United States v. Sadig , 271 F. App'x 290 ( 2007 )


Menu:
  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-4733
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    HAYDAR BADAWI SADIG,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Richard L. Voorhees,
    District Judge. (CR-03-62)
    Argued:   November 2, 2007              Decided:     December 27, 2007
    Before TRAXLER, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the opinion,
    in which Judge Traxler and Judge Shedd concurred.
    ARGUED: Anthony Glen Scheer, RAWLS, DICKINSON & SCHEER, P.A.,
    Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.     Amy Elizabeth Ray,
    Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.      ON BRIEF:
    Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North
    Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
    A jury found Haydar Badawi Sadig (“Sadig”) guilty of knowingly
    attempting to procure citizenship contrary to law, in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1425
    (a).    When    Sadig   originally   submitted   his
    application for naturalization, he truthfully indicated that he had
    not been arrested or charged with violating any laws.              After
    submitting his application, but prior to his pre-naturalization
    interview, Sadig was arrested on misdemeanor assault charges and
    felony interference with a flight crew, which he subsequently
    failed to disclose.     During his interview, moreover, he signed a
    form representing, under penalty of perjury, that the information
    he had submitted was true and correct.         Because we find that the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sadig’s
    request to instruct the jury that an applicant for naturalization
    has no duty to volunteer information at the interview and because
    we find that the district court did not err in its instruction, we
    affirm.
    I.
    Sadig, a Sudan native, was granted permanent asylum in 1993.
    On August 2, 2000, Sadig applied for citizenship by submitting a
    completed N-400 form.        Question 15(b) on the form asks if the
    applicant has ever “been arrested, cited, charged, [or] indicted .
    . .for breaking or violating any law or ordinance[,]” to which
    -2-
    Sadig truthfully answered in the negative.               J.A. 241.   While
    returning to the United States from overseas on November 14, 2000,
    however, Sadig was involved in an altercation with the airline
    flight crew.   Upon arrival, Sadig was arrested and charged with
    felony   interference   with   a   flight   crew   and   three   counts   of
    misdemeanor assault.    Those charges were still pending at the time
    of his pre-naturalization interview on August 7, 2001.1
    At the interview, Sadig reviewed his previously completed N-
    400 form, which contained a check mark in the “No” box next to
    question 15(b).    The final section of the form instructs the
    applicant not to complete it until directed to do so at the
    interview.   The paragraph under the instruction reads as follows:
    “I swear that I know the contents of this application, . . . that
    the corrections, numbered 1 through 9 were made at my request, and
    that this amended application, is true to the best of my knowledge
    and belief.”    J.A. 242.      The form also contains the following
    statement:
    I certify . . . under penalty of perjury under the laws
    of the United States of America that this application,
    and the evidence submitted with it, is all true and
    correct. I authorize the release of any information from
    my records . . . to determine eligibility for the benefit
    I am seeking.
    1
    Sadig ultimately pleaded guilty to the misdemeanors and was
    sentenced to a term of two years’ probation.
    -3-
    J.A. 242.     Sadig signed the form during the interview, and was
    subsequently granted U.S. citizenship.
    In December 2003, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents
    learned that Sadig became a citizen following his November 2000
    arrest and that there was no reference to that arrest on his
    application   even   though     the    pre-naturalization     interview   was
    conducted after the arrest.           Sadig was subsequently charged with
    three crimes alleging violations committed by him at his pre-
    naturalization interview.       Count One charged Sadig with knowingly
    making a false statement under oath in a matter relating to and
    under a law of the United States relating to naturalization,
    citizenship and registry of aliens, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1015
    (a).    Count Two charged Sadig with knowingly and willfully
    making a materially false, fictitious and fraudulent statement and
    representation, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
    (a)(2).            Finally,
    Count Three charged Sadig with knowingly procuring and attempting
    to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of a person and
    other evidence of naturalization and citizenship, in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1425
    (a).2     J.A. 11-12.
    Sadig’s jury trial commenced on May 20, 2004.            At trial, the
    government    presented   the    testimony     of   Charles   Seagle   Cross
    (“Cross”), a retired Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)
    2
    On May 19, 2004, the district court granted the government’s
    motion to dismiss Counts Four and Five.
    -4-
    agent with 31 years of experience as an immigration examiner.3                    The
    district court accepted Cross as an expert in immigration and
    naturalization        procedures.          Mr.    Cross     testified    that     the
    naturalization process begins with the filing of an application,
    the   N-400    form,    after     which    the   applicant    appears    before    an
    adjudicator for a pre-naturalization interview.                   According to Mr.
    Cross, the purpose of the interview is to “give the applicant the
    chance to establish that they [sic] are entitled to the benefit
    that they are seeking,” noting that the applicant has the burden of
    establishing his or her entitlement to citizenship. J.A. 43.
