United States v. Carico , 311 F. App'x 572 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4745
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SCOTTY LEE CARICO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, Chief
District Judge. (1:07-cr-00006-jpj)
Submitted: November 20, 2008 Decided: December 19, 2008
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Vaughan C. Jones, JOHNSON & JONES, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Julia C. Dudley, Acting United States Attorney,
Zachary T. Lee, Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Scotty Lee Carico was convicted by a jury of
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(2006). Carico was sentenced to a total of 138 months’
imprisonment. Finding no error, we affirm.
On appeal, Carico contends the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress. We review the factual findings
underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error
and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Branch, 537
F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008). The evidence is construed in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party below. United
States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 704 (4th Cir. 2006).
Carico initially contends that his statement
acknowledging the presence of a firearm in his vehicle was
acquired in violation of the Fifth Amendment and Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Law enforcement officers,
however, are not required to administer Miranda warnings to
everyone they question or suspect. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). Rather, Miranda is only
implicated when officers question an individual who is in
custody. United States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 628 (4th Cir.
2007). An individual “is ‘in custody’ for purposes of receiving
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Miranda protection . . . [when] there is a ‘formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with
a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125
(1983) (per curiam) (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495).
Here, Carico was not in custody when he made the
statement at issue as the officer had not placed him under
arrest or otherwise restrained his freedom requiring the
administration of Miranda warnings. See Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (holding one temporarily detained in
traffic stop is not in custody for Miranda purposes); United
States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 131 (4th Cir. 1998) (same).
Additionally, Carico’s statement was spontaneously rendered
rather than the result of any formal questioning by a law
enforcement officer. See United States v. Wright, 991 F.2d
1182, 1186 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[S]pontaneous statements [that are]
not the product of interrogation [are] not barred by the Fifth
Amendment.”). Therefore, the district court did not err in
refusing to suppress Carico’s statement.
Carico also contends that the warrantless search of
his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. He does not assert
that the traffic stop was invalid, but argues that his detention
and the initiation of the vehicle search were improper.
However, a law enforcement officer may conduct a protective
search of the passenger compartment of a lawfully stopped
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automobile where the “officer possesses a reasonable belief
based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant’ the officer in believing that [a] suspect is dangerous
and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons” within
the vehicle. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
It is undisputed that Carico was stopped by law
enforcement because an unauthorized weapon was visible in his
vehicle. The officer was therefore permitted to perform a
protective search of the vehicle to secure the weapon. United
States v. Elston, 479 F.3d 314, 320 (4th Cir. 2007) (search of
vehicle in Terry stop authorized if officer has reasonable
belief that suspect is dangerous and may gain control of weapons
in vehicle, even if suspect is restrained at the time).
Moreover, Carico’s disclosure that there was a firearm on the
front passenger seat further highlighted the danger Carico posed
to the officer. Thus, the initial search of the vehicle for
weapons was proper.
Carico additionally argues that the officer did not
have probable cause to perform a more thorough search of the
vehicle, including its trunk. However, it is well established
that, “‘[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists
to believe it contains contraband,’” an officer may search the
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car without a warrant. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467
(1999) (per curiam) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S.
938, 940 (1996) (per curiam)). The scope of the search
authorized under the automobile exception “is no broader and no
narrower” than that which could be authorized pursuant to a
warrant. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). “If
probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped
vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle
and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”
Id. The Supreme Court has defined the test for probable cause
as “whether, given all the circumstances, . . . there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238
(1983).
The law enforcement officer found multiple weapons and
a large quantity of cash during his initial search of the
vehicle. Under these circumstances, there was more than a fair
probability that either controlled substances or other weapons
were present. Considering the nature of the suspected
contraband, the scope of the officer’s search was appropriate.
Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err in
refusing to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of
Carico’s vehicle.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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