United States v. Medina-Castellanos , 359 F. App'x 404 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4341
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CARLOS JAVIER MEDINA-CASTELLANOS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:05-cr-00155-F-1)
Submitted: December 1, 2009 Decided: January 4, 2010
Before KING and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Terry F. Rose, Smithfield, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne
M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Javier Medina-Castellanos appeals his
convictions and sentence following two jury trials on charges of
conspiring to commit interstate transportation of stolen
property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (“Count One”),
and two counts of committing violent crimes in aid of
racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3)
(2006) (“Counts Three and Four”). At the conclusion of
Medina-Castellanos’ first jury trial, he was convicted on Counts
One and Four. Count Four was based upon a May 2, 2004 home
invasion robbery that Medina-Castellanos organized, and in which
he participated, against a fellow co-conspirator. After
Medina-Castellanos’ first jury trial concluded, he was
re-indicted for the conduct on which the first jury could not
reach a verdict. This indictment also charged Medina-
Castellanos with committing a violent crime in aid of
racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3)
(“Count Two”). Count Two was based upon a February 15, 2004
home invasion robbery that Medina-Castellanos organized, and in
which he participated, against a different co-conspirator. At
the conclusion of his second jury trial, Medina-Castellanos was
convicted on Count Two.
At sentencing, Medina-Castellanos received an advisory
guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. However,
2
the statutory maximum for Counts Four and Two was 240 months and
sixty months for Count One. Because the district court
sentenced Medina-Castellanos to the statutory maximum sentence
for each count and ordered that the sentences be served
consecutively, Medina-Castellanos’ aggregate sentence of 540
months’ imprisonment fell within his advisory guidelines range.
On appeal, Medina-Castellanos challenges the jury
convictions, arguing that the district court erred in admitting
a letter Medina-Castellanos had written and that the district
court erred in allowed his former wife to testify against him.
He further raises multiple claims related to his sentence.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Medina-Castellanos first argues that the district
court erred in admitting, during his first trial, a letter he
wrote to his uncle. Medina-Castellanos claims that the letter
was not adequately authenticated and that the letter was more
prejudicial than probative. This court reviews decisions
regarding authentication of evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 901 for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Patterson, 277 F.3d 709,
713 (4th Cir. 2002). Medina-Castellanos’ claim of prejudice
under Fed. R. Evid. 403 is reviewed for plain error as it is
raised for the first time on appeal. United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Plain error requires a finding that:
(1) there was error; (2) the error was “plain;” and (3) the
3
error affected Medina-Castellanos’ substantial rights. Id. If
the three elements are met, this court may exercise its
discretion to notice the error only “if the error seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Id. We have reviewed the transcript of
the proceedings and find that the letter was properly
authenticated and its admission was not unduly prejudicial.
Medina-Castellanos next argues that the district court
erred in admitting the testimony of his former wife. To the
extent Medina-Castellanos claims his former wife’s testimony
violated the confidential marital communications privilege, his
claim is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Singleton, 260 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). To the extent
that Medina-Castellanos claims his former wife’s testimony
violated the adverse spousal testimony privilege, his claim is
reviewed for plain error because he did not lodge an objection
in the district court on this basis.
The confidential marital communication privilege
applies to “[i]nformation that is privately disclosed between
husband and wife in the confidence of the marital relationship.”
United States v. Parker, 834 F.2d 408, 411 (4th Cir. 1987).
Medina-Castellanos fails to point to any act to which his former
wife testified that would fall within the confidential marital
communications privilege. Therefore, his claim fails. See
4
United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 514-15 (4th Cir. 1995).
Also, Medina-Castellanos’ adverse spousal testimony claim fails
because Medina-Castellanos and his former spouse who testified
were divorced at the time of his trials. See United States v.
Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 1018 (6th Cir. 1993).