    Mr.     Cross    further    described      the   interview    process.       He
    testified that the adjudicator places the applicant under oath,
    asking him to swear or affirm that the contents of the application
    are correct.      The adjudicator routinely asks the applicant every
    question contained in the application.                 If a change is required,
    based on the answers provided by the applicant, the adjudicator
    notes that change in red ink and numbers the change.                    While Cross
    testified      that    all   of   the     questions    on   the   application     are
    important, he stated that 15(b), which asks whether the applicant
    3
    As of March 1, 2003, INS ceased to exist as an agency within
    the Department of Justice.    Its functions are now performed by
    three agencies within the Department of Homeland Security: (1) the
    Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, responsible for the
    enforcement of immigration laws; (2) the Bureau of Citizenship and
    Immigration Services, responsible for administering services and
    benefits under the immigration laws; and (3) the Bureau of Customs
    and Border Protection, responsible for the United States Border
    Patrol. See 
    68 Fed. Reg. 10922
    -01 (Mar. 6, 2003).
    -5-
    has “knowingly committed any crime for which [he has] not been
    arrested”   or   has   “been   arrested,      cited,     charged,    indicted,
    convicted, fined or imprisoned for breaking or violating any law or
    ordinance, excluding traffic regulations,”             J.A. 241, is the most
    significant.     If the applicant were to report that he had been
    charged with a crime, the adjudicator would ask about the nature of
    the criminal conduct with which he was charged.                Then, following
    the interview, the applicant would be required to complete a form
    related to the criminal behavior and provide the adjudicator with
    a certified copy of the charging document.           According to Cross, an
    applicant would not be approved for naturalization while the
    charges   were   pending.      Once   the    charges    were    resolved,   the
    adjudicator would make a determination as to whether the conduct
    was serious enough to justify denying the applicant citizenship.
    On cross-examination, when asked whether he was aware of any
    federal   regulation   or   published       manual   requiring      that   every
    question on the application be asked during an interview, Cross
    answered that he was not aware of any such written policy, but that
    it was the standard practice of every adjudicator with whom he
    worked to ask every question, particularly number 15.               Cross also
    affirmed that every applicant has a duty to answer all question on
    the N-400 form honestly and truthfully.              When asked whether an
    applicant has a legal duty to volunteer information not asked by
    the adjudicator during the interview, Cross responded that the law
    -6-
    requires that an applicant remain eligible for naturalization up to
    the moment he is sworn-in, but acknowledged that there is no
    written regulation or rule requiring an applicant to voluntarily
    update his application.
    Regina Bryant (“Bryant”), the adjudicator who interviewed
    Sadig, testified next.           Bryant stated that she worked for the
    agency for 24 years, of which 15 were spent conducting interviews.
    It   was   her   practice   to   begin   each   interview   by   placing   the
    applicant under oath. After that, she would go through the entire
    application with the applicant to make sure that all of the
    information on the application was correct, marking each question
    asked in red ink.     Like Cross, Bryant testified that number 15 was
    the most important question on the application; when she would
    reach that question, she would pause briefly so as to emphasize its
    significance.     With respect to the certification under penalty of
    perjury language at the end of the application, Bryant stated that
    she would instruct the applicant to read the statement and sign it
    if he agreed with it; then she would sign the form as well.
    Based on what Bryant could tell from Sadig’s application, she
    had in fact asked him all of the questions, including number 15,
    because each question had a red check mark next to it.             According
    to Bryant, had Sadig changed his answer to question 15 from the
    “no” that he originally reported to a “yes,” she would have made
    notes next to the question.          Further, Bryant noted that Sadig’s
    -7-
    application reflected nine changes based on information gathered
    during the interview and that Sadig had signed the application in
    her presence. Bryant had signed the form as well.
    The government’s final witness, Special Agent John Scott
    Sherrill (“Agent Sherrill”), was an investigator working with the
    Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.                 Agent Sherrill
    testified      that    he   began     investigating       Sadig’s      alleged
    naturalization fraud in 2003 after learning that Sadig had become
    a citizen, following his arrest on assault charges, without having
    mentioned the arrest on his application.                When Agent Sherrill
    questioned Sadig about his failure to report his arrest during his
    pre-naturalization     interview,    Sadig    responded       that   while   the
    adjudicator had asked him most of the questions on the application,
    she had not asked him about criminal charges or convictions.
    Similarly, when testifying on his own behalf at trial, Sadig
    stated that the adjudicator did not ask him every question on the
    application and that the interview only lasted between ten and
    fifteen minutes.      Sadig specifically stated that the adjudicator
    did not ask him question 15(b), related to his criminal conduct.
