not stay open. Instead of repairing
    the damaged window, the Votaws sealed the window with tape and
    posted a sign in a prominent place, warning not to open the window.
    An agent of TBI inspected the property prior to taking possession and
    observed the warning sign.
    Watkins consumed several beers at a local bar before moving into
    the house. When Watkins moved his belongings into his room, he
    attempted to open the broken window. Once opened, the window
    slammed shut on Watkins's hand. He alleges he had never been in
    that bedroom before and that there was no warning sign posted on the
    window.
    _________________________________________________________________
    1 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 255 (1986).
    2
    Under North Carolina law, Watkins has no stronger rights as an
    employee of TBI against Defendants than TBI has as the tenant.2 Gen-
    erally, for landlord-tenant disputes, North Carolina applies the doc-
    trine of caveat emptor with one narrow exception: if the landlord
    knows of and conceals a latent defect that involves a menace or dan-
    ger which the tenant does not know or could not have reasonably
    discovered.3
    Here, we find that Defendants did not conceal the latent defect.
    When TBI leased the premises, the prominently located sign warning
    not to open the window put TBI on notice of the defective window.
    Since there is no evidence of an agreement between the landlord and
    the tenant that Defendants would repair the window, Defendants were
    under no obligation to do so.4 Thus, we find Defendants satisfied any
    duty owed to TBI and to Watkins and affirm the district court's order
    granting them summary judgment.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
    tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    _________________________________________________________________
    2 See Phillips v. Stowe Mills, Inc., 
    167 S.E.2d 817
    , 820 (N.C. App.
    1969).
    3 See Harrill v. Sinclair Ref. Co. , 
    35 S.E.2d 240
    , 242-43 (N.C. 1945).
    4 
    Id. at 242
    .
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97-2714

Filed Date: 11/30/1998

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021