As to his sentence, Medina-Castellanos first
challenges the district court’s calculation of his advisory
guidelines range with respect to Counts Four and Two. According
to Medina-Castellanos, the district court should have calculated
his base offense level for Counts Four and Two using U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 2A2.2, Aggravated
Assault, rather than USSG § 2A3.1, Criminal Sexual Abuse. In
reviewing a district court’s application of the sentencing
guidelines, this court reviews the district court’s factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
United States v. Sosa-Carabantes, 561 F.3d 256, 259 (4th Cir.
2009).
The district court applied the correct guideline, USSG
§ 2E1.3, to Counts Four and Two charging Medina-Castellanos with
committing violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity. See
USSG § 2E1.3; USSG App. A (Statutory Index). According to USSG
§ 2E1.3, the district court is to apply the higher of either a
base offense level of 12 or “the offense level applicable to the
underlying crime or racketeering activity.” USSG § 2E1.3(a)(1),
5
(2). Where, as here, more than one base offense level exists
within a particular guideline, a district court is to use the
relevant conduct criteria in USSG § 1B1.3 to determine the
applicable offense level. United States v. Smith, 232 F.3d 650,
651 (8th Cir. 2000); USSG § 1B1.2, comment. (n.2).
Medina-Castellanos’ relevant conduct included the
February 15, 2004 and May 2, 2004 robberies during which victims
were sexually assaulted. Thus, the district court’s
determination that sexual assault is the underlying crime for
purposes of USSG § 2E1.3 is well-supported. See United States
v. Martinez, 136 F.3d 972, 979 (4th Cir. 1998) (upholding the
district court’s determination under USSG § 2E1.3(a)(2) that the
defendant’s base offense level was 32 pursuant to USSG § 2A1.5
because the defendant conspired to commit murder even though the
defendant was acquitted of murder); see also United States v.
Carrozza, 4 F.3d 70, 74 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that, in
determining base offense level in a RICO case, district court
should not limit its relevant conduct to predicate acts charged
against the defendant, but instead should consider all conduct
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant in furtherance of the
RICO enterprise). Accordingly, the district court did not err
in determining the offense guideline for Counts Four and Two.
Medina-Castellanos also challenges (1) the two-level
USSG § 3B1.1(c) enhancement he received for Counts Four and Two
6
based on his leadership or management role, (2) the two-level
enhancement he received pursuant to USSG § 2B1.1(b)(12)(B) for
possession of a dangerous weapon for Count One, and (3) the two-
level USSG § 3C1.1 enhancement he received for obstructing
justice for Counts One and Four. 1 We have reviewed the materials
submitted in the appendices and the parties’ arguments and
conclude that the district court did not err in applying the
three challenged enhancements. 2
Finally, Medina-Castellanos claims that, because there
were multiple counts that could not be grouped, the district
court should have applied USSG § 5G1.2 rather than USSG § 3D1.4.
Two of Medina-Castellanos’ convictions were for violations of 18
U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3), which are covered by USSG § 2E1.3 and are
specifically excluded from the grouping rules in USSG § 3D1.2.
Therefore, the district court properly treated the three counts
as separate groups and applied USSG § 3D1.4 in determining
Medina-Castellanos’ combined offense level.
1
Medina-Castellanos’ advisory guidelines range was
calculated using the 2006 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual.
Section 2B1.1(b)(12)(B) was subsequently renumbered as USSG
§ 2B1.1(b)(13)(B). See USSG § 2B1.1(b)(13)(B) (2008).
2
We have reviewed Medina-Castellanos’ USSG § 3C1.1 claim
for plain error because Medina-Castellanos failed to object to
it in the district court
7
Accordingly, we affirm Medina-Castellanos’ convictions
and sentence. However, we remand the case to the district court
for correction of a clerical error in the criminal judgment.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. The judgment erroneously indicates
that Medina-Castellanos pled guilty to the offenses of
conviction. This error does not affect the validity of Medina-
Castellanos’ convictions or sentences. We dispense with oral
argument as the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
8