    Because   he    had   not   been   asked,    he   did   not    volunteer     any
    information, consistent with the legal advice he had received.4
    4
    Sadig’s wife also testified that she and her husband had
    considered withdrawing their citizenship applications after Sadig’s
    arrest, but decided against it after consulting with their friend,
    a law professor at Emory Law School in Atlanta, Georgia.       They
    decided that Sadig should testify truthfully if asked about his
    -8-
    Sadig also testified that at the end of his interview, Bryant
    handed him numerous documents, in addition to the N-400 form, which
    he signed without reading.     In particular, Sadig testified that he
    did not read the statement regarding providing truthful evidence
    under penalty of perjury at the end of the application prior to
    signing it.
    With respect to Count Three, charging him with attempting to
    procure naturalization contrary to law, Sadig filed proposed jury
    instructions essentially stating that there is no legal duty for an
    applicant     to   volunteer    any     information   during   the   pre-
    naturalization interview.      The government opposed the instruction,
    noting that the form itself requires that an applicant affirm at
    the conclusion of the interview that everything in the application
    is correct.    The government argued that the proposed instruction
    would be misleading and confusing in light of that requirement.
    The district court declined to give the proffered instruction.
    Instead, it instructed the jury as to the elements of the offense
    by tracking the language of the statute.5
    criminal charges that had arisen since the filing of his
    application, but that he would not volunteer any information.
    5
    The judge instructed the jury that Sadig
    could be found guilty of [knowingly procuring citizenship
    contrary to law] only if each of the following elements
    of the crime [was] proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
    First, that the defendant procured or attempted to
    procure citizenship. Second, that it was contrary to the
    law to procure such citizenship. And third, that he knew
    -9-
    During closing arguments, the government disputed Sadig’s
    contention that an applicant has no duty to volunteer information
    during a pre-naturalization interview by stating “[t]hat is not the
    law and that is not accurate.”    J.A. 551.     The government explained
    to the jury that the purpose of the “under penalty of perjury”
    language was to compel an applicant to inform INS if information
    contained in the application was inaccurate.        See J.A. 242.
    The jury acquitted Sadig of Counts One and Two involving
    knowingly making false statements, but convicted him of Count
    Three.   Sadig now appeals, arguing that because the district court
    refused to give his proposed jury instructions as to Count Three,
    the jury received improper instruction as to the law.
    II.
    We first turn to the issue of whether the district court
    abused   its   discretion   by   not   giving   Sadig’s   proposed   jury
    instruction.    United States v. Russell, 
    971 F.2d 1098
    , 1107 (4th
    Cir. 1992) (a district court’s “decision to give (or not to give)
    a jury instruction . . . [is] reviewed for abuse of discretion.”).
    A “district court should give the instruction that a criminal
    defendant requests as to any defense as long as the instruction: 1)
    has an evidentiary foundation; and 2) accurately states the law
    it was contrary to the law to procure such citizenship.
    J.A. 571-72.
    -10-
    applicable to the charged offense.”            United States v. Stotts, 
    113 F.3d 493
    ,   496   (4th   Cir.   1997).      Even    if   these   factors   are
    satisfied, failure to give the defendant’s instruction is not
    reversible error unless a defendant can show that the record as a
    whole demonstrates prejudice. See United States v. Ellis, 
    121 F.3d 908
    ,923 (4th Cir. 1997).
    Sadig contends that the district court abused its discretion
    by refusing to give his proposed instruction that “[t]he law does
    not require that someone being interviewed volunteer information to
    the INS.”      J.A. 455.    This argument is a red herring.         While Sadig
    is   technically     correct   that   no     legal    requirement   compels     an
    applicant to volunteer information during an interview, the law
    does require an applicant to remain eligible for naturalization up
    until the date he is administered the oath of allegiance. Further,
    the burden is on the applicant to prove such eligibility.               Berenyi
    v. Dist. Dir., INS, 
    385 U.S. 630
    , 637 (1967);               
    8 C.F.R. § 316.2
     (b)
    (“The    applicant    shall    bear   the    burden    of   establishing   by   a
    preponderance of the evidence that he or she meets all of the
    requirements for naturalization[.]”); 
    8 C.F.R. § 316.10
    (a)(1) (“An
    applicant for naturalization bears the burden of demonstrating that
    . . . he or she has been and continues to be a person of good moral
    character.      This includes the period between the examination and
    the administration of the oath of allegiance.”).
    -11-
    Moreover, the N-400 form and the interview are the process
    through which an applicant proves eligibility.             The form itself
    requires that all information be true as of the date of the
    interview and obligates the applicant to sign an oath to that
    effect.    The applicant imposes a requirement on himself to be
    forthcoming    by   swearing   “under   penalty    of   perjury”   that   the
    information in the application is true as of the date of the
    interview.     See J.A. 242.    Even if the applicant does not have a
    generalized duty to volunteer information, the oath at the end of
    the application specifically and absolutely requires that the
    answers   be   true   and   correct.      Read   together,   the   form   and
    regulations required Sadig to respond in any manner necessary,
    including volunteering information, to ensure that the statements
    in the N-400 were accurate.
