Willie Jackson v. Doctor Donald Sampson , 536 F. App'x 356 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6293
WILLIE J. JACKSON,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
DOCTOR DONALD SAMPSON; DOCTOR STEEN; WARDEN STEVENSON,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District
Judge. (6:12-cv-00231-TLW)
Submitted: July 16, 2013 Decided: July 30, 2013
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Willie J. Jackson, Appellant Pro Se. Tracy S. Dubey, James E.
Parham, Jr., JAMES E. PARHAM JR. LAW OFFICE, Irmo, South
Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Willie Jackson, a South Carolina inmate, appeals the
district court order granting summary judgment in favor of
Defendants on Jackson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) action. Jackson
alleged that Defendants—medical staff and the warden of the
correctional institution where he is housed—were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs and violated equal
protection by delaying and ultimately denying requested
treatment for his diagnosed disease. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
On appeal, Jackson primarily asserts that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment on his deliberate
indifference claim. He alleges that the court improperly
applied the summary judgment standard and failed to recognize
genuine issues of material fact regarding Defendants’ knowing
denial of treatment and failure to follow institutional policies
mandating additional treatment.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. PBM Prods.,
LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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56(a). When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and
supported, the non-moving party may not rely merely on
allegations but must respond with competent evidence showing a
genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Thompson v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002).
“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does
a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the non-moving
party’s] case.” Thompson, 312 F.3d at 649 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from
acting with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious
medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
To establish deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege both
that he experienced a deprivation that was “objectively
sufficiently serious” and “that subjectively the officials acted
with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” De’Lonta v.
Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks, alteration, and emphasis omitted). Negligence or medical
malpractice will not establish a sufficiently culpable state of
mind. Id. at 634; Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir.
1999). Instead, a constitutional violation does not occur
unless the medical provider’s actions were “so grossly
incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience
or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v.
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Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on
other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
An inmate’s mere disagreement with the course of treatment
provided by medical officers will not support a valid Eighth
Amendment claim. Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th
Cir. 1975).
Viewed in the light most favorable to Jackson, the
record creates no genuine issue of material fact to support his
deliberate indifference claim. There is simply no evidence in
the record that Jackson was denied necessary treatment or that
any delay in treatment was the result of deliberate indifference
by Defendants. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06 (“[A]n
inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be
said to constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain’ or to be ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’”).
Jackson’s dispute with Defendants’ decision not to authorize the
particular treatment program he requested, and the subsequent
course of monitoring he received, amounts to a disagreement with
his course of treatment that is not cognizable under the Eighth
Amendment. Moreover, prison officials’ failure to follow
internal prison policies are not actionable under § 1983 unless
the alleged breach of policy rises to the level of a
constitutional violation. See Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427,
430 (8th Cir. 1997). Therefore, any failure by prison officials
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to follow internal correctional policies is insufficient,
without more, to support Jackson’s claim.
Jackson also argues that the court erred in granting
summary judgment on his equal protection claim, as an affidavit
Jackson provided to the court was sufficient to support his
claim that he was treated differently from similarly situated
prisoners. “To succeed on an equal protection claim, a
plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated
differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and
that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or
purposeful discrimination.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d
648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001). We conclude that the affidavit upon
which Jackson relies was insufficient to support a finding that
he was denied treatment from others similarly situated or that
any difference in treatment was due to purposeful discrimination
by Defendants.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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