-
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT MICHAEL ARTHUR RORER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NORFOLK; JAMES B. OLIVER, JR., Honorable, Individually and as corrupt former Norfolk City Manager; G. CONOLY PHILLIPS, Honorable, individually and as negligent Norfolk City Councilman; BERNARD A. PISHKO, Individually and as new Norfolk City Attorney; HAROLD P. JUREN, Individually and as corrupt Senior Deputy Norfolk City Attorney; JACOB STROMAN, IV, Individually and as corrupt Deputy No. 99-2579 Norfolk City Attorney; DANIEL HAGEMEISTER, Individually and as corrupt Deputy Norfolk City Attorney; ALBERT TEICH, Individually and as Clerk, Norfolk Circuit Court; GARY WRIGHT, Individually and as Chief Deputy Clerk, Norfolk Circuit Court; JOHN Y. RICHARDSON, JR., Individually and as corrupt Deputy Norfolk City Attorney; JEFF W. ROSEN, Individually and as a conspiring and suborning, perjurious Attorney; ADLER, ROSEN AND PETERS, Professional Corporation, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Jerome B. Friedman, District Judge. (CA-99-552-2) Submitted: June 13, 2000 Decided: June 29, 2000 Before NIEMEYER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. _________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. _________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL Michael Arthur Rorer, Appellant Pro Se. John Yulee Richardson, Jr., CITY OF NORFOLK, Norfolk, Virginia; Lisa Ehrich, Jeff W. Rosen, ADLER, ROSEN & PETERS, P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellees. _________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). _________________________________________________________________ OPINION PER CURIAM Appellant Michael Arthur Rorer appeals the district court's order denying his motion for reconsideration. Rorer filed an action under
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983(West Supp. 2000), which the district court dis- missed on August 16, 1999. On September 14, 1999, Rorer filed a 2 document purporting to be both a motion for reconsideration and a notice of appeal. Because Rorer's filing clearly evinced a primary intent to seek reconsideration, the notice of appeal was ineffective, and the document was properly construed as a motion for reconsidera- tion.* See Buffalo v. Sunn,
854 F.2d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 1988); Mosley v. Cozby,
813 F.2d 659, 660-61 (5th Cir. 1987). Rorer's motion for reconsideration was filed more than ten days after judgment and, therefore, is appropriately construed as a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) rather than Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). See In re Burnley,
988 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1992). Although Rorer timely appealed the district court's order denying reconsideration, a Rule 60(b) motion does not toll the period for filing an appeal of the under- lying judgment, nor does it allow the review of the merits of the underlying order. See Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections,
434 U.S. 257, 263-65, 268-69 (1978). Hence, we have jurisdiction only to decide whether the district court properly denied reconsideration. Although the district court construed Rorer's motion to reconsider as a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), the district court's error is harmless because Rorer presented no grounds on which a Rule 60(b) motion may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Rorer's motion for reconsidera- tion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal con- tentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED _________________________________________________________________ *Even if we found that Rorer's motion to reconsider constituted a suf- ficient notice of appeal as to the merits of the August 16, 1999, order, Rorer's appeal fails. Rorer's informal brief fails to offer any evidence supporting his allegations of bias by the district court or perjury by city officials. Furthermore, there is no constitutional right to engage in settle- ment negotiations with a municipality in regards to a personal injury claim. Finally, the district court properly held that
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 241, 242 do not create a civil right of action. 3
Document Info
Docket Number: 99-2579
Filed Date: 6/29/2000
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021