    A jury instruction that the applicant does not have a duty to
    volunteer information would fly in the face of the affirmative
    obligation to prove his eligibility by answering the questions on
    the N-400 form truthfully, and would be at best misleading and at
    worst an inaccurate statement of the law.          The district court did
    not abuse its discretion in refusing to give such an instruction,
    and it was well within the province of the jury to decide that
    Sadig’s failure to disclose the charges against him constituted the
    knowing procurement of citizenship contrary to law.
    -12-
    Even if Sadig could have shown that the court abused its
    discretion, he did not demonstrate that the failure to give his
    requested instruction, in light of the record as a whole, was
    prejudicial error.     See Ellis, 121 F.3d at 923..            To find such an
    error, we would have to conclude that the evidence was insufficient
    to support a finding that by failing to disclose the charges, Sadig
    knowingly procured citizenship contrary to law.               Cf United States
    v. Tipton, 
    90 F.3d 861
    , 883 (4th Cir. 1996).                  For the reasons
    stated above, we cannot reach such a conclusion.
    Although Sadig specifically challenged the failure to give his
    proffered jury instruction and acknowledged at oral argument that
    if we disagree we can properly affirm the district court, out of an
    abundance of caution we will briefly address the question of
    whether the court’s instruction as to Count Three fairly stated the
    controlling law.
    III.
    We review de novo the legal question of whether a court has
    properly instructed the jury on the elements of an offense. United
    States v. Rahman, 
    83 F.3d 89
    , 92 (4th Cir. 1996).              With respect to
    the   adequacy   of   the   instructions,      this   court    “accord[s]   the
    district court much discretion and will not reverse provided that
    the   instructions,    taken    as   a      whole,    adequately   state    the
    controlling law.”      Teague v. Bakker, 
    35 F.3d 978
    , 985 (4th Cir.
    -13-
    1994); see also United States v. Cobb, 
    905 F.2d 784
    , 788-89 (4th
    Cir. 1990).
    Section 1425(a) criminalizes the conduct of any person who
    “knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to law, the
    naturalization of any person, or documentary or other evidence of
    naturalization or of citizenship.”             
    18 U.S.C. § 1425
    (a).        As noted
    above, the district court instructed the jury that they could only
    convict Sadig of this offense if they found (1) that Sadig procured
    or attempted to procure citizenship, (2) that it was contrary to
    the law to procure such citizenship, and (3) that Sadig knew it was
    contrary to the law to procure such citizenship.
    Sadig admits, as indeed he must, that the district court’s
    instruction          accurately   tracked   the    language   of    the   statute.
    Nonetheless, for reasons that parallel those in support of his
    proffered instructions, Sadig maintains that the jury instruction
    did not fairly and adequately state controlling law.                 According to
    Sadig, Cross’s testimony and the government’s closing argument left
    the jury with an improper understanding of the law: that there was
    a     “legal    requirement       imposed   on     citizenship     applicants   to
    voluntarily update their application when there is a change as to
    one     of     the    questions     asked   when    they   originally       apply.”
    Appellant’s Br. at 13.            Therefore, Sadig contends that          Cross and
    the government misstated the law and the court erred in not
    clarifying their misstatements in the jury instructions.
    -14-
    This argument must also fail.             Cross’s testimony and the
    government’s closing arguments were not misstatements of the law,
    rather they were accurate reflections of the requirements of the N-
    400 form.      Cross only testified within the scope of his expertise
    as to INS procedures and the requirements of its application.                        He
    acknowledged that nothing in the regulations or the adjudicator’s
    field manual states that an applicant has a duty to voluntarily
    update his application and then simply reiterated the affirmative
    obligations imposed by the form and the regulations. To the extent
    that   Cross    testified      as   to   what   the    law   is,   it    is    not    a
    misstatement that an applicant must remain eligible up until the
    time he takes his oath.         See Berenyi, 385 U.S. at 637.            As we have
    already explained, any instruction to the contrary would simply be
    incorrect.      Similarly, the government’s closing argument merely
    enforced    what    was   in    fact     a   correct    statement       as    to   the
    requirements of the application that the information therein be
    true and correct under penalty of perjury.                   Therefore we must
    disagree with Sadig’s contention that the testimony left the jury
    with an incorrect understanding of the law that the district court
    needed to clarify.
    IV.
    Because we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in
    denying to give Sadig’s proposed jury instruction, and because we
    -15-
    further   find   that   the   district   court   did   not   err     in   its
    instruction, the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    